

The History Teacher's Magazine

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

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THE STUDY OF THE GREAT WAR

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The Magazine in 1918

THE WAR SUPPLEMENTS.

In this issue appears the first of a series of War Supplements, designed to present to history teachers helpful material concerning the war. Through the co-operation of the National Board for Historical Service and the Committee on Public Information, the MAGAZINE is enabled to present to its readers these supplements, containing matter not readily accessible elsewhere. It is believed that the content of these supplements will aid teachers (1) in adequately presenting the facts of the war; (2) in teaching the geography of the war; (3) in referring students and inquirers to the best literature on the war; and (4) in using authentic illustrative material upon certain phases of the war.

SYLLABUS OF THE WAR.

The excellent and detailed syllabus of the war, prepared by Professor S. B. Harding, which appears in this number, will be the first of these reprints. Copies of it may be obtained from the publishers. It is hoped that this syllabus will become the basis of instruction in the war. Despite the great amount of writing which has appeared upon the war, it is still true that many Americans have a vague conception of the historic background of the war, and an equally vague idea of the issues now at stake. A careful study based on the syllabus will tend to create an intelligent public sentiment upon the causes, the events and the possible outcome of the war. It has been impossible to include the detailed reading references for each chapter of the Syllabus. These will be published in the MAGAZINE for February, and have been inserted in the Reprints (price, 20 cents each).

WAR REPRINTS.

It is now proposed by the publishers of the MAGAZINE to issue the War Supplements in the form of inexpensive reprints. This will make it possible to use the supplements as a basis for class instruction, or to distribute them to reading classes, women's clubs and other organizations engaged in the study of the war.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE WAR.

Many questions concerning the war are being asked by teachers, lecturers and others interested in the course of present events. It has heretofore been difficult to obtain scholarly replies to such requests for information. Beginning with this issue, the National Board for Historical Service will conduct a department in the MAGAZINE devoted to answers to proper inquiries on the war. A number of the best-trained scholars in the country will co-operate in the work of this department. If our readers have any problems of fact, inference or method they are invited to call for assistance upon this body of experts. Queries may be addressed to the secretary of the board, Mr. W. G. Leland, 1183 Woodward Building, Washington, D. C., or to the Editor of the MAGAZINE.

REGULAR FEATURES OF THE MAGAZINE.

The editors of the MAGAZINE realize that instruction in history must continue through the war, and that the emphasis on history may well be augmented as a result of the present interest in the subject. Accordingly, there will be no diminution in the space and attention given to general historical articles, to those upon practical class aids and to the news items and bibliographical notes. The four series of articles bearing upon the relation of the war to the four regular high school courses will be continued.

CHANGE IN NUMBER AND DATES OF ISSUE.

The issues of the present volume (IX) will appear monthly, except in July, August and September. The issue for September has previously been published about the fifteenth of that month, owing to the frequent changes of address during the summer and the absence of subscribers from their permanent addresses. This has brought the September and October issues so close together that they could not be fully used by many readers. Under the new arrangement the September issue will be omitted, and the numbers will be brought out on the twentieth of the month preceding the date of issue. There will be no reduction in the amount of material presented to the subscribers under this plan; indeed, the present plans provide for a large increase of matter and pages through the War Supplements, which will appear monthly as a regular part of the MAGAZINE. Any subscriber who desires a refund of one-tenth of his payment where the subscription runs through next September will gladly be given the amount.

America's Debt to England¹

BY THE HONORABLE LUCIUS B. SWIFT, OF INDIANAPOLIS.

In the midst of the mighty events which have shaken the world for nearly three years, nowhere has the standard of liberty been upheld with stronger arm than here in Indiana University.

I am glad to say to the young men and young women of this graduating class and to all here present that we are standing upon the threshold of a future which is not uncertain, for the battle of liberty will be won.

I shall spend the half-hour in calling your attention to the question why we were slow in comprehending the meaning of this war and in taking our place in the ranks of the English-speaking race in defense of the freedom of the world.

The human aspect of this country has changed from what it was in 1914 and for many months following the outbreak of the war. The voice of the peace-at-any-price advocates headed by Mr. Bryan is silent. Yet up to a recent date he had a following made up of men and women who sang, "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier," and who fought hard to make us, by staying at home ourselves and by keeping our ships at home, submit to the domination of the Kaiser now instead of waiting for his final victory. They were indifferent to the fate of liberty in the world and they daily gave thanks that we were not at war; though to keep out of the risk of war we had suffered national shame and humiliation. They seemed dead to patriotism; they seemed ready to give up self-government and pass under the yoke of any conqueror who came provided they might live their own limp existence unharmed. Nothing but a course under a conqueror, of slow, devilish torture such as triumphant German efficiency has inflicted upon the people of Belgium for nearly three years, will make them believe that liberty is worth fighting for. I am thankful that I was born under different stars and have the hallowed recollection of a different mother. We have not heard the last of them. Peace at any price has existed in all ages. It has always been a refuge for traitors, and, while it would be far from true to say that every peace-at-any-price man is a traitor, it is true that every traitor in America to-day is a peace-at-any-price man.

Then we had various groups of socialists who apparently had never heard of Anglo-Saxon principles and who thought that the only need of the world was what they called economic liberty. They preached that there should be no such thing as patriotism, and some of them notified the country that they would not serve in any war. To-day they stand at the parting of the ways.

We had also a multitude of men busy with money-making who wanted to squeeze through and preserve their gains, and they ignored the war and passed by on the other side, not heeding the call of liberty. They were silent then and they are silent now, but in greatly diminished numbers.

We had labor bodies that, with seemingly unsurpassed selfishness, thought that whatever the crisis of civil liberty, the demands and laws of labor came first. They were like the labor bodies in England at the beginning of the war. But in England a revolution took place; patriotism resumed its own and labor with noble sacrifice marched in step with all Britain. To-day in America all is changed. On every hand workingmen are raising the Stars and Stripes, and the most powerful labor bodies declare in noble words their devotion to the principles upon which this government is founded.

We had a class larger than all of the other classes together made up of those moved by a passive dislike of England, and who, as a rule, looked on with indifference at whatever might happen to her in this war. They had no English-speaking race patriotism. That this feeling was widespread is plain from the fact that outside of leading magazines and newspapers—in fact, in the bulk of public prints read by the American people—there rarely appeared generous and unstinted praise of England.

There is no doubt that in the course of a century, at critical moments, the British government was not sympathetic. When I was discharged from the Union army in June, 1865, I never expected to forgive England for sympathizing with the South. But later I came to remember that Lancashire starved without complaint when we cut off the cotton supply. I read the words of John Bright, that when in our Civil War British officials "were hostile or coldly neutral the British people clung to freedom with an unfaltering trust." I came to understand that both in the Civil War and in the Revolution the English government for the moment was not the English people. I came to learn of the battles which the English people had fought for the development and establishment of Anglo-Saxon rights and of the great reward of their victories which we had reaped, and which I had not before learned from lack of proper teaching in the schools. And I also learned how finally in the Spanish War her diplomacy kept at bay the diplomacy of Germany; and at last with the frankest and most open good-will, without request, she ranged her ships and guns with ours in Manila Bay. Is not the score at least balanced? A great and increasing number of Americans to-day answer that it is.

The greatest apparent change of all has taken place among Americans of German birth or descent. Tak-

¹ Delivered as the commencement address at the eighty-eighth commencement of Indiana University, June 13, 1917.

ing them the country over, when the Kaiser drew the sword they seemed to rise as one man to back him up. Led by professors, German and American, they sounded the praises of Kaiser-Germanism and descendants of '48'ers joined in. They believed that the war would be over in a few months and that the Kaiser would win, and they were glad. They urged the superior merit of the German cause on every hand; they promoted the sale of German bonds; to objections to autocracy they pointed out its efficiency; and they had no criticism to make of the invasion of Belgium. They were passionate and imperious, and displayed a zeal which showed that they believed in the German government. In fact, they wanted the Kaiser to win, and they took no thought of the effect upon Anglo-Saxon ideals of liberty. Of course there were those who opposed all this, but with rare exceptions they kept silent. To-day Americans generally of German birth or descent declare themselves united behind the Stars and Stripes against the Kaiser. I shall not attempt to state what has brought about this change. If it is simply the performance of a duty required by law while retaining every one of their former opinions, then their hearts are not yet right. If they agree with the president of the German-American Alliance of Ohio who says that all German-Americans are with America against Germany, but that they hope for the defeat of the Allies, of whom America is one, then they are not yet Americans. But if the Kaiser's ruthlessness, if such acts as the sinking of the "Lusitania," the murder of Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt, the enslavement of over 150,000 Belgians, the desolation of France, the brazen hoisting of the black flag of the pirate, and the frightful display by the German General Staff of will and power to do these things in the face of civilization have convinced German-Americans that civilization cannot remain half democracy and half autocracy and that democracy is the only promise of a peaceful world, and if they have planted themselves upon President Wilson's war message which embodies the whole of freedom, and if they have accepted every word of it, then they are Americans.

In 1847 Bismarck, a Prussian junker, stood up in the Prussian Assembly and defined Prussian autocracy in these words:

"Whereas, it is not the people but the grace of God which has bestowed on the Prussian monarchs the possession of a practically absolute crown, part of the rights of which they have voluntarily lent to the people."

This is a model definition of absolute government. It braced up the Hohenzollern of that time to crush the Revolution of 1848. It roused the ambition which worked its will upon Denmark, upon Austria, upon France. It was Bismarck's guide when he sat at Versailles and drew up the imperial German constitution. When the German government is held up to us as a model, it is Bismarck's definition of autocracy which is presented to us. Not out of the heart of any people, but only out of the heart of an absolute ruler have

come murder by submarines and desolated Belgium and northern France and Poland. When we contemplate the success of the Kaiser in this war we contemplate the domination of the world by a ruler who owns all the rights and who, at will, lends part of those rights to the people. The whole world now sees its danger writ large. Why did we not see it in America in August, 1914?

Although we took little notice of them, we had in America at the beginning of the war a body of Anglo-Saxon rights such as representative government, trial by jury, no taxation without representation, free speech, a free press, habeas corpus, the right of petition, the right of protest, the right of public assembly, and many other rights which make a people free. The beginning of the growth of this body of rights was 1,500 years ago at the beginning of the Dark Ages, and all through the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages and in modern times down to our abolition of slavery those rights have been held and created and added to by the English-speaking race. They did not come like summer breezes. Most of them came in storm and stress. The autocrat is always and everywhere. He did his best to master the English-speaking race and he failed. For many centuries Anglo-Saxon skies resounded with combat for liberty.

Lance and torch and tumult, steel and gray goose wing.
Wrenched it, inch and ell and all, slowly from the king.

The German in Germany learned nothing of this. During all those centuries, liberty was dumb in Germany; the only sound was the sound of the glory of a ruler passing by. The German who lands upon the shores of America to-day finds here that liberty the germ of which his ancestors in the German forests had and lost and which the Angles, the Saxons, and the Jutes carried into England and handed down to us. That German ought to cry out:

"At last I am home again! I here enjoy the full growth of that liberty which was lost in Germany, but which the English-speaking race with its strong arm has preserved for all the modern world!"

No other race has such a record. Other races have their own reasons for pride, but this record is the peculiar and the crowning glory of the English-speaking race.

When the shock of this war came, France, who at a vital moment helped us to gain our independence and who now stands among the foremost of civilized democracies, made head against it. With her was England, absolutely controlled by the will of her people and who had built for us most of the foundations of the well-ordered liberty and self-government we now enjoy. From her had spread over the world those powerful guarantors of freedom, Anglo-Saxon rights.

The first question which ought to have come into the mind of America was, "What if the Kaiser should win?" Standing at the head of a victorious army, his treasury bursting with war indemnities, with France bled white as he promised and England reduced to the condition of Holland, where will be left

a battleground for liberty except here in America, and who will be left to fight that battle except America alone? The answer to these questions should have been that the Allies were not only fighting the battle of democracy against absolutism, but that they were fighting our battle, and that not only patriotism but self-interest called upon us to throw in our whole strength upon their side.

I shall not go over with recrimination the long period which elapsed before we took our stand against this enemy of mankind. My thankfulness is too great that at last my country is to suffer and sacrifice in the cause of the liberty of the world and not leave the battle to be won by others while we only gather in the profits of the struggle.

When the mighty issue of this war loomed up before us, what had been the failure on our part which not only raised up the multitude of slackers in the defense of liberty composed of the classes I have named, but made the whole country so slow in comprehending the danger to its institutions? There is only one answer. We have never so much as named the foundations of their liberty to American youth. Much less have we told them the story of the storms which for centuries raged around the building of those foundations; nor of the blood and sacrifice and suffering which went into the construction; and we have never mentioned the subject to immigrant citizens. Autocratic governments impress upon their subjects the virtues of emperors, kings, and princes to cement allegiance. We do not take the trouble to bring to American citizens the knowledge of the history of the rights which make them free. If we did it would become a religion arousing all Americans at any sign of danger.

If you ask the inhabitants of America what are the foundations of the liberty they enjoy, a great majority will name the American Revolution only. For this situation I blame the schools and particularly the grades below the high school, because more than three-fourths of American youth never reach the high school. For more than a century we have brought up American children to hate England, and this has led us to slur over the history of those foundations of our liberty which rest upon English soil.

For more than a century we have in effect taught each generation of children that Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill were the beginning of all liberty; and after hearing us talk our immigrant citizens have come to the same conclusion.

Let me say at once that whatever we have taught, the importance of the Revolution itself will never diminish. The fathers fought for the rights of Englishmen and won. They not only secured to us imperishable blessings, but they freed every English colony from a selfish colonial policy; and their action inspired the people of the civilized world to examine into their own rights. This examination caused a realization of wrongs which set the world ablaze, first in the French Revolution, and again in the continental uprisings in 1848—the one leading by painful steps

to the self-governed France of to-day, the others done to death by the bayonets of autocracy.

Our Revolution and our abolition of slavery were indeed major foundations of American liberty, and they are America's noble contribution to the list. But other battles had been fought and won, in the centuries past, which educated and inspired our fathers and made them master-builders to build these two American foundations. The results of those other victories lie in the midst of us and yet unseen; generations come and go in happiness because of

Ancient right unnoticed as the breath we draw.

My time permits only the briefest examples to show what I mean.

Americans are as familiar with elections as with the alphabet. They see the representatives of the people, chosen in various ways, go to their duties in every direction from township officers to the President and Congress; from the justice of the peace to the supreme court of the United States. We do not stop to consider that this representative government is vital to American liberty and that without it we should pass under the yoke of arbitrary rule. Knowledge of its origin and history can alone make us comprehend our debt. No youth should leave school without knowing that our Anglo-Saxon forefathers carried representative government from the forests of Germany into England; how it flourished in the hundred-moot, the shire-moot, and the folk-moot; how all government was laid prostrate for the moment by William the Conqueror; how starting again with the Great Council of the Norman kings, the people of England slowly against their kings built up a more and more representative government, which developed into the English Parliament and the American Congress of to-day; how the people of England drove to the block and to exile their kings who would rule in defiance of their laws and without the representatives of the people in Parliament assembled; and finally how our English fathers came and planted representative government upon the shores of America; and how, ever since, those who had known only the hand of a ruler have come here and have been permitted to enjoy the ancient Anglo-Saxon right of joining in the choice of representatives of the people and so have become rulers themselves.

Make the facts such as the story of the common law, of trial by jury, of habeas corpus, of the mighty drama of Magna Charta, as familiar as the stories of Washington, and we shall have an American citizenship proud of the deeds of the English-speaking race and rejecting with scorn any Kultur which does not embrace for everyone the right of walking abroad a free man.

Americans do know that we fought the American Revolution with "no taxation without representation" as our leading war-cry; but they never think of the struggle of the English people through many centuries to settle it that they should not be taxed except by law which they had a hand in making. Yet with-

out the example of that fight before them our Revolutionary fathers would never have thought of raising objection to the Stamp Act and the Tea Tax. Americans do not realize that when five hundred years after the Conqueror, Henry VIII in 1525 without law levied a tax of one-tenth of every man's substance and when the people rich and poor cursed the king's minister, Cardinal Wolsey, as "the subverter of their laws and liberties" and rose in insurrection, and when Henry, bulldog as he was, had to back down and pay back, the English people were in the midst of a battle which never ended until Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown.

And all through the centuries the English people fought taxation without representation whether in the form of the forced voluntary contribution, or the forced loan or tonnage and poundage or ship money or in whatever form, and although multitudes were ironed and suffered imprisonment for refusing, yet we find the people always facing the king with the declaration that they cannot be legally taxed without their own consent and long before the American Revolution they had won the victory.

George III and his packed and corrupted Parliament which did not represent the people proposed to tax America. Our fathers, mindful of the centuries-old struggle which the English people had won, answered the proposal to tax them with a demand for the rights which Englishmen enjoyed in England; and for those rights they fought. And from whatever country our fathers came that was the fight. Lafayette and Steuben and Pulaski did not fight for the rights of the French in France, nor for the rights of the Germans in Germany, nor for the rights of the Poles in Poland, but they fought for the rights which Englishmen had won for themselves in England and which as part of the English Empire were our heritage, along with the common law, trial by jury, and habeas corpus. And this was Washington's opinion. "American freedom," he said, "is at stake; it seems highly necessary that something should be done to avert the stroke and maintain the liberty which we have derived from our ancestors."

In the New York farmhouse in which I was born, great beams hewn from forest trees outlined the foundation; these were the sills. Other hewn timbers extended across from side to side, a few inches apart; those were the sleepers. This massive foundation, which a hundred years have not shaken, is all unseen, unless you go into the cellar. American children have never been taken into the cellar of their political history where they might see the sills and the sleepers which are the foundation of the marvelous and well-ordered liberty which they enjoy to-day. If they had been, the first gun of this war would have warned a united people of the danger to democracy. It is time to begin; and when the children ask who built these foundations of free speech, free press, right of petition, trial by jury, and all the rest, with the two American exceptions, there can be only one answer—England.

And when they ask, what of England to-day, they will have to be told that when George III was trying to conquer us, the English people, led by Chatham and Burke and Fox, were struggling for the same ideals we were fighting for; and that what we won by the sword they won against the same enemy by years of political struggle, until England stands to-day the government most responsive to the will of the people. And when they ask what race has preserved these foundations and spread civil liberty over the world, the answer will have to be—the English-speaking race.

In teaching history it is essential to be truthful for truth's sake; but it is equally essential that all native-born Americans and all immigrant citizens realize the struggle and the sacrifices of the hundreds of years consumed in building up the Anglo-Saxon foundations of liberty upon which the government of civilized democracy rests to-day. Knowing its history they will recognize the vast heritage of civil liberty which they here enjoy; and that that heritage was not built up by America alone, but is the common work of the English-speaking race. They will feel in their inmost souls that democratic government is a pearl without price, and will view with the deepest anxiety and place before everything else the danger of its being shaken or checked in the world, and with their backs to the wall will resist every kind of encroachment upon it.

And now the call has come. Let no one be persuaded that there will be a greater issue for America in some later war with some other nation. The issue of freedom for the world is here and must be settled on this battlefield.

HISTORICAL REVISIONS.

Under the title of "Historical Revisions" the editors of "History" (London), have inaugurated a department in which will be treated historical subjects, which modern research has shown to be most widely misunderstood, with a view to bringing the teaching of history in schools more closely in touch with historical scholarship. In the number for October, 1917, Prof. A. F. Pollard treats of the misconceptions concerning Magna Charta. Professor Pollard points out, first, that Magna Charta was not signed by King John or anyone else, but actually was sealed. The second point is that the Magna Charta is not and never has been the law of the land save for a few weeks before its repudiation by King John. Third, an effort is made to show the great difference between the word liberty of the present time and the liberties as expressed in the Great Charter. Another comprehensive error which the writer combats is the idea that the Charter asserted the principle "no taxation without representation," and lastly the legend that Magna Charta created or secured trial by jury is overthrown. The editors of "History" are to be congratulated for the introduction of a novel and valuable feature in their magazine.

The War and the Teaching of History

BY HOWARD C. HILL, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO HIGH SCHOOL

"Every cloud has a silver lining," runs the old adage. The Great War is no exception to the rule. Along with its waste of treasure, its destruction of property, its loss of life, its moral tragedies, there have been certain beneficent results. The liquor traffic has been lessened or abolished, effectiveness in production has been stimulated, the social view-point has been magnified, and the Russian revolution is taking place. When the rattle of the machine-guns has ceased and the men finally leave the battle-lines, this old world will be a better place to live in than it was before the conflict began.

Along with these beneficial aspects of the war, a minor result of especial concern to us teachers has been a marked growth of interest in history. Never before has it been so easy to make the study of the past virile, stimulating, significant. As in the days of old all roads led to Rome, so now all roads lead to history through the gateway of the Great War. How then can we make the most of our opportunity?

At the very outset, may I disclaim any particular originality for the ideas hereinafter presented. For the most part, they are but what many of us have been thinking, more or less consciously. Any merit they may possess lies in the fact that they are brought together and organized, I trust, in a convenient and suggestive way. You will not agree with all that I shall say, but no matter how great your dissent from particular points, I am confident there will be no disagreement with the spirit in which I have tackled the problem. For that spirit is a love of truth.

In the midst of war the laws may be silent, but truth should neither stutter nor be dumb. Yet at no time, I suppose, is the temptation to distort facts so great, nor yielded to so frequently, as in time of war. Indeed, the name of patriotism itself is then invoked to justify betrayal of truth.

Now it is commonplace to say that if history stands for anything it stands for truth. There are occasions, however, when it is well to emphasize commonplace things. The present is one of them. And, in my judgment, the history teacher who nowadays does not teach his pupils to discern between fact and opinion, between inference and conjecture, between truth and falsehood, is recreant to his trust. Never was there greater need and never was there greater opportunities to teach something of the nature of evidence and of the historian's method of separating truth from error than at the present time. Though the value of historical-mindedness has been emphasized for years, my observation forces me to the conclusion that rarely, if ever, is any systematic effort made to instill it in the pupils of the elementary or the high school, and, I was about to add, the normal school. In these institutions, for the most part, history is still taught

merely as a collection of facts, a body of information; its *process* side is almost wholly neglected.

In my judgment, the first way then in which the war should affect our teaching of history is by causing us to go back to bed rock and begin to emphasize the importance of evidence in establishing any conclusion.¹

To me, one of the tragedies of the war was the intellectual collapse of Germany. You all remember the amazement with which we read the astonishing communication entitled, "To the Civilized World," issued in the fall of 1914 by ninety-three of the "leaders of German learning and art." Without citing a figment of evidence for support and in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the ninety-three signed such statements as these:

"It is not true that we criminally violated the neutrality of Belgium."

"It is not true that our soldiers have attacked the life or property of a single Belgian citizen without the utmost provocation."

"It is not true that Louvain was destroyed by our troops in the blindness of rage."

"It is not true that our methods of warfare are contrary to international law."

Not only was no evidence offered to support these assertions, but, as all the world knows, there was a mass of evidence to refute them. Bethmann-Hollweg had openly acknowledged the criminal violation of Belgian neutrality and the consequent breach of international law. Such evidence must have been known to the signers. If not, the issuance of such a declaration, unsupported by any evidence, is in itself a confession not only of the moral bankruptcy of Germany, but of the mental suicide of her intellectual leaders. War passion had blinded them. And, in my opinion, not the least of the punishments of Germany, as a result of the war, will be the distrust, for decades to come, of the sincerity of German scholarship, at least where German interests are involved.

In striking contrast to the illustration just cited, was the document recently issued by our government entitled, "The War Message and Facts Behind It."² While it contains a few instances where affirmations are unsupported by citation of facts, on the whole such evidence is given and, as an *ex parte* publication, it is a most creditable document. It offers, in

¹ In this connection, see my forthcoming article, "History for History's Sake," in THE HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE.

² "The War Message and Facts Behind It." Annotated text of President Wilson's message, April 2, 1917. War Information Series, No. 1. Published by Committee on Public Information, Washington, D. C. An annotated edition of the President's "Flag Day" address has also been published by the government.

itself, an excellent tool, suitable for school purposes, to show concretely the difference between fact and opinion, between a supported conclusion and a mere assertion.

I trust I am not being misunderstood. I would not have us adopt a holier-than-thou attitude. Unfortunately, error is not entirely absent from our own land. From pulpit and platform, in magazine and in the press, occasionally come statements at variance with the facts. For example, an appeal issued in behalf of the late Liberty Loan by Secretary McAdoo begins with these words: "America never fought a war except for freedom."

Now is this true? Will the facts support the assertion? Was our war with Mexico "a war for freedom"? Were all our wars with the Indians "wars for freedom"? In our late conflict with the Filipinos, were we engaged in a war for liberty? Hardly, at least not in the present sense of the word. Not that these wars were necessarily unjustifiable. The Mexican war, most of the Indian wars, perhaps the Filipino encounter also, were fought on justifiable grounds, but not as "wars for freedom."

Illustrations similar to this statement of the Secretary of the Treasury could be cited from books, news items, addresses, and elsewhere, many of them much more flagrant than the one just mentioned. I believe we should correct some of these mis-statements in the class-room, and thereby, not only advance historical-mindedness, but promote the cause of truth.

We can also further the cause of truth by using the present situation to clear up certain long-standing misconceptions of other countries and of our past relations with these countries; misconceptions which have blackened many of our school histories and have vitiated much of our teaching, especially in the elementary schools.

Take England, for example. The fact that we have had two wars with her, together with the pernicious practice, still all too common, of using history as a vehicle for inculcating a spread-eagle, jingo type of patriotism, has led to perversions of historic truth. These perversions and misconceptions have resulted in such prejudice that even to-day, in some quarters, one hears apologies whenever reference is made to the fact that we are now fighting side by side with England.

Now is the time to correct these errors, and to destroy this prejudice by bringing out the truth concerning our great debt to England. Now is the time to emphasize the fact that this country had its origin in England; that it was from England that our language, our literature, our customs, our civilization, our liberties originally came. Though Scotchman and Irishman, Dutchman and Frenchman, Swede and German, came to this land in colonial days, each with his contribution to American life, it was but a matter of time until they all adopted English law, and, for the most part, English institutions. As Professor Sioussat has said, "An enlightening instance of this

process may be found in the trial of the German John Peter Zenger, in which the Dutch Rip van Dam had been involved, and in which a Scotch lawyer played a leading role—all in relation to the English law of libel."³

From England came free speech, free press, trial by jury, the great writ of personal liberty, freedom from large standing armies, and representative government. With few exceptions, the rights we value to-day more than life itself all had their origin not in France, or Spain, or Holland, or Denmark, or Italy, or Germany, but in England. It is well nowadays to emphasize the fact that, at the time of the Revolution, the English colonial policy, notwithstanding its narrowness, was the most liberal in all the world,⁴ and that, when we finally took up arms against the mother country, it was but to maintain "the rights of Englishmen;" rights Englishmen had won decades before, then threatened by a would-be despot, German king. Much of the popular prejudice and misconception of England will vanish, if we but bring out the truth about the causes of the American revolution, and, instead of picturing England as a cruel tyrant, explain something of the difficulty of her problem of imperial organization, of the political ambitions of George III, and of the sympathy and moral support given to America by many brilliant English statesmen.⁵ In fact, the political situation in England at the time of the Revolution is a good example of how a government may be distinct from a people.⁶ If this fact is brought out clearly, it will aid not only in a true interpretation of the Revolution, but it will help illuminate a perplexity some Americans have had about the validity of the distinction President Wilson has drawn between the Imperial German Government and the German people.

Better, for this purpose, however, is the distinction between government and people which existed in England in 1861. By making clear the political conditions in England at that time, not only will the President's statement be clarified, but the popular prejudice against England because of the unfriendly

³ HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE, October, 1917, page 260.

⁴ In this connection, a contrast between conditions in the English and the German colonies in the years preceding the present war will aid in a clear understanding of certain questions which are sure to arise during the peace negotiations.

⁵ How necessary a revision of our teaching of the American revolution is, appears vividly and conclusively in Charles Altschul's "The American Revolution in Our School Textbooks" (1917). Of fifty-three texts in use at the present time, only "six deal fully with the grievances of the colonists, give an account of general political conditions in England prior to the American revolution, and give credit to prominent Englishmen for the services they rendered the Americans." See page 21. See also Greene's "The American Revolution and the British Empire," HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE, November, 1917, page 292.

⁶ In 1760, out of a population of about 8,000,000, but 200,000 had the right to vote, and many of these were influenced by the corrupt methods used by George III to gain control of Parliament.

attitude of the British government during a portion of our Civil War will be lessened, if not removed.⁷ Unfriendly as the British government of that day was, we owe it a large debt; for, according to Rhodes, it alone "was the insurmountable obstacle to the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by France and other European nations."⁸

Let us no longer twist the lion's tail, but, on the contrary, let us promote the cause of truth and international friendship by bringing out the facts about the glorious little island to which we owe so much and with which we are now practically allied.⁹

In the second place, there is a veritable host of matters, connected with the war, which history illuminates and which illuminate history. The magnetic attraction of Oriental trade which caused Columbus to undertake his momentous voyage and which played such a large part in early exploration was one of the underlying factors which brought about the Great War—witness the *Drang nach Osten* and the Berlin-Bagdad railway. The European colonial rivalry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has its counterpart in the occupation and exploitation of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—another fundamental factor in causing the present world struggle. The development of federation in America involved problems somewhat similar to those now vexing modern statesmen who are trying to solve the question of world organization.

The events which caused us reluctantly to take up arms against Great Britain in 1812 have their startling parallel in the incidents of the three years which preceded our forced entrance into this war. In both cases we went to war to maintain principles of international law; though in the earlier instance, it must be admitted, the principles of international law were by no means so clear and definite, nor the violations so great, as in the present war.

The years immediately preceding the war of 1812 saw in the presidency a man who believed in the efficacy, as a preventative of war, of what was so ardently desired and so vociferously demanded by some Americans not a great while ago—an embargo. In the study of Jefferson's administration, it is illuminating to teach by extracts from Henry Adams' monumental history how the embargo worked and how it failed to keep us out of war.

As on the verge of the Civil War, there was a vigorous, but futile, effort to avoid the conflict by submitting the Crittenden Compromise to a vote of the people, so but a few months ago we saw a determined,

and unsuccessful, attempt to force the submission of the question of war to popular vote. As we had "Copperheads" then, so we have pro-Germans now. The Knights of the Golden Circle of the sixties are succeeded in 1917 by the People's Council of America.

Just as the blockade played a large part in the winning of the Civil War, so we believe it is playing a prominent part in the winning of this war. And, in this connection, it is well to point out that it was the United States which first developed, in a large way, the principle of the "continuous voyage;" that principle which England has followed in this war, and which, in the days before our entrance into the struggle, was so vigorously denounced in certain quarters in America. It is worth while, perhaps, to bring out clearly how American vessels in those days not only stopped neutral ships when bound for the neutral port of Matamoras, Mexico, but even interfered with British ships plying between British ports in England and the British port of Nassau in the Bahamas. The principle on which we then acted, namely, that trade which could not legally be carried on directly could not be carried on indirectly, was not seriously questioned then, and, so far as I am aware, has never been challenged since by any nation prior to the opening of the present war.

Striking similarities and contrasts between the events of recent months and earlier incidents in our history constantly present themselves: Washington's treatment of Genet, and Wilson's dismissal of Dumba; the unpreparedness of the country in 1812 and conditions in the spring of 1917; the financing of our other wars and the methods employed in this war; the raising of troops in former times and the system in operation now; the conduct of military evolutions in the past and the methods in vogue to-day;¹⁰ the Confederate cruiser warfare and the present German submarine campaign; the war powers of President Lincoln and the present powers of President Wilson. These and many other illustrations, which might be cited, are pregnant with meaning and interest for the student of American history.

In the third place, I believe it is our duty to teach why we are at war. Does it not seem foolish to take the time to explain why we went to war in 1812, or 1861, and keep silent on our motives in 1917? And such instruction is needed. Even some adults say they don't know. Some declare the "war was instigated by the predatory capitalists." President Wilson says we went to war to make the world safe for democracy. Whatever the truth, it should be taught by teachers of history.

"A capitalistic war"? If so, one caused by and fought for the capitalists. Now whatever may have been the case abroad, to argue that American capitalists wanted and caused our entrance into the struggle is to argue that American capitalists do not know their own interests. The most amateur financier can see that American capitalists had everything to gain

⁷ In 1860, out of an adult male population of about 5,000,000, only about 1,000,000 were allowed to vote. Concerning this matter, see Professor McLaughlin's pamphlet, "From Spectator to Participant," also published in HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE, June, 1917.

⁸ Rhodes, "United States," IV, 388; incorrectly quoted by West, "American History and Government," 614, note.

⁹ See Swift's "America's Debt to England," in the Indiana University Alumni Quarterly, July, 1917. Printed elsewhere in this number of the MAGAZINE.

¹⁰ Violette, "Renaissance in Military History," HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE, October, 1917.

by staying out of the war. Were they not floating profitable loans, and selling munitions, and heaping up enormous fortunes? Were their taxes not light? Were they not shrewd enough to see that, if America entered the war, profits would shrink and taxes would rise, just as profits had shrunk and taxes had risen in all the belligerent countries? Could they not see that, in case we entered the war, there was even danger that the government might set prices, and limit profits, and commandeer plants? To argue otherwise, is to maintain that, while the ox may know his owner and the ass his master's crib, Wall Street does not know the source of profits.

But—we are asked—what about the bonds of the Allies which Wall Street had purchased? If the Allies were defeated—and defeat was sure if we stayed out (one cannot but wonder if the wish was not father to the thought)—then all Wall Street's treasure would be lost. The United States must, therefore, enter the war to save Morgan's investments. As if defeat of the Allies—in case it came—spelled repudiation of their financial obligations. Did Austria repudiate in 1866 after being conquered by Prussia? Did France repudiate in 1871 after being crushed by Germany? Did Russia repudiate in 1906 after being defeated by Japan? Is there one case in all modern history where an established government ever repudiated its bonds?

"Wall Street caused the war"? Did Wall Street declare treaties scraps of paper? Or sink the "Lusitania"? Or enslave Belgium? Or offer California to Japan and Texas to Mexico? Did "the predatory capitalists of the United States" blow up munition plants? Or advocate the sinking of ships without leaving a trace? Were the Kaiser, Von Tirpitz, Bethmann-Hollweg, Hindenburg, and the rest of the Potsdam crowd in the employ of Wall Street? If this is "a predatory capitalistic war," in the name of truth, let us have a scrap of evidence to support the charge.

What the initial causes of this war were, need not especially concern us here. So far at least as the United States is concerned, it was made in Germany—witness the evidence in the annotated copy of the President's war message. It would be hard to prove that the struggle originated as a war for democracy, when we remember that, at the beginning, autocratic Russia was one of the Allies. However that may be, is not now a matter of great concern. As wars develop, the issues involved frequently change. In 1775, we fought for "the rights of Englishmen;" in 1776, we were fighting for independence. In 1861, we fought to save the Union; a year later, we were fighting to end slavery. And so to-day, whatever we may believe the initial causes of the present conflict were, we should make clear to our pupils the great outstanding fact that, on the whole, the autocratic governments are now on the one side and the democratic governments on the other. So far as most of us can see, one or the other must go; for, to paraphrase Lincoln's classic statement, this world cannot

endure permanently half autocratic and half democratic. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of autocracy will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where it will be ultimately extinguished; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall exist in all the countries of the world.

To-day we are engaged in a world war to determine which is to survive—autocracy or democracy. If we take up the gage of battle for the reasons and in the spirit suggested by President Wilson, instead of the struggle being, as the Socialists declared at St. Louis last spring, "the most unjustifiable war in all modern history,"¹¹ it will prove to be the most holy and the most unselfish war we ever waged. And it is up to us, as teachers of history, to do our part in holding public opinion true to the President's ideal, and to explain the causes and issues which justified our entrance into the war.

Finally, it is our privilege to show our pupils that the war is being fought for them. As one hundred and forty years ago our ancestors won the independence we now enjoy; as our fathers fought to preserve the Union in which we live; so now men die in France to preserve for them, for us, for coming generations, a heritage of liberty, justice, humanity, democracy.

It is a solemn thing nowadays to teach history to the young.¹²

CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES ON THE TEACHING OF HISTORY.

LISTED BY W. L. HALL, SUBLIBRARIAN IN HISTORY, NEW YORK STATE LIBRARY.

Fisher, H. A. L. [A letter to the historical association.] *History* (London). New series, II (July, 1917), 65-66.

Howard, Miss M. A. Some problems of history teaching in girls' secondary day schools. *History* (London). New series, II (July, 1917), 96-106.

Opportunities for history teachers. The new educational foundations, XXIX (November, 1917), 163-164.

Outline of work in history. *Atlantic Educational Journal*, XIII (November, 1917), 132-139.

Smith, Geo. W., and Lentz, E. G. United States history—Eighth year. Slavery in the United States—Secession. *School news and practical educator*, XXXI (December, 1917), 165-167.

The teaching of history.—I. In preparatory schools by C. Vaughn Wilkes. II. In elementary schools by Jos. A. White. *History* (London). New series, II (October, 1917), 144-158.

Tryon, R. M. A brief review of the current literature relating to history and the teaching of history in junior and senior high schools. *The school review*, XXV (November, 1917), 684-689.

The series of articles on Russia begun in the December "Century" by Professor E. A. Ross, now in that country, form the best contributions to our knowledge of the situation there which have yet appeared.

¹¹ Order of words reversed. See platform in "International Socialist Review," Vol. 17, 671 (April 7, 1917).

¹² Paper read before the History Section of the Wisconsin History Teachers' Association, Milwaukee, Wis., November 1, 1917.

Timely Suggestions for Secondary School History

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF FOUR COMMITTEES OF HISTORIANS IN CO-OPERATION WITH
THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE.

I. The Study of the Roman Republic To-day

BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM STEARNS DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

The study of the Roman Republic possibly presents more lessons of inspiration or warning to Americans in these present days of stress than does any other epoch in antiquity. Athens and Sparta, with all their achievements, were, after all, very small states; in the Oriental monarchies our interest must often be scientific rather than personal; but the Roman Republic wrestled with and conquered, or was conquered, by very many of the problems that have harassed the United States. Before its story was ended it had come to embrace a vast dominion, which in area and population can be roughly compared to our own republic of the twentieth century.

Just as our history begins with the little colonies at Jamestown and Plymouth, then spread constantly its field of action until California becomes an American State and Hawaii and the Philippines American possessions, so the Roman annals start with the petty problems of an outlaw and shepherds' hold on some hills beside the Tiber, but are incessantly extending their scope of interest until just before the transition to the empire Caesar is carrying his raids into Britain soon after Pompey has been giving the law to Asiatic vassal kings beside the Euphrates. In dealing with the Roman Republic, therefore, we are dealing with very large units, so that at the beginning of the empire, excluding half-barbarous Parthia and the completely barbarous northern tribes, the history of Rome is the history of the western world.

But it is not merely through its geographical extension and "bigness" that American students find an interest in Roman historical studies. It is impossible to study the Italian character as it developed down to the decline of the Commonwealth and not feel that here we are dealing with men of passions decidedly similar to those of many of the fathers of the republic. Hard-headed, hard-handed, unimaginative, but intensely tenacious, self-sacrificing, conscientious and patriotic, the men of the school of Cato the Younger assuredly exhibited qualities which would have been duplicated in seventeenth century Salem or Newtowne. When we read in Polybius of the close money habits and of the extreme willingness to take every advantage that the law permitted which existed in typical Roman circles, we are clearly meeting with types familiar in altogether too many "Yankee" communities. And if we have a duplication of human frailties it is only fair to say we have a duplication of virtues. Hugo Munsterberg, in the days of his paternal admonitions to his protégés, the Americans, is said to have told us "that America was hardly as yet a

great nation because we had produced very few great men." The fair answer was that the test had already broken down, because Rome certainly, up to the actual time of her decline as a free commonwealth, had become and remained a very great nation—indeed, she came to overshadow the whole world—and yet had produced even fewer great men than even the Herr Professor was willing to concede to the United States. We instantly recognize that down to 133 B. C. the Roman Republic had produced many worthy men, many patriotic men, many good business men and administrators, many decidedly competent generals—but nowhere a man of genius. Camillus was assuredly not one of the immortals, nor Scipio the Elder (capable and genial as he doubtless was), nor Cato the Elder, that crabbed personification of Italian practicality; nor Scipio Aemilianus, the friendly patron of the Greeks. And why then had Rome become great? Precisely for the cause which made America great, however emphatically we may repudiate the assertion that we have developed no mighty leaders—because of the high intelligence, practical efficiency, self-sacrifice and willingness for teamwork of the individual Roman peasant and soldier—the same qualities of the man and the citizen, which dispense sometimes with the need for over-minute supervision and make the whole mass of the community often the leaders instead of the led. Different as were the education and environment of Roman youth and American youth, the product was the same, namely, a spontaneous personal intelligence which went far to counteract official blundering. And it was this high average of efficiency which enabled Rome to see the end of Pyrrhus and Hannibal and of the formidable kings of the East. It is this same individual efficiency which has saved before and will save again the American Republic.

But Americans do well to note that it was not mere smartness and cleverness as a nation which gave Rome her empire. We see in her a nation where the love for individual gain developed to an almost outrageous point, but also a nation which was capable of sinking every private, personal consideration at the first proclamation "the republic is in danger." The story of the vast cohesive exertion, the prodigious, unselfish effort put forth year after year in the gruelling seventeen years' struggle with Hannibal is not merely a stirring historical record: it is a profound human document to show how impotent is a mere military machine (as Hannibal's excellent mercenary army was), controlled by a supreme military genius, to overcome a great people worthily resolved to be free. The stories

of how the Senate thanked the blundering and defeated Varro "for not having despaired of the republic" and of how the villa property on which Hannibal was encamped "outside the gates" was calmly sold in the Forum at its usual price, are hackneyed enough to-day, but they are not part of the story of Rome only; they are part of the "golden book of liberty" whereof America is helping to write the most recent chapters. Athens before Xerxes and Rome before Hannibal were fighting not to save their own existence simply, but to make possible the coming victory in Armageddon over the new Sennacherib.

Less vivid perhaps, but no less essential, should be our understanding of the Roman love for lawful procedure, orderly compromise and faithful adhesion to the civil bond. How many are the revolutions we trace in the hot little Greek cities, and how few in the rising capital by the Tiber! The famous "secessions by the plebeians" were nothing but strikes, or at worst, mutinies, never genuine rebellions! There are one or two possible cases of political assassination. Very likely Marcus Manlius was the victim of a judicial murder. There were a few other ugly happenings. But considering the long scope of Roman republican history, these crimes are very few. In tracing the sustained struggles of the tribunes for plebeian equality, the constant effort on both sides to keep within the letter of the law and to use every legal weapon and no others, one is inevitably reminded of the eighteenth century struggle of the American colonies, and especially of Boston and her town meeting, against the British efforts to impose taxation without representation—with this important difference. The Roman patricians knew when the time had come to yield, and they did so if not cheerfully, at least honestly, preserving the unity of the state. King George III had no such saving intelligence to make him realize the breaking point at which a law-abiding people might be driven to extra-legal remedies.

Of course, not all the lessons of the Roman Republic are examples for commendation. All through Roman history there ran a coarseness, a lack of nice discrimination, a looking for merely material ends, a love of cheap display, a brutality that is all the more a warning to American students, because we see some

of the bad traits in many of our own people; and because we also see these qualities presently getting the upper hand in the second century B. C., destroying the stamina of the Roman youth, the integrity of their magistrates, and so paving the way directly for the tragedy of the Gracchi, the civil wars, the gross oppression of the provinces and the final downfall of the republic. The parallels here, with certain American abuses, are so obvious and the warning equally so obvious that there is no need of pointing the moral. We can compare Verres the plunderer of Sicily with Boss Tweed; can read in Cicero's letters (fearfully modern in their tone) how corrupt politicians in his day manipulated and bought up votes in the Comitia; can place beside all the many modern scandals the tax-jobbing of the Roman publicans and the bizarre financial methods of Crassus. If the Roman Republic became great because of many qualities which we are glad to find in ourselves, it is a sobering antidote to our pride to find very many of the precise evils which made the republic change painfully into the empire, exhibiting themselves in American life. *Absit omen!*

Finally, we must observe that, although there certainly existed much "freedom" and many democratic elements in modern Europe, before the rise of the American Republic, our Government was the most ambitious attempt to maintain a non-monarchical state that the world had ever seen, since on the field of Pharsalia Julius Cæsar destroyed the decaying relics of Roman Republicanism. Switzerland and Holland were interesting minor states, nothing more. But in 1776 was founded a great nation which very speedily made a bid to be not a free city or a few cantons or provinces only, but a vast imperial realm, yet without a king. The only other experiment on a corresponding scale was the Roman Republic, and that had showed very many noble qualities in its institutions and its citizens, and then—as a free commonwealth—utterly failed. Americans are doubtless determined that their attempt shall have a happier history; but their own republic has lasted only one hundred and forty-three years. That of Rome lasted over four hundred and fifty-three years! If we are to surpass the earlier record, we will need obviously to take every warning from Roman failures to heart, and we must not at present indulge in premature boasting.

II. Points for Emphasis in English History from 1688 to 1815

BY PROFESSOR DAVID DUNCAN WALLACE, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

The period from 1688 to 1815 is one of the great ages of European history. During this period a series of movements took definite form, the development of which was to occupy and influence the life of many successive generations. The chief of these were the struggle between England and France for maritime and commercial supremacy; the development of cabinet government; the division, through a complication of personal and general forces, of the English-speaking free peoples into two empires; the Wesleyan

revival; the growth of modern science; the mighty outburst of social and political forces embodied in the French Revolution; the struggle of Europe against the despotism of Napoleon; and, after this tumult had hushed into reaction, the continued progress of the more lasting industrial revolution. With such a wealth of topics of the first importance at his disposal, the teacher naturally finds the problem of selection and emphasis somewhat difficult to solve.

Through all its decades the eighteenth century

looks back to the revolution of 1688-1689; for however contrary and irrelevant the cross-currents may seem to be, the dominant tendencies of the age lead toward liberalization, expansion and freedom. Though sadly disfigured by littleness and corruption, the century is notable for great personalities whose aims and achievements have historic significance and rank them among the shaping forces of modern history. Some of these are William of Orange, Marlborough, Peter the Great, Frederick II, Voltaire, Rousseau, Clive, Chatham, Wesley, Pitt, Washington and Napoleon.

The fact that the period was notably one of conflicting principles and forces finds illustration in the expansion of the British Empire. As Seeley points out in his "Expansion of England," the unifying idea which brings system out of the apparent triviality and aimless chaos of the innumerable wars, big and little, involving France and England, is the century-long struggle incident to British imperial growth. The outcome made North American civilization dominantly English-speaking and republican; it brought India under English control, and it secured the establishment of the extended empire which Admiral Dewey declared the greatest single agency in modern history for civilizing the world.

Two forces quite distinct operated to give British expansion this beneficent character: (1) the establishment of free political self-government by the working out of parliamentary control through the cabinet system made possible a sisterhood of nations intensely devoted to free institutions, such as Canada and Australia, and led to a new colonial system under which such countries as Egypt and India are enjoying greater prosperity and freedom than ever before; (2) the Wesleyan revival, bringing again to the fore the strong ethical instincts of the English, permeated the empire (and also its lost half, the United States) with a moral earnestness which has always characterized the great epochs of English history. The profound influence of these two forces which English colonizing activity has carried out into the larger world can also be found and traced in other important phases of English history.

Hardly had cabinet government attained a development entitling it to recognition as an established system when George III made a vigorous, insidious and persistent attack upon it. This was the last deliberate attempt of a British sovereign to assert the co-ordinate authority of the crown with that of parliament. But it frequently happens in history that forces operate in ways widely different from the intentions of those who release them. The almost accidental origin of the cabinet's independence of the king, the unexpected resistance of the American colonies to the arbitrary purposes of George III, his failure in this test of power and the consequent discredit of his personal authority—all indicate how deep-lying and interwoven are the forces that finally worked out what is perhaps the most truly democratic system of government in modern times: parliamentary control under the guidance of a cabinet serving as the agent of the party in power.

For an American the outstanding feature of English history in the eighteenth century is the Revolution, which established our national independence. It seems clear that this event was an integral part of the empire-wide struggle between the native forces of self-government which triumphed in 1688 and the revived principle of royal supremacy asserted by George III. The cause championed by Washington and Adams in America and by Chatham, Burke, Fox, Barre, Shelburne, Camden, Rockingham and a host of lesser men in England was essentially the same—the common cause of Anglo-Saxon freedom.

In most school texts the story of the Revolution is told without regard for the fact that the common cause of British and American freedom was supported by a strong minority of the English people and without any effort to state the case of the English Government. Though the greater right was on the side of the colonists, we must recognize that even Grenville with his stamp act was aiming at ends some of which were necessary and proper. The conflict of colonial rights with the needs of imperial defense brought up the age-long problem of how to co-ordinate liberty and authority or centralized power for the general good and local self-government—the problem which was solved in the United States, as Professor McLaughlin points out, only by the War of Secession. In the critical years following the war of 1756-1763 with its momentous results and lessons there doubtless was enough of intellect and goodwill in England and America to solve the problem; but athwart the crisis ran the "I-will-be-king" policy of George III in such a way as to make England's wisdom and goodwill practically unavailable. Though King George, as Lecky has correctly stated, did more profound injury to his country than any other English sovereign of modern times, he also, though unintentionally, became one of the most influential agencies in the achievement of American independence.

An unfortunate result of this one-sided method of teaching Revolutionary history is that the pupil's mind is left with the impression that England led the world in tyranny and corruption. The teacher's wider knowledge of European history should supply the fact that, even in the latter half of the eighteenth century, England was so far in advance of the other powers as to be the inspiration of liberals all over Europe. It was indeed at this time that Montesquieu described the British kingdom as "a republic under the forms of a monarchy."

The outstanding feature of the closing years of the period is England's long struggle against Napoleon, in which, as the one relentless enemy of autocracy, she saved Europe from a European despotism. America's interest in the struggle was pithily expressed by John Randolph in his reply to certain Congressmen, whose understanding of the situation was scarcely more illuminated than that manifested by certain other persons in the face of a more recent attack on the safety and liberty of the world: "Give to the tiger the properties of the shark and there remains safety neither for the beast of the field nor the

fish of the sea." Now, as then, England in seeking her own safety is securing the safety of all nations. Not even an Englishman will maintain that England has done this merely to serve mankind; but the student of history nevertheless recognizes that she rendered valuable service when she preserved the freedom of others along with her own in the wars of William III and Marlborough against Louis XIV, in

the resistance of Pitt and Nelson to Napoleon a hundred years later, and again a century later in the fateful struggle of to-day.

The history of Europe has been studied with small benefit if we have not discovered that free institutions are liberalizing and that a despotic system is brutalizing, and that it is therefore not merely to enjoy a luxury that men should be free.

III. The Power of Ideals in History

BY DANIEL C. KNOWLTON, PH.D., CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL, NEWARK, N. J.

DESIRABILITY OF A NEW EMPHASIS IN HISTORY TEACHING.

The emphasis upon *Kulturgeschichte*, which dates from the latter part of the nineteenth century, although largely attributable to German historians, undoubtedly represented a democratic tendency in the presentation of the facts of history in that it drew attention to the life and interests of the masses. In thrusting the common people into the foreground of the picture it did much to bring out in sharp relief the long-neglected phases of social and economic history. The English historians, Thorold Rogers and Cunningham, did much to popularize the study of economic origins in their scholarly inquiries into English industry. It was not long before the teaching of history began to feel these new impulses. The result has been that in our day every up-to-date teacher feels impelled to stress the bread-and-butter aspects of his subject and to give to the great movements of history a decidedly materialistic tinge. To such extremes have these teachers and historians gone that many of the great gains which the study of *Kulturgeschichte* brought with it have been either altogether lost or have become hardly discernible in the modern classroom.

Democratic history we must have, especially in this period of world conflict, and the suggestion has been made that a new course be organized to be known as a study of nations, with a view to placing the emphasis where it rightly belongs. It is too much perhaps to expect that even were this suggestion adopted there would follow a broader treatment than that implied by the economic interpretation of the past. The nations selected would in too many cases be considered from the standpoint of their economic self-sufficiency, and their *raison d'être* would be reduced to terms of supply and demand, or of production and consumption.

With the passing of every generation is to be witnessed a shifting of emphasis. Now monarchies are popular and now democracies; it is now the *tiers état*, and now the despised fourth estate; at one time the state is paramount, at another the people; or again a conflict is on between two opposing concepts. Dealing as the historian does with human phenomena which he is endeavoring to interpret for the benefit of other human beings who are themselves conscious of their intimate connection with the past, he finds him-

self confronted with infinite possibilities as to emphasis, and his task, therefore, becomes fascinating in the extreme.

If there is one thing more than another which this war has demonstrated it is the importance of attaching proper values to the phenomena of the past; of rating progress at its true worth. The question of the war aims of the contending powers has brought with it a sifting process and a veritable searching of the heart of the nations involved in the conflict. No mere outward or surface manifestation satisfies the inquirer after the truth. He refuses to measure a nation's greatness in such terms as growth of population or national wealth. It is a quest much more complicated and much more vital than attaches to a problem in arithmetic. In the light of this groping for the eternal verities of man's existence, it would seem our manifest duty to draw attention to some of the inner strivings of these social groups which have been knitted together to form the powerful states of our day; to seek after the idealistic in their make-up; to probe the very depths of their natures; to ascertain, if possible, what has prompted them to action in the great crises of their history.

It is a rather significant fact that our numerous philosophies of history have sadly neglected this phase of the past. Time and again have efforts been made to appraise our debt to the past and to identify the links which bind us thereto; but the great ideals which have consciously shaped development have been either entirely overlooked or perhaps taken too much for granted.¹ When a Ferrero and an Eduard Meyer, in presenting their pictures of the distant past, speak so largely with the voice of their own generation, giving utterance to the ideas and aspirations of their own community, should we not listen for these same utterances from the voices out of that past itself—a past which was so much of a reality to our ancestors and with which their very lives, fortunes and sacred honor were so intimately bound together? It must be admitted that it was given only to a few men of vision to see clearly the goal toward which their own age was tending; to analyze clearly the intellectual and spiritual concepts which possessed them and the age of which they were a part. Our very distance from these events enables us to

¹ This is illustrated by the appearance of such a book as Marvin, "Progress and History."

discern more clearly than contemporaries the impulses at work, the ideals toward which they were striving and to appraise the success attending these struggles to a higher level of thinking and doing.

This war seems to mark a parting of the ways; it has brought to light an awakened idealism in sharp contrast with the rather crass materialistic cynicism so common but a few years ago. Those who have become a part of it, who have been drawn into its vortex, wherever they have been capable by their training of analyzing their feelings and emotions, have given expression to it in no uncertain language. Take for example the Diary and Letters of Alan Seeger, Conningsby Dawson's Carry On and Donald Hankey's Student in Arms. Even the cockney soldier somehow or other senses it, as Mr. G. H. Wells so vividly portrays in "Mr. Britling Sees It Through." This idealism was not so apparent when the war broke out, but has risen with the tide of war, reaching greater and greater proportions as the struggle has taken on more of the character of a world upheaval. It is voiced by President Wilson in such ringing phrases as: "We have no selfish ends to serve. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when these rights have been made as secure as the faith and freedom of nations can make them. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government." Even Lloyd George draws upon the utterances of a Lincoln to give expression to it.

These developments would seem a sufficient justification for drawing the attention of our younger generation to the power of ideals in the shaping of the past, focussing for example their attention on the war aims of other days, which made of Europe's struggles something more than mere *Futterkriege*—a characterization applied by a German teacher of history to the struggles of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

NATURE OF IDEALS.

At this point it would not be out of place to define what is involved in an ideal. We could not do better than quote from the preface to Greek Ideals by C. D. Burns. "An ideal is an emotionally colored conception of a state of things which would be better than the present; it is not a complete program for action, for a man influenced by an ideal may often stumble over obstacles to its realization because he has not any definite method of attaining what he desires. On the other hand, an ideal must be emotionally appreciated. It is not the kind of reality which can be understood by mere calculation or intellectual analysis. It moves because it is desired. But although ideals of every kind originate in the clear thought or deep emotion of individuals, they are powerful only when many are moved by them. The common experience seems in them to produce a common vision." (pp. v-vi.) These then are the kinds of concepts

which we should seek to discover and give their due need of emphasis in our handling of history in the classroom.

IDEALS IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

With such an objective in mind the teacher of history would not overlook the influence upon a Charlemagne of the ideal of universal empire and that close co-operation of church and state, so sympathetically portrayed by Viscount Bryce in his "Holy Roman Empire." This was something more than a political concept; it was an ideal state of society, a goal for all Christendom. It is illustrated by his campaigns against the Saxons, prompting him to force the acceptance of Christianity at the point of the sword. He was merely seeking to realize the ideal expressed by St. Augustine in his "City of God." Although eight centuries elapsed between the author of this great work and St. Thomas Aquinas, the entire period has well been named the Age of Faith, for all through these centuries great souls were constantly struggling to give reality to the vision which hovered before the eyes of the Bishop of Hippo. The influence of this ideal may be traced even to the days of Martin Luther. Feudalism, harsh and militaristic in its inception, became softened as it was impregnated with that idealism born in part of the crusading movement. Historians are wont to speak of the Age of Chivalry and see in the enthusiasm for the acceptance of the Truce of God a dim apprehension by the doughty warriors of a power mightier than the sword and a destiny for mankind which opened up a more attractive vista than that afforded by the reign of fist law.

The reform movements in the Church, whether embodied in a St. Francis of Assisi, a St. Dominic, a Wiclif or a John Huss, represent a striving toward something better, toward a goal dimly perceived, but essentially idealistic in character. What if we admit that sordid motives prompted the rabble to follow them, the ideal was still there, however tarnished and marred by other and more materialistic motives. An idealism of a different sort marks the Renaissance which became marred somewhat by the exaltation of mind and matter over spirit. On the other hand, the idealistic is clearly discernible in the works of a Michael Angelo or a Raphael. It must not be forgotten that the joy of living burst in upon man as a new experience. His spirit had freed itself from the fetters of the past. He had in truth come to a realization of his powers as an individual. With the dawn of modern science the ideal was often overshadowed by the apparent power of man over the forces of nature; and still the scientific age was not without its dreamers and thinkers.

IDEALS IN MODERN TIMES.

Although the Protestant revolt and the religious wars have their economic aspects, the attitude of a Luther before the Diet of Worms or of a Ridley and Latimer at Oxford illustrate the lofty idealism underneath the surface and give evidence of an heroic courage born only of a consecration to a great, overmas-

tering purpose. Human liberty was at stake—a new concept of liberty had been vouchsafed; and shadowy and idealistic though it was, it was still the most potent force at work in these centuries of readjustment.

In the century and a half which elapsed between the religious wars and the French Revolutions, historians recognized a *Siècle de Louis XIV* and an Age of Frederick the Great. The first of these is still conceived as one of the bright spots in the history of the French nation. Although we might question the loftiness of the ideals of these periods as contrasted with those of other epochs, ideals they were, potent enough to leave an enduring impress upon modern times. Prussia is but an illustration of the militaristic concept of Frederick the Great. We become conscious as we follow these changing goals of man's endeavor that we are not always viewing the world from a Pisgah height; we are depressed at times by the knowledge that mankind was so often sated with material things and so frequently set themselves low standards of effort and attainment.

As we approach more nearly our own day we are impressed again and again with these undercurrents, stronger at times than at others, as, for example, during the early days of the French Revolution. Such a spirit has been rarely seen as carried the armies of the French Republic across their own frontiers into the heart of Europe proclaiming the New Evangel of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Excesses there had to be; but these should not blind our eyes to those aspects of the revolution which have brought undying glory to the French nation. Napoleon himself was not unmindful of the power of ideals, as he proved on many an occasion, both by word and act. Where he thought them lacking he took particular pains to manufacture them. On one occasion he remarked, "Religion is a part of destiny. With the soil, the laws, the manners, it forms that sacred whole which is called *La Patrie* and which one must never desert." At another time he said, "Yes, imagination rules the world. The defect of our modern institutions is that they do not speak to the imagination. By that alone can man be governed." Rose, commenting on these utterances, says, "He alone of all the leaders of the Revolution . . . had thrilled the French nature . . . Within the years 1796-1802 France recurred to the ideals of the reign of Louis XIV." He was destined to fall a victim to an ideal which he himself had brought into being—the ideal of nationality.

The Napoleonic ideal itself became a dominant force under the Second Empire and is the best explanation of the vicissitudes of that child of fortune, Napoleon III. Fisher expresses the ideal as follows: "He stood for the Revolution, he defended the principle of nationality, he never deviated from his love of peace, he respected the influence of religion in society. Men thought of Napoleon as the soldier of the Revolution, as the misunderstood idealist whose liberal plans were for Europe."²

² Bonapartism, pages 70-71, 75.

Not a high ideal perhaps as interpreted by "the nephew of his uncle," but illustrating again the grip of the idealistic upon the destiny of mankind.

Even in that age of Metternich, so prosaic and dreary in many of its aspects, socialism had its birth, and although grounded in part upon the bedrock of economic injustice, constituted an ideal in which perhaps man was conceived as better than he really was, ready to respond to the noblest impulses of his being and capable of the highest form of self-abnegation. It must be remembered that, historically considered, socialism has always had its men of vision, devotees who elevated it to the plane of a religion.

Although Stanley Leathes in his introduction to the last volume of the Cambridge Modern History sees nothing but crass materialistic tendencies in the period preceding the present war, he nevertheless admits that social service—serving one's fellows—has become a religion, finding its disciples in all walks of life, invading the pulpit and prompting these shepherds of their flocks to dissipate their energies in grandiose schemes of social uplift rather than in ministering to the real needs of the spirit.

In the relation of states to each other, imperialistic ambitions seem to fill the vision of statesmen and politicians—a consciousness of a world mission, but a mission interpreted in somewhat materialistic terms, involving, for example, the guardianship of backward peoples and the custodianship of their unexploited riches. *Weltpolitik* is a grandiose concept to set before a nation, but its advocates have not been inspired by the same motives as possessed the founder of Christianity. To the pursuit of this ideal may be attributed in no small measure the present world cataclysm.

Although the European field has been selected to illustrate the power of ideals, the other fields of history present the same opportunities. Many and varied are the possible interpretations of the past. Those which are based on sound scholarship should not be neglected. With all the results of our investigations, whether they be at the hands of sociologists, economists, archeologists or their ilk, there will still be a place for work of this kind with our impressionable young folk. This deeper and more serious study will perhaps enable them to grasp more understandingly the trend of events in our day, besides giving added dignity and standing to the study of history.

SUGGESTIVE READINGS.

The teacher will find the following volumes suggestive and helpful in this connection: Shailer Mathews, "Spiritual Interpretation of History" (1916); Marvin, "The Living Past" (first published in 1913); Burns, C. D., "Greek Ideals" (1917); Fisher, H. A. L., "Bonapartism" (1908); Adams, E. D., "Power of Ideals in American History" (1913); Simons, A. M., "Social Forces in American History" (1912); Myers, "History as Past Ethics" (1913); Reinsch, P. S., "World Politics" (1900); Hart, A. B., "National Ideals Historically Traced, 1607-1907" (1907).

IV. The United States and World Politics, 1793-1815

BY PROFESSOR THEODORE C. SMITH, WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

No period is so fruitful in analogies to the problems in foreign relations recently confronting the United States as that between 1793 and 1815. At the same time the differences in the present American policy are so marked that the contrasts are at least equally instructive. The impression is made that the Government of the United States and the majority of the people have learned the lessons taught by the failures and blunders of the earlier epoch, and instead of waiting too long and waging a futile war have met the situation with resolution.

The superficial similarities are striking. In the first place, the defense of the French Republic against successive coalitions of neighboring monarchies—Prussia, Austria, Spain, England and the rest—aroused the same democratic sympathy which has been so marked during the present European struggle for France, England, Italy, and later Russia, against the Teuton powers. If the more radical elements had had their way the United States would, about 1793, have actually entered the world war in behalf of France against England. Only the caution of the Washington administration and the conservative classes in the Government and the country were able to prevent this rash venture. In addition, the division of American sentiment into anti- and pro-German was prefigured by the sharp antagonism which divided Republican and Federalist regarding our relations with England. The kindly feeling for France, expressed by Washington so late as 1796, rapidly declined after the excesses of the reign of terror and the establishment of Napoleon's military rule, but the hostility to England, lasting from Revolutionary days, continued unabated in the same classes. On the other side, the conservative and wealthy elements of society showed the same partiality for England against France as they have recently exhibited for England against Germany. If they could have had their way, the country would have joined the allies against Napoleon, whom they regarded, in English fashion, as the enemy of mankind.

In the second place, the efforts by England to hamper all commerce with France or her allies and the endeavors of the French to retaliate by all means in their possession created for American commerce a situation almost identical with that prevailing in 1914-1917. The importance of American foodstuffs and of West Indian sugar, carried by American ships as neutrals, was almost as great then as that of American raw materials and munitions is now, and each country did its best to prevent the other from receiving them. The upshot was an interlocking series of decrees and orders in council, between 1806 and 1809, which, on paper, absolutely prohibited all neutral trade with either side and made all American ships subject to capture or destruction for even attempting to enter a British or a European port. The analogy to the sit-

uation created by the German and British War Zone proclamations and Orders in Council of 1914-1917 is manifest. On the other hand, the actual damage wrought in the earlier war to American shipping was immeasurably greater than that suffered in the present one, since both Napoleon and the British Government carried out confiscations of ships and cargoes on a scale that surpasses the utmost American losses from mines and submarines. In addition, the British naval authorities, upholding the British doctrine of indefeasible allegiance, systematically impressed British-born seamen from American ships, with complete indifference to American naturalization papers. While it is true that numerous deserters from the British navy were in this way recaptured, it was none the less an assertion of naval force, regardless of American sovereignty, that constituted a galling grievance. And no British ministry would even discuss the possibility of its modification, alleging that the practice was necessary to naval supremacy and the existence of the country. The contrast in this respect between British methods of 1806-1812 and 1914-1917 is deserving of full recognition.

The policy of the United States in the earlier period offers abundant instructive analogies and contrasts. To begin with, the Government, in spite of all pro-French or pro-British popular sympathies, maintained from Washington's Proclamation of 1793 to the end an attitude of complete neutrality. With the European aspects of these wars the United States absolutely refused to be involved, regarding them as wholly outside the range of American interests. Even when fighting France in 1798 or declaring war on England in 1812, the United States refrained from acting as an ally of either side, fought its own battles and made its own separate treaties of peace. The present administration began in precisely the same spirit, but has made a complete departure from it in declaring war on Germany. The messages and speeches of President Wilson and his supporters, and still more the action of our naval, military, financial and administrative departments have put the United States almost unreservedly into joint action with the Entente powers. The reasons for this complete change of policy—a change strongly opposed by many old-fashioned Americans and not wholly relished by Congress—deserve careful study.

Another illuminating comparison may be made between the commercial policies of the earlier Presidents and those of the Wilson administration. Both, it may be noted, were distinctly pacifist, Washington and Adams differing from Jefferson and Madison chiefly on the point of what is now called "preparedness," which the two former wished, but the latter expressly rejected. President Wilson has wavered in this respect, beginning with an almost Jeffersonian disclaimer of the need for war preparations, but chang-

ing to the position of the Federalist Presidents as the war progressed and the future looked more dubious. As to diplomatic proceedings, the earlier period shows that Washington and Adams relied on negotiations and treaties to secure trade rights, with considerable success; but Jefferson and Madison made the effort to compel France and England to withdraw their commercial restrictions and cease outrages upon American commerce by withholding exports and excluding imports from the offending country. This policy proved a total failure, since neither England nor France would surrender its power of dealing economic injury, even to regain the American trade, without the certainty that its enemy would take the same step. That the United States was unable to guarantee. The Madison administration ultimately went to war largely because, relying on a conditional pledge from Napoleon, it insisted on compelling England to cancel its orders in council. It is noteworthy that repeated efforts by the German Government to involve the Wilson administration in an identical dilemma, by inducing it to compel the English to abandon their blockade, were decisively defeated.

But the most important difference between the period 1793-1815 and the present day is found in the existence of a problem that has ceased to affect American diplomacy. At that time the great domestic interest of the United States concerned its westward growth, the getting possession of the Indian

lands and the securing of outlets for trade through the rivers running into the Gulf of Mexico. Inter-mixed with the efforts of each administration to protect commercial rights ran a current of wholly American diplomacy relating to the navigation of the Mississippi and the relations of Indian tribes with Spain and England. It was the question of New Orleans, of West Florida, of the Northwestern Indians, which brought the United States to the verge of rupture with Spain, with France and constantly with England. At the last it was the Indian question which brought the hatred of the interior communities against England to the boiling point and precipitated a war which might have been avoided had it depended solely upon problems of commerce or even impressments. It was the Indian outrages, for which British agents were held responsible, which stung the United States to the pitch of war with England. The confiscations of Napoleon were fully as illegal as the English seizures, just as certain British restrictions in 1914-1917 may have been technically as contrary to international law as the German submarine policy. But it was the power charged with offenses against human life against which the nation finally turned in each case—in 1812 against those who were held directly or indirectly responsible for Indian outrages on our borders; in 1917, against the murderers of defenseless men, women and children on the high seas.

The Use of Pictures in the Study of the War

BY EMMETT A. RICE, HIGH SCHOOL, BRAZIL, IND.

One of the interesting observations that come to the American public from a study of the European nations, whether at war or peace, is the fact that they do so much with so little. America in her wastefulness is coming to realize that she has done so little with so much. One of the most important factors in the progress of the race has been the ability to use the apparently useless things. I fear we history teachers have been prone to disregard and neglect the many, many aids in teaching that are thrust upon us unexpectedly and unasked for.

It is fair to assume that somewhere in the curriculum of every high school a place is found for a study of this, the greatest war in history. The mass of literature, pamphlets, documents, magazines, newspapers and pictures on that subject is overwhelming; it is impossible to use all. The material must be evaluated, and in that evaluation pictures must occupy a foremost place.

The educational value of pictures has long been recognized, but I fear has been used least of all in the schoolroom. The advertiser of the day knows that the successful advertisement must contain a picture whether it relates to the article for sale or not. The magazine editors have felt the popular demand for illustrations, and some have very nearly turned their periodicals into picture books, giving valuable infor-

mation in that form. Some feature pictures only. The newspapers try to find a place in their crowded columns for them. The motion-picture companies go to great expense and trouble to meet the popular demand for illustrated current events.

The history teacher should be the first to use this easy, interesting and valuable medium of teaching facts dealing with the war. The pupils are only too glad to literally overwhelm the class with pictures. In the Brazil high school four classes collected over two hundred pictures in a few weeks. For the most part these were large colored prints from photographs dealing with war machinery, scenes at the front and political events as well. They are to be found in illustrated Sunday supplements, the illustrated magazines and newspapers. The pupils wait until several pictures are collected, then a group stays after school and neatly pastes them on large heavy sheets of paper or cardboard, classifying them at the same time. For example, pictures of aeroplanes will be placed on one sheet, dirigible balloons on another, trench scenes on another, etc. In this form the pictures may be passed around through the class without damage and several pictures dealing with the same thing are apparent at a glance.

The pictures are of utmost value in the study of the machinery of war. It is a source of great satis-

faction when a pupil tells the class of an aeroplane fight to be able to show such an event in progress. When one speaks of the clumsy tanks in action nothing is so effective at that moment as a picture of the same, the pupils may inquire into the interior of the monster and there is a picture of that, too. The methods and problems of submarine warfare and trench construction are most easily brought out by this method. When women soldiers are mentioned nothing is so convincing as a picture of the Battalion of Death. So it goes, a picture at hand for every subject, for the editors vie with each other in their distribution and the pupils compete in their collection.

Incidentally these pictures have proved valuable in the ordinary history course. When the ancient empires of the East were studied the pupils had pictures of the late operation of the British on the Tigris River. When the Crusades were spoken of, pictures of the British advances in Palestine were available. When the study of the Gothic architecture was taken up, pictures of the Gothic churches ruined by the shell fire of the present war were exhibited. When mention was made of the historical importance of the Alps, pictures representing the great difficulty which even a modern army experiences there were shown.

This method of illustrating points has been a source of great satisfaction to the teacher, the pupils have learned to appreciate and value pictures and they have obtained a knowledge of the war that could not have been obtained by reading alone and the pictures have been conserved.

Periodical Literature

EDITED BY GERTRUDE BRAMLETTE RICHARDS, PH.D.

Robert Machray's tribute to President Wilson in the November "Nineteenth Century" ("President Wilson's Greatest Achievement"), in which he praises him in highest terms for inspiring the marvellous development which insures the overthrow of Germany, should be read in connection with the editorial article in the "North American Review" for December, which denounces the policy of the President. The latter magazine also publishes V. R. Savie's "Problem of the Adriatic," one chapter of his book on South-Eastern Europe, which is to be published shortly. Mr. Savie is a man of affairs in Serbia, and has spent much time in Dalmatia. His article is full of suggestions as to the dangers which will arise from the obvious solution of this territorial question.

Newell Dwight Hillis, a member of a Diplomatic Mission to the French Front in Behalf of the United States Government, writes on "What America is Fighting Against" in the "Current Opinion" for December.

The article in the "Independent" for December first, by Dr. G. Etsujiro Uyebara, Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Delegation to the United States, on "The People's Chance in Japan," claims that "it is exaggeration to say that as regards her foreign policy, Japan is a most misunderstood country, which is due to the fact that all foreign policy was hitherto carried out by a few persons behind a screen." Recently, however, there has been appointed a

Council of Foreign Affairs which will play a considerable part in shaping Japan's future foreign policy, and will lead the country more strongly toward industrial and economic development, than toward imperialistic expansion.

J. H. Harley's "Labor in France" in the "Contemporary Review" for November is well worth reading. He discusses the attitude of the various labor parties toward the government since the war began, and proves that their attitude has been generally that of turning their backs on their dead selves. The laborers have apparently adopted a new slogan to sustain themselves for war. While the French laborer has not displayed the same genius for practical administration as has the British laborer, and has not made the same progress in suggesting plans for the democratization of industry, yet on the whole, French labor is an example to the world, proving that the lesson this war has taught to the French mind is that the toilers have come into their own, and henceforth the history of labor is the history of the world.

Walter George Bell's article in the December "Fortnightly Review" on "Foreign Accounts of the Great Fire," adds some interesting facts from contemporary French and Dutch accounts of the London fire in the seventeenth century.

"The North American Review" for December publishes an article by Professor H. G. Moulton, of Chicago University, on "The Pressing Need of Industrial Conscription." The object of the author is to direct attention to some serious dangers in connection with the regulation of prices in the form in which it will be likely to develop in the coming months. The problem the United States must face is unusual in two ways: (1) because it is impossible to receive appreciable aid from outside, and (2) because the present conflict is being conducted on the scale of supply not sufficient for demand. There are, he says, two main alternatives open by way of solution. The first is to let prices adjust themselves at what level they may under the work of unrestricted economic forces, and then employ a taxation of excess profits as a corrective, and the second is to fix a nominal price for all commodities and allow the Government to underwrite the losses of concerns which cannot produce at a profit.

The little that is known of Colonel House from all sources is collected and published in the December "Forum" under the title, "Colonel House, the Man Mystery."

The author of the article entitled, "Parliament and People, a Charter of Political Democracy" ("Athenaeum," for November), states that the chief political problem of the period after the war is to establish the control of Parliament by the people, and to reassert the control of government by Parliament; the electorate must coincide with the adult population, and the area of representation must be as wide as possible; the House of Commons must predominate in the State as the political legislative authority; the Cabinet must carry out the will of the elected Houses, and be subordinate to it. To effect these ends, there must be established adult suffrage and abolition of dual voting; the payment of all election expenses by the State; the publication of party funds and a statutory non-political authority for the award of life honors for public service; the reversion of the second chamber; Triennial Parliament and no dismissal of Parliament by the Cabinet.

The October "National Geographic Magazine" is devoted to illustrations of flags of all nations, modern and medieval, and official insignia of the army and navy.

SCHOOLS AND THE WAR.

The Bureau of Extension of the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, N. C.) has announced a series of lectures on the war which will be furnished free of cost to North Carolina communities upon the payment of the traveling expenses of the lecturers. Thirty-eight topics by nineteen members of the faculty are announced.

Educators and school administrators are urged by the National Security League (31 Pine Street, New York City) to tell school children the meaning of the war. The League has sent resolutions bearing upon the subject to mayors of cities, and to state, county, and city superintendents of schools. In addressing the latter the National Security League says: "We respectfully call your attention to the most important duty which educators in this country can perform to-day.

"We ask you to make American school children fully acquainted with the reasons why we are at war with Germany and the menace of defeat. If this knowledge is given to them in simple and clear fashion, they will carry a message into their homes creating a unified and enthusiastic American spirit in support of the war. Wars are now won by the people behind the line through their moral support and their supply of means for battle. The stimulating of the national morale which will encourage our soldiers abroad is a distinct aid to victory.

"We submit it is the patriotic duty of all educators to undertake the work referred to in the enclosed resolutions. To be of practical assistance, we are preparing an outline of subject-matter from Government publications. It will be forwarded upon request.

"We are sending copies of this letter and resolution to the mayor and the editors of the newspapers in your city, asking support for you in the affirmative action which we hope will be taken.

"We urge this upon you most seriously because of our knowledge of conditions which make this patriotic service necessary, and ask you to favor us with an early reply."

Prof. John W. Wayland contributes to the "Normal Bulletin" (Vol. 9, No. 6, October, 1917) of the State Normal School at Harrisonburg, Va., a paper entitled, "Some Causes of the Great War." Prof. Wayland enumerates seven general causes of the war, including race prejudice, national patriotism, competition in commerce, acquisition of territory, the large standing armies and navies, opposition between monarchy and democracy, the false philosophy taught in the schools of Germany, and the enmity caused by the Alsace-Lorraine seizure.

The University of North Carolina has published in its Extension Leaflets two papers entitled, "Why We Are at War with Germany." These are intended primarily for the use of high school principals, superintendents and educational officials. It is suggested that the information contained therein be used for opening exercises, debates, essays in the schools, and that through school officers and pupils the general public may be reached.

Prof. E. M. Violette, of the State Normal School at Kirksville, Mo., contributes to the Missouri School Journal for November, 1917 (Vol. 34, No. 9), a paper upon "The History Teacher and the Present War." In this he calls attention to two obligations imposed upon the history teacher in the present crisis: First, the necessity that he inform himself thoroughly on the events of the world's history; and secondly, that he bring this information to the class and make his history teaching more vital than ever before. Reference is made to various useful publications and to methods of work.

Prof. A. A. Johnston, of Geneva College, Beaver Falls, Pa., will begin in the second term of the school year 1917-18 a course to college students to study the essentials, the aims, the causes and the historic antecedents of the Great War.

No. 5 in the series entitled, "Iowa and War," published by the State Historical Society of Iowa, bears the same title as the series and reviews briefly the connection of Iowa with the War of 1812, the Black Hawk War, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and the Great War.

The lessons on the Great War prepared by the Pasadena, California, High School are being published in the Pasadena "Star-News" of that city.

Theodore Marburg treats in a short work "The League of Nations" (Macmillan, 1917, 50 cents), the history and growth of the movement toward a league to enforce peace. He takes up the proposed organization and the change in public opinion toward the problem, the various criticisms of the plan and the recent support gained in the United States and abroad.

DEPARTMENT OF QUERIES AND ANSWERS RELATING TO THE WAR.

With this number the HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE is enabled, by arrangement with the National Board for Historical Service, to offer to its readers a general information service on matters connected with the war. Queries relating to the war will be received from readers of the MAGAZINE and will be referred to competent scholars for answer. It is hoped to make this department of especial use to teachers of history, and it is suggested that queries should be devoted more to bibliographical matters and to the general subject of history teaching in connection with the war rather than to such questions of fact as can be readily ascertained in any reference library. Queries as to questions of fact are, however, by no means excluded, and are welcomed from those who do not have access to good reference facilities.

In general queries will be answered by letter as soon as possible after their receipt. The more important and representative queries, together with their answers, will be published in this column. All queries should be addressed to the National Board for Historical Service, 1133 Woodward Building, Washington, D. C., and plainly marked QUERY DEPARTMENT, HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE.

1. Query: What is the Rathenau plan and where can I secure information in regard to it?

Answer: At the beginning of the war the president of the German General Electric Company, Dr. Walther Rathenau, developed a plan for systematically combing Germany and conquered territory for all raw material in an attempt to offset the British blockade which was foreseen. To this end an enormous organization was built up with Rathenau at its head. It is this organization which has conducted the stripping of Belgium of everything that the Germans considered useful for the carrying on of the war. An elaborate treatment of the subject is to be found in French in "Les Déportations Belges," by Fernand Passeelecq, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1917, pages 129 and following. An account of it in English will be found in the forthcoming second part of "German War Practices," edited by Professor D. C. Munro, and being published by the Committee on Public Information, Washington, D. C., from which it can be secured upon request.

2. Query: Where can I find a brief up-to-date treatment of socialism in Germany?

Answer: See the article by Professor Carleton J. H. Hayes, "The History of German Socialism Reconsidered" in the "American Historical Review" for October, 1917, pages 62-101.

3. Query: Can you refer me to outlines that would be useful in conducting a course for advanced high school students on the war?

Answer: In this number of the HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE will be found a carefully prepared topical outline by Professor S. B. Harding. Other readily procurable outlines are: "The Great War: A Study Outline of the Causes, the Immediate Background and the Beginnings of the Great World War," by Professor Wayland J. Chase, of the University of Wisconsin. (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Serial No. 881, Madison, November, 1917; price, ten cents.) "An Outline of Recent European History, 1815-1916," by Clarence Perkins, Ohio State University, College Book Store, Columbus, Ohio; also "Handbook of the War for Public Speakers," edited by A. B. Hart and A. O. Lovejoy, National Security League, 31 Pine Street, New York; price, 25 cents.

Notes from the Historical Field

DEATH OF PROFESSOR BOTSFORD.

In the death of Professor George Willis Botsford, of Columbia, on December 14, the field of ancient history has lost a most distinguished representative, following, as it does, so shortly upon the death of Professor Henry A. Sill, of Cornell. Professor Botsford was born in 1862, and was at the height of his powers and effectiveness when suddenly stricken with heart disease while working, as usual, in his office at the University. He was widely known throughout the country as the author of many valuable text-books in ancient history, including "A History of Greece," 1889; "A History of Rome," 1890; "Ancient History," 1901; "The Story of Rome," 1902; "The Ancient World," 1911; "A Source Book of Ancient History," 1912; "Hellenic Civilization," 1915. In the field of research his work was highly valued by specialists for its qualities of keenness of criticism, accuracy and insight, and he has left important contributions to scholarship in his "Development of the Athenian Constitution," published in 1893, and "The Roman Assemblies," which appeared in 1909. He was, moreover, a constructive and trenchant critic of the work of others as may be seen in his various reviews and special articles.

After receiving his doctor's degree at Cornell in 1891 he was for a time instructor at that institution, going from there to Harvard University, where he remained from 1895 to 1901. Since 1902 he had been connected with Columbia University, first as Instructor and later as Professor of Ancient History. He was an effective teacher especially of advanced students, inculcating the highest ideals of scholarship and leaving a lasting impression on their minds.

Historical Prizes

The secretary of the American Historical Association calls attention to the fact that the rules governing the Winsor and Adams prize essay competitions will shortly be radically modified, and he suggests that all who intend to compete for those prizes should address him at 1140 Woodward Building, Washington, D. C., asking for copies of the new regulations.

The new rules respecting the competition for the prize in military history offered by the American Historical Association have been adopted as follows:

A prize of \$250 is offered for the best approved essay on a subject in military history. The fields of study are not limited, but the Civil War is recommended as specially suitable. While the committee expects that the essays submitted will range from about 20,000 to 50,000 words, this is not intended as an absolute condition. Essays may be submitted in print or in manuscript, but in the latter case they must be typewritten. All essays must be sent to the chairman of the committee, Professor R. M. Johnston, 275 Widener Hall, Cambridge, Mass., not later than August 31, 1918.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COURSE OF STUDY IN HISTORY TO THE NEBRASKA HISTORY TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, OMAHA, NOVEMBER 8, 1917.

For several years the Nebraska History Teachers' Association has been attempting to secure a reorganization of the history courses offered in Nebraska elementary and secondary schools. At the fall meeting of the association in 1916 we had the pleasure of hearing the report of the Committee of Eight discussed by the chairman of that committee, Dr. J. A. James, of Northwestern University. It developed at that time that the teachers of history over the state were quite unfamiliar with the excellent report produced by his committee of the American Historical Association.

During the year 1916 there appeared another report affecting the status of history, particularly in the secondary school. This was the report of the Committee on Social Sciences of the National Education Association. It proposed a reorganization of history entirely different from the American Historical Association committee's report.

The 1917 spring meeting of the Nebraska History Teachers' Association gave one entire session to the consideration and discussion of these reports together with the report of the Committee of Five on secondary school history. As a result of this discussion the present committee was appointed to consider these various reports and to make recommendations at the 1917 fall meeting as to a course of study in history for Nebraska schools.

This committee has had the matter under consideration since last May. We have studied the question from a number of angles. We have discussed it with leading educators. We have gone over the printed reports of the various committees of national prominence. At this time, we are ready, in accordance with the direction given at the spring meeting, to make our recommendations.

It has been our purpose to set up a goal in advance of the present practice in Nebraska schools. At the same time, we have sought to place our goal near enough to present conditions to make it possible of realization. We do not claim that the scheme we shall propose is the ultimate ideal—the ne plus ultra—of history courses. We do believe we are in harmony with the most recent and best

educational thought of the country; that we are taking a distinct step forward in the right direction; and that our proposals are entirely feasible under existing conditions.

We believe our legitimate field is the field of the social sciences, of which history is one. We feel that history teachers must become willing to broaden out, must teach less of pure scientific narrative and more of history in its social aspects. This committee is of the opinion that history should be studied in the elementary and secondary schools mostly for its utility—its bearing on the social sciences rather than for the production of expert historians. We are willing to leave that to the universities.

This committee favors socializing the entire field of history; and to that end, we recommend the condensing of some of the purely history courses in order to gain time for the other social sciences. Even the pure history is to be taught from the social point of view.

This committee recommends very strongly a study of history in the making, as developed from week to week in standard periodicals. In the elementary school this may take the form of current events; but in the junior and senior high schools, magazine material should be used freely. We recommend that in the senior high school (Grades 10, 11 and 12) one day each week be given to a definite study of some standard weekly periodical, such as "The Literary Digest," "The New Republic," "The Outlook," or the "Independent."

In preparing the following synopsis of a course of study, this committee has sought to make a working compromise between the reports of the Committee of Eight, the Committee of Five, and the Social Science Committee of the National Education Association. We believe the junior high school organization is a permanent addition to our scholastic machinery. Therefore, we favor a course primarily designed for the six-three-three plan of organization. We desire to call attention to the fact, however, that the program we shall propose will work equally well with the older eight-four type of school.

In the time at the disposal of this committee, and without any financial assistance whatever, it has been clearly out of the question for us to present anything more than a synopsis of the work we favor. We recommend at this time that this association appoint a Committee on Elaboration and Publication, whose duty it shall be to elaborate the course outlined in this report and to canvass the possibilities of the publication of the completed work in accessible form, said committee to report at the spring meeting of this association. We further recommend that the Executive Committee of this association take up the matter of financial assistance for this work with the proper authorities of the Nebraska State Teachers' Association, or otherwise arrange for an appropriation of a sum sufficient to carry forward this project to a successful completion.

We recommend the adoption of the following as a history course for Nebraska schools:

OUR SLOGAN—ONE SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDY EVERY YEAR.
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL.

For the first five years we recommend that the report of the Committee of Eight (published by Charles Scribner's Sons, Chicago, 50 cents) be followed closely.

GRADE ONE—Primitive life and public holidays.

GRADE TWO—Primitive life and public holidays. (Continued.)

GRADE THREE—Pictures of historical scenes and persons in different ages.

GRADE FOUR—Historical scenes and persons in American history. (From early American history to about the Revolutionary period.)

GRADE FIVE—Historical scenes and persons in American history. (From about the Revolutionary period through the Civil War period.)

GRADE SIX—Historical scenes and persons in American history since the Civil War. (This work is not outlined in the report of the Committee of Eight, but there is no reason why more recent Americans should not be given equal attention with those of other generations.) We recommend that about one-half of the history time of this grade be given to this work, and the other half be given to a study of the history of Nebraska—using, probably, Sheldon's "History and Stories of Nebraska."

It will be noted that this committee does not favor a formal textbook study of history in the elementary school, except for the Nebraska history in grade six.

JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL.

GRADE SEVEN—European history to 1300 (first semester). European history to 1688, with attention to American connections (second semester).

GRADE EIGHT—(First semester) American history from 1688 to about 1843, with attention to the European connections. (Second semester) American history from 1843 to the present, with attention to the European connections.

GRADE NINE—(First semester) Civics, with emphasis on the community, state, national, and world aspects. (Second semester) Civics, with emphasis on the economic and vocational aspects.

SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL.

GRADE TEN—European history to about 1600 or 1700, including English history and colonial American history. One day each week devoted to current history, as developed through a standard weekly periodical.

GRADE ELEVEN—European history from 1600 or 1700 to the present, including contemporary civilization. One day each week devoted to current history as developed through a standard weekly periodical.

GRADE TWELVE—(First semester) American history, 1789 to the present day. One day each week devoted to current history as developed through a standard weekly periodical. (Second semester) School authorities will select one of the following lines of work for the semester's study:

1. Comparative Government. (How the world is governed.)
2. Elementary Economics.
3. Elementary International Law.
4. Elementary Sociology.

Continue the use of current history one day each week through the use of a standard weekly periodical.

Respectfully submitted,

C. RAY GATES, Superintendent of City Schools, West Point, Chairman.

J. G. W. LEWIS, Head of History Department, State Normal School, Wayne.

MRS. ADA I. ATKINSON, Head of History Department, Central High School, Omaha.

The "Catholic Educational Review" for November, 1917 (Vol. 14, page 304), prints a paper by Sister Mary Ruth upon "The Specific Means of Training for Citizenship in the Secularized Schools of the United States." The writer traces the history of civic instruction in the United States from the middle of the nineteenth century. Since 1890 she sees four methods of civic instruction: (1) the teaching of emotional patriotism; (2) school organizations, especially the school city and school republic; (3) civics courses; (4) community civics. An analysis is given of the reports of various committees upon the teaching of civics.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY PROFESSOR WAYLAND J. CHASE,
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

JACKSON, F. J. FOAKES. *Social Life in England, 1750-1850*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916. Pp. viii, 338. \$1.50.

These eight lectures, delivered in the Lowell Series for 1916, are aimed to illustrate the various phases of the social life of the period through a more or less gossipy treatment of individuals. These are chosen partly with reference to chronological convenience, and partly because of the wealth of material which relates to them.

Lecture I is devoted to John Wesley's world, chiefly as viewed through his Journals. Lecture II, to George Crabbe, whose works comprise some seven volumes, and whose ability to reflect the manners of his age is undoubted. Lecture III, to the less well-known Margaret Catchpole, whose county of Suffolk comes in for review, largely on the basis of her "Life" by the Rev. Richard Cobbold. Lecture IV, to Cambridge life by means of Gunning's "Reminiscences of Cambridge." Lecture V covers the Regency through Creevy's Memoirs; and rather emphasizes the baleful influence of George IV. Lecture VI is an unusually agreeable examination of Dickens' world, both as it was and as he saw it. Lecture VII considers Thackeray's environment and his success in interpreting it. Lecture VIII is entitled simply "Sport, and Rural England;" but it is regarded through the medium of Surtees' "Mr. Sponge's Sporting Tour."

As a whole, the work, which at first sight impresses one as somewhat unsystematic, appeals more and more to the interest of the reader, and succeeds in interpreting English life in a way both pleasing and effective.

HENRY L. CANNON.

Stanford University.

BARD, HARRY ERWIN. *South America: Study Suggestions*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1916. Pp. 68. 60 cents.

Dr. Bard, in the positions of official adviser of the Ministry of Instruction of Peru and secretary of the Pan-American Society of the United States, has had good opportunities for gaining acquaintance with the literature on South America, and has placed this knowledge in the form of a combination of syllabus and annotated bibliography. The books listed are grouped by subjects and deal with description of South America and the individual countries of it, and also with their languages and literatures.

MINER, W. H. *The American Indians North of Mexico*. Cambridge: University Press, 1917. Pp. xi, 169. \$1.00.

This is a brief handbook written in the hope to provide for the public "a readable, comprehensive (and) authentic account" of the American Indians. It is shorter, more technical and less interesting than the account which President Farrand wrote in 1904 ("The Basis of American History," in the American Nation Series), and does not appear to be better fitted than that work for the use of the general reader or teacher.

WILLIAMSON, JAMES A. *The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire*. London: The Macmillan Co., 1916. Pp. xii, 290. 75 cents.

As announced in the preface, this work is distinctly planned as a text-book. Each chapter is accompanied with

a summary and a list of important dates, and there are ten maps. There are no lists of books for further reading, such as we are accustomed to find.

The aim of the author is to supply "an abundance of vivid detail carefully selected so as to concentrate attention on the salient features of the story," and to avoid generalizations which are more suitable for the consideration of mature minds. In following out this purpose he has presented a very readable book which tempts one to read on always a little farther. Moreover, it is well-balanced and fair in its judgments. For instance, the treatment of Warren Hastings is markedly so, and in accord with the most recent verdicts of historians.

It gives one a slight shock to find at the conclusion of a text-book an explanation of the present war which does not mince words in placing the attitude of the Central Powers in its correct setting. Coming at the conclusion of a sober treatise on English world power it deserves some attention. Although an extract taken out of its connection hardly does justice to itself, we quote the concluding sentences: "The struggle for peace was abortive because one nation was determined for war. When the time was ripe the aggressor struck. The peaceful development of the British Empire and of civilized Europe came to an end on the fatal August day of 1914 when the German hosts poured across their frontiers to spoil the lands of Belgium, France and Poland."

HENRY L. CANNON.

Stanford University.

BEER, GEORGE LOUIS. *The English-Speaking Peoples: Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917. Pp. xi, 322. \$1.50.

The author, sometime lecturer in European history at Columbia University, has gained a wide recognition of his learning through his scholarly books on colonial America. Declaring in the first chapter of this, his latest work, that the present world-wide war "both in its outbreak and in its devastating course has forcibly driven into the minds of most thinking men the firm conviction that the existing system of international relations is out of harmony with the fundamental facts of modern life," he describes the modern system of sovereign states and the international anarchy that prevails because of the limited content and ambiguity of existing international law. The postulate of his second chapter is that the present theory of nationalism, state sovereignty, is in discord with the actual political needs of the world whose tendencies are strongly toward internationalism. In the third chapter he treats of our political philosophy and ideals, especially as to our relations with the rest of the world before 1914. Here he traces the origin of the Monroe doctrine, and our later non-intervention policy, evaluates the results of this policy of isolation and shows its conflict with our increasing assumption of obligations in the far east. Chapter four, entitled, "The Background of the War," deals with the development of Germany's *Weltpolitik* ambitions and her apprehension of what Maximilian Harden called the Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the New and Old World. Out of these grew in Germany a distinctly hostile purpose towards the English-speaking peoples, and in England the slow recognition of the need of a defensive coalition against it. The international relations which Morocco, Persia, China, Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa involve are also discussed. "America's Reaction to the War" is the title to Chapter V. Declaring that "certainly the immediate if not the ultimate fate of western civilization is at stake in this war," he

shows its relations to the United States and discusses our earliest attitude to it, and the reasons and motives that led us to enter it. In these connections he urges that "it is open to the most serious question whether the oft-drawn distinction between the German people and their government is really sound. The German people have for generations been so impregnated with the creed of Teutonic racial superiority, . . . and they have so widely accepted a materialistic code that rejects all moral considerations in interstate relations, that even the overthrow of an autocracy supported by the army and a subservient bureaucracy would by no means guarantee the liberties of the world and make it safe for the peace-loving democracies." He shows that against these now manifest perils American public opinion has come to appreciate the need of forming an after-war league for maintaining world-peace, and discusses the various forms of leagues proposed. Whatever defensive alliances need to be participated in after the war by our country his conclusion in this chapter is that "an alliance of the United States with the British Commonwealth on clearly defined terms of unquestionable explicitness, made in the open light of the day, so that those planning aggression could realize clearly the formidable obstacle in their path, would effectively, though not absolutely, secure the general peace of the future world." This idea he develops and discusses with reference to the internal and domestic concerns of America in the two closely reasoned and illuminating chapters on "The Unity of English-Speaking Peoples" and "Economic Interdependence." In the concluding chapter on "Community of Policy" he still further discusses the same theme from the side of sea power and its control, in its relation not only to safety from invasion, but also to the maintenance of American policies towards Latin America and towards China. In all these chapters there is very much that is both stimulating and convincing, and through them the author has made a very weighty contribution to political science. It is too closely reasoned for high school pupils, but should have a place in every public library.

SEYBOLT, ROBERT FRANCIS. *Apprenticeship and Apprenticeship Education in Colonial New England and New York*. New York: Teachers' College, Columbia University, Contributions to Education, No. 85, 1917. Pp. 121. \$1.00.

Dr. Seybolt has produced an excellent paper of just the right kind on a subject that has received little or no attention from students of colonial history. As far as I know there is no treatise of any sort on the subject of apprenticeship in the American colonies, just as there is almost nothing on the convict system. Apprenticeship was an important factor in the advancement of labor and education in the colonies, and yet Dr. Seybolt is the first one to point out its educational significance. He shows very clearly that apprenticeship in America, though in origin merely a translated practice that had been in vogue in England since the thirteenth century, took on a new form and meaning, when to the familiar industrial and moral features there was added the educational. America gave to apprenticeship a wholly new purpose and used it as a medium through which to enforce the first experiment in compulsory education. This fact alone is sufficient to give apprenticeship an important place as a colonial institution, and we hope that Dr. Seybolt will carry his investigations further and cover the middle and southern colonies also. The apprenticeship system existed in all the colonies, and it would be interesting and profitable to know whether the practices were everywhere the same or whether they differed. It would be

worth while, also, to study apprenticeship in its relation to indentured service and the status of the negro, for there were points of contact between these three forms of service.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

Yale University.

FOERSTER, NORMAN, AND PIERSON, W. W., JR. (editors). *American Ideals*. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917. Pp. viii, 326. \$1.25.

This little volume offers thirty-seven selections from the works of such Americans as Washington, Henry, Jefferson, Clay, Webster, Lincoln, Lowell, Whitman, Emerson, Root, Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and a few of our visitors like Tocqueville and Bryce. About half of the selections are by men still living.

The title might more properly have been "American Political Ideals," for there is but little in the book about our ideals of social and economic readjustment. In the preface the editors quote Emerson as saying, "It is not free institutions, it is not a republic, it is not democracy that is the end—no, but only the means." Possibly some expression of our social and economic ideals might have suggested the end toward which political organization is the means. The political liberty, union, democracy for which America stands, are important enough and would be valued more highly if they were not so well provided; but one constantly asks with Emerson, "They afford an opportunity for what?" American ideals—are they ideals only of political organization? But the selections are well made, and the book is attractive. It is a useful addition to the equipment of the teacher who would help to make the world safe for democracy.

EDGAR DAWSON.

Hunter College of the City of New York.

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CHANGE OF ADDRESS. Both the old and the new address must be given when a change of address is ordered.

ADVERTISING RATES furnished upon application.

"Joseph Hawley's Criticism of the Constitution of Massachusetts," edited by Mary C. Clume, appears in the *Smith College Studies in History* for October, 1917, Vol. 3, No. 1. A brief sketch is given of the life of Hawley and his proposed amendments to the Constitution of Massachusetts in 1780 are given in full, together with his reasons for the urging of these amendments.

BOOKS ON HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED
IN THE UNITED STATES FROM OCTOBER
27 TO NOVEMBER 24, 1917.

LISTED BY CHARLES A. COULOMB, Ph.D.

AMERICAN HISTORY.

- Elliott, Charles B. *The Philippines*; vol. 1, to the end of the military regime. Vol. 2, to the end of the commission government. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 451, 451 pp. \$9.00, net.
- Griffin, Grace Gardner, compiler. *Writings on American History, 1915*. New Haven, Ct.: Yale Univ. 200 pp. \$2.50, net.
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PREPARED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION.*

I. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE WAR.

1. GENERAL FACTORS.

1. The constitution of the German Empire permits its foreign policy to be determined by the Emperor alone, who is at the same time, by "divine right," King of Prussia—the State which possesses an overwhelming territorial, political, and military predominance in the Empire.

"The Emperor declares war with the consent of the Bundesrat, the assent of the Reichstag not being required. Not even the Bundesrat need be consulted if the war is defensive, and as the Hohenzollerns have always claimed to make defensive warfare it is not surprising that even the unrepresentative Bundesrat was officially informed about the present war three days after the Emperor declared it." (Charles D. Hazen, *The Government of Germany*; Committee on Public Information publication.) (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Autocracy," "Kaiserism," "William II.")

2. Profit derived from war in the past by Prussia (Germany).

- (a) Through increase of territory (cf. maps).
- (b) Through indemnities (e. g., from France, 1871).
- (c) Through increased prestige and influence. Hence justification of the "blood and iron" policy of Bismarck, and his predecessors. War as "the national industry" of Prussia.

"The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps of his glorious ancestor. . . . None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. . . . The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911.)

3. Germany's demand for "a place in the sun."

- (a) Meaning of the Kaiser's phrase ("a place in the sun") not clear. It covers vaguely colonies, commerce, and influence in international affairs in proportion to Germany's population, industrial importance, and military power.
- (b) Obstacles. The German Empire was a late-comer in the family of nations; the best regions for colonization and exploitation, especially in the temperate zones, were already occupied by other Powers.
- (c) Examples of the demand. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 6, 10; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Place in the Sun," "Pan-Germanism," etc.)

"We need colonies, and more colonies, than we have

already, to give vent to our surplus energies without losing them and to make the motherland economically independent." (Manifesto of the Colonial League.)

"We need a fleet strong enough not only to protect the colonies we now have, but to bring about the acquisition of others." (Manifesto of the Navy League.)

"A progressive nation like ours needs territory, and if this cannot be obtained by peaceful means, it must be obtained by war. It is the object of the Defense Association [*Wehrverein*] to create this sentiment." (Lieut.-General Wrochem in speech to the *Wehrverein* in March, 1913.)

"Without doubt this acquisition of new lands will not take place without war. *What world power was ever established without bloody struggles?*" (Albrecht Wirth, *Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte*, 1904. Quoted by Andler, *Le Pangermanisme continental*, 1915, p. 308.)

"It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us voluntarily. . . . Till the world comes to an end, the ultimate decision must rest with the sword." (German Crown Prince, in Introduction to *Germany in Arms*, 1913.)

4. Biological argument for war.

- (a) Darwin's theory of the "struggle for existence" as a chief factor in the evolution of species.
- (b) Development in Germany of the theory that States are of necessity engaged in such a "struggle for existence."
- (c) Hence war is an "ordinance of God for the weeding out of weak and incompetent individuals and states." Corollary: "Might makes right."
- (d) Examples of such arguments from Treitschke, Bernhardi, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 1, 2, 4; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Bernhardi," "Treitschke," "War, German View;" Vernon Kellogg, "Headquarters' Nights," in *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1917.)

"War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization. . . . 'To supplant or be supplanted is the essence of life,' says Goethe, and the strong life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the most favorable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. . . .

"Might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute

* This outline was prepared with the active aid of the Committee on Public Information (Department of Civic and Educational Co-operation), 10 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. Frequent reference is made herein to the publications of this committee, which with a few exceptions are distributed free upon application.

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McKinley Publishing Co., Philadelphia.

as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911, pp. 18, 23.)

"They fight, not simply because they are forced to, but because, curiously enough, they believe much of their talk. That is one of the dangers of the Germans to which the world is exposed; they really believe much of what they say." (Vernon Kellogg, in *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1917.)

5. Idea of the German mission in the world, and the German demand for world influence and prestige (Pan-Germanism).

- (a) Ardent belief in the superiority of the German race and German "Kultur" over all other races and civilizations.
- (b) Hence the duty to promote the Germanization of the world, and to oppose the absorption of Germans by other nationalities.
- (c) Examples of these ideas in writings of Treitschke, Rohrbach, Bernhardi, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 1, 2; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bernhardi," "Hegemony, German Ambition," "Kultur," "Pan-Germanism," "Treitschke," "William II.")

"I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times they said *Ciris Romanus sum*, one may in the future need only to say, 'I am a German citizen.'"

"God has called us to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress."

"The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again consummated without Germany and the German Emperor." (Speeches of Emperor William II.)

"The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passive races in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur." (Ludwig Woltmann, *Politische Anthropologie*, 1913.)

"If people should ask us whether we intend to become a world power that overtops the world powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World Power, the reply must be that the will to world power has no limit." (Adolph Grabowsky, in *Das neue Deutschland*, Oct. 28, 1914.)

"By German culture the world shall be healed, and from their experience those who have only heard lies about German culture will perceive, will feel in their own bodies what German means and how a nation must be made up, if it wishes to rule the world." (Benedikt Haag, *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, 1914.)

"With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, and the German language would become the world language." (Theodor Springman, *Deutschland und der Orient*, 1915.)

"Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. 'World power or downfall!' will be our rallying cry." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911, p. 154.)

II. MILITARISM AND ARMAMENTS.

1. Definition of militarism. It is a state of mind; not the having of an army, no matter how large, but the exaltation of it to the chief place in the state, the subordination to it of the civil authorities. Joined to this is the reliance upon military force in every dispute. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Militarism," "Prussianism," etc.)

2. Militarism and the military class dominant in Germany.

- (a) Historical reasons for this: lack of defensible frontiers; hostile neighbors, etc. Relation also to topics under heading 1.
- (b) The Zabern Incident (1913) as a practical example of military domination. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Zabern," "Luxemburg, Rosa.")
- (c) Quotations showing German exaltation of war and army, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 4, 5.)

"Because only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarism is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high estimate of war in its turn makes an essential ingredient of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it as holy." (Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden*, 1915.)

"War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common." (*Jung-Deutschland*, official organ of Young Germany, October, 1913.)

"War is for us only a means, the state of preparation for war is more than a means, it is an end. If we were not beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create it artificially, in order to strengthen our softened and weakened Germanism, to make bones and sinews." (Ernst Hasse, *Die Zukunft des deutschen Volkstums*, 1908.)

"It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests with the army." (Emperor William II.)

Otfried Nippold, a University professor and jurist, was shocked to observe, on his return to Europe from a residence of several years in Japan, the extraordinary growth in Germany of militarism and the "jingo" spirit. At the end of a book which he compiled, made up of statements by prominent Germans in 1912-13 advocating war and conquest, he said: "The evidence submitted in this book amounts to an irrefutable proof that a systematic stimulation of the war spirit is going on, based on the one hand on the wishes of the Pan-German League and on the other on the agitation of the Defense Association [Wehrverein]. . . . War is represented not merely as a possibility that might arise, but as a necessity that must come about, and the sooner the better. In the opinion of these instigators, the German nation needs a war; a long-continued peace seems regrettable to

them just because it is a peace, no matter whether there is any reason for war or not, and therefore, in case of need, one must simply strive to bring it about. . . The desire of the political visionaries in the Pan-German camp for the conquest of colonies suits the purpose of our warlike generals very well; but to them this is not an end, but only a means. War as such is what really matters to them. For if their theory holds good, Germany, even if she conquered ever so many colonies, would again be in need of war after a few decades, since otherwise the German nation would again be in danger of moral degeneration. The truth is that, to them, war is a quite normal institution of international intercourse, and not in any way a means of settling great international conflicts—not a means to be resorted to only in case of great necessity." (*Der deutsche Chauvinismus*, 1913, pp. 113-117; quoted in *Conquest and Kultur*, 137-139.)

3. The competition in armaments. Europe an "armed camp" following 1871, with universal military service, and constantly increasing military forces and expenditures. The trained forces at the beginning of the war were estimated approximately as follows: Russia, 5,900,000; Germany, 4,000,000; Austria, 4,300,000; France, 3,800,000; Great Britain (including its "Territorials" or trained militia), 772,000.
4. Germany, already the first of military powers, planned a Navy to rival that of England. Her first Naval Bill was introduced in 1898; Great Britain's reverses in the Boer War (1899-1902) greatly stimulated German naval activities.

III. FAILURE OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, AND OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON (1908-9).

1. History of the Hague conferences. Agency of Russia and the United States in calling them. Their positive results in formulating international law and establishing a tribunal at the Hague. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hague Conferences," "Hague Conventions," "Hague Regulations," "Hague Tribunal.")
2. Plans therein for disarmament and compulsory arbitration defeated by Germany and Austria.
3. General policy of Germany with reference to arbitration. Refusal to enter into an arbitration treaty with the United States. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 4, 5; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Arbitration, German Attitude," "Peace Treaties.")
4. British vs. German views of the "freedom of the seas," as revealed at the Hague Conferences and the Naval Conference of London. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Freedom of the Seas," "Declaration of London," etc.)

"The German view of freedom of the seas in time of war was that a belligerent should have the right to make the seas dangerous to neutrals and enemies alike by the use of indiscriminating mines; and that neutral vessels should be liable to destruction or seizure without appeal to any judicial tribunal if in the opinion of the commander of a belligerent war-vessel any part of their cargo consisted of contraband. On the other hand, Germany was ever ready to place the belligerent vessels on the same footing as neutral vessels, and to forbid their seizure or destruction except when they were carrying contraband or endeavoring to force a blockade. In this way she hoped to deprive the stronger naval power of its principal weapon of offense—the attack upon enemy commerce—while preserving for the weaker power

every possible means of doing harm alike to enemy or neutral ships. At the same time she was anxious to secure to belligerent merchant-ships the right of transforming themselves into warships on the high seas." (Ramsey Muir, *Mare Liberum: The Freedom of the Seas*, pp. 8-13.)

IV. SOME SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT.

1. French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, taken by Germany in 1871. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Alsace-Lorraine," "Franco-German Rivalry.")
2. Desire of Italy to reclaim its "unredeemed" lands held by Austria. (See *Ibid.*, "Italia Irredenta.")
3. Colonial and commercial rivalry among the Great Powers over Central and Northern Africa (Morocco especially); Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Persia; China and the Far East; South America, etc. (See *Ibid.*, under "Morocco Question," "Franco-German Rivalry.")
4. Increased gravity of questions concerning the Balkan Peninsula after the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Plans for Austrian and German domination in these regions (*Drang nach Osten*) conflicted with Russia's desire to secure Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean, and threatened the security of Great Britain's communications with India. (See *Ibid.*, "Balkan Problem," "Drang nach Osten," etc.)
5. Grouping of the Great Powers into the Triple Alliance (1882) and the Triple Entente. Germany's fear of being "hemmed in" (alleged policy of "encirclement"). (See *Ibid.*, "Encirclement, Policy of," "Triple Alliance," "Triple Entente.")
6. The Anglo-German Problem. (See Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, 1911; *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16.) Due to—

- (a) Menace to Great Britain's industrial and maritime supremacy through Germany's rapid industrial development since 1870.
- (b) Colonial and trade rivalry in Africa, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, etc.
- (c) Hostility to Great Britain taught by Treitschke and others. Doctrine that England was decrepit—"a colossus with feet of clay"—and that her empire would fall at the first hostile touch. Toasts of German officers to "the Day"—when war with Great Britain should come. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Der Tag," "Treitschke," etc.)

"If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is inevitable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult." (Heinrich von Treitschke.)

- (d) Attitude of Great Britain on the whole one of conciliation.
- (e) Failure of the two Powers to arrive at an agreement as to naval armaments and mutual relations. Great Britain proposed (in 1912) to sign the following declaration:

"The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggressions upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which

England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object."

Germany refused to sign a similar declaration unless Great Britain would agree to *stand aside and be neutral in any war which might break out on the Continent*, i. e., to abandon her new friends, France and Russia, and allow Germany to attack them unhampered by fear of British interference.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

For forty years political and economic theories and governmental policies, especially in Germany, had been bringing a great European war ever nearer. Forces making for peace were also in operation, and at times it seemed that these would continue to control the situation. But in 1914 the influences making for war definitely triumphed in Germany and Austria, and precipitated the Great World War.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR (1870-1914).

I. FOUNDATION AND CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT GERMAN EMPIRE.

1. Franco-German War (1870-71), and the Treaty of Frankfurt. France to pay an indemnity of one billion dollars and to cede Alsace-Lorraine.

2. Formation of the German Empire; its undemocratic character. (See C. D. Hazen, *The Government of Germany*; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Autocracy," "Bundesrat," "German Constitution," "Kaiserism," "Reichstag.")

(a) The number of States in the Empire is twenty-five, with one imperial territory (Alsace-Lorraine). The list includes four kingdoms, six grand duchies, five duchies, seven principalities, and three free cities. Each of these States has its separate State government, subordinate to that of the Empire.

(b) The king of Prussia is hereditary "German Emperor," with full direction of military and foreign affairs.

(c) The Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) is a council of ambassadors appointed by the rulers of the separate States, and responsible to them. It oversees the administration and initiates most legislation, and is the most powerful body in the Empire. The States are represented unequally in it. Prussia, which contains two-thirds of the population of Germany, has 17 votes out of a total of 61. (If we include the three votes allotted to Alsace-Lorraine in 1911, which are "instructed" by the Emperor, Prussia has 20 votes in the *Bundesrat*.) Bavaria has six votes, Saxony and Württemberg four each, and the other States fewer.

(d) The *Reichstag* is the representative chamber of the legislature. It is composed of 397 members, of whom Prussia elects 236. Representative districts are very unequal in population. "A Berlin deputy represents on the average 125,000 votes; a deputy of East Prussia, home of the far-famed Junkers, an average of 24,000." The members are elected by manhood suffrage for a term of five years; but the Emperor may (with the consent of the *Bundesrat*) dissolve the *Reichstag* at any time and order new elections.

(e) The administration of the Empire is in the

hands of a ministry, headed by the Imperial Chancellor. Unlike the ministers of true parliamentary governments, the German ministers are responsible to the Emperor, and not to the legislative chamber. They do not need, therefore, to resign their offices when defeated in the *Reichstag*.

II. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

1. The Triple Alliance formed by Germany, Austria, and Italy (1882). Germany's main object was to safeguard herself against an attempt by France to recover Alsace-Lorraine. As France recovered strength Germany plotted new aggressive designs against her.

2. Germany attempted in 1904-05 to form a secret alliance with Russia and France against Great Britain. Failure of the attempt owing to France's unwillingness to give up hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The evidence of this attempt was published in 1917, in a series of letters signed "Willy" and "Nicky" which passed between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and which were discovered in the Tsar's palace after his deposition. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Willy and Nicky Correspondence.")

3. Formation of the Triple Entente.

(a) Dual Alliance of France and Russia formed (1891-94) as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance.

(b) Settlement of England's disputes with France over certain African questions, etc. (1904), and with Russia over Persia, etc. (1907), established the Triple Entente ("good understanding") between those powers.

"France and England were face to face like birds in a cockpit, while Europe under German leadership was fastening their spurs and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They had decided not to fight, and the face of European things was changed." (Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 57.)

III. THREE DIPLOMATIC CRISES: 1905, 1908, 1911.

1. First Morocco crisis, 1905-06. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, 120-126; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Morocco Question," etc.)

(a) French interests in Morocco; slight interests of Germany.

(b) The Tangier incident. The Kaiser, landing from his yacht in Tangier, challenged France's policy in Morocco.

(c) Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dismissed on Germany's demand. "We are not concerned with M. Delcassé's person, but his policy is a menace to Germany, and you may rest assured we shall not wait for it to be realized." (German ambassador to France, in published interview.)

(d) France brought to the bar of Europe in an international conference at Algieras—which, in the main, sanctioned her Moroccan policy.

(e) The purpose of Germany in this crisis, as in those which follow, was to humiliate France and to test the strength of the Triple Entente. These were struggles to increase German prestige.

2. Crisis over Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Bosnia-Herzegovina," "Congress of Berlin," "Pan-Slavism," "Slavs," etc.)

- (a) These provinces freed from direct rule of the Turks by Serbia and Russia, but handed over by the Congress of Berlin to Austria to administer (1878).
- (b) Austria seized the occasion offered by the "Young Turk" Revolution of 1908 to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and refused to refer the question to a European congress for settlement.
- (c) Russia (as yet unrecovered from the Russo-Japanese War) was forced to acquiesce when the Kaiser "took his stand in shining armor by the side of his ally." Humiliating submission imposed on Serbia. (See below, ch. iv, 12a.)

3. Second Morocco crisis, in 1911. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, 120-126; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Morocco Question.")

- (a) Agadir Affair: German cruiser "Panther" sent to Agadir as a protest against alleged French infractions of the Algeiras agreement, and "to show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one side." (Speech of the German Chancellor to the Reichstag.)
- (b) Great Britain, in spite of political difficulties at home, warned Germany that in case of war she would help France.
- (c) Adjustment of the Moroccan question. Germany accepted compensation from France elsewhere in return for recognition of French protectorate over Morocco. (Treaty of November 4, 1911.)
- (d) Furious resentment of the German military party at this outcome. "The humiliation of the Empire is so much the greater, since it is the Emperor himself who had engaged the honor of the German people in Morocco." (*Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*.)

4. Hardening of the German resolve not to accept another diplomatic defeat. "It is not by concessions that we shall secure peace, but by the German sword." (Speech in Reichstag, applauded by the German Crown Prince.)

IV. BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE "MIDDLE EUROPE" PROJECT CONSTITUTE OTHER GROUNDS OF CONFLICT.

1. Germany supplants England as the protector of Turkey against Russia. Speech of the Kaiser at Damascus, 1898: "The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times."
2. The Bagdad Railway. Designed to connect Bagdad with Constantinople and the Central European railways. Germany obtains concession from Turkey for its construction in 1902-03. Political as well as economic motives involved. Threat to British rule in India by proposed extension to the Persian Gulf. (See the *President's Flag Day Address with Evidence of Germany's Plans*, note 15; *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 8; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Berlin to Bagdad," "Corridor," etc.)
3. The "Middle Europe" Project. This may be defined briefly as a plan for "a loosely federal combination for purposes of offense and defense, military and economic, consisting primarily of the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy [Austria-Hungary], but also including the Balkan States and Turkey, together with all the neutral States—Roumania, Greece, the Scandinavian kingdoms, and Holland—that can be drawn within its embrace." (W. J. Ashley, in Introduction to F. Naumann's *Central Europe*, translated by Christabel M. Meridith, 1916.)

The plan includes the domination of this group State by Germany through (a) its control of the common financial and economic policy, and (b) its control of the military forces, based on universal military service. (Compare Prussia's control within the German Empire.) (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 8; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Mittel-Europa," etc.; the *President's Flag Day Address*, notes 15-17.)

4. Union of the Middle Europe project and the Bagdad Railway project in a Berlin-to-Bagdad plan.

"Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous States of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German States themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians—the proud States of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These people did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way." (President Wilson, *Flag Day Address*, June 14, 1917.)

"Across the path of this railway to Bagdad lay Serbia—an independent country whose sovereign alone among those of southwestern Europe had no marriage connection with Berlin, a Serbia that looked toward Russia. That is why Europe was nearly driven into war in 1913; that is why Germany stood so determinedly behind Austria's demands in 1914 and forced war. She must have her 'corridor' to the southeast; she must have political domination all along the route of the great economic empire she planned. She was unwilling to await the process of 'peaceful penetration.'" (*The President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans*, note 15.)

V. TRIPOLITAN AND BALKAN WARS, 1911-13. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Balkan Wars," "Constantinople,"

"Drang nach Osten," "Young Turks.")

1. War of Italy with Turkey over Tripoli (1911-12). Claims of Italy on Tripoli; weakness of Turkey following Young Turk revolution of 1908; unfavorable attitude of Italy's allies (Germany and Austria) to the war as endangering their relations with Turkey. Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 15, 1912) transfers Tripoli from Turkish to Italian rule.
2. War of Balkan Allies against Turkey (1912-13).
 - (a) Secret league of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro to expel Turkey from Europe and

liberate their fellow Christians from Turkish misrule. War declared Oct. 16, 1912.

- (b) Inability of the Great Powers, because of their own divergent aims, to restrain the Balkan allies.
 - (c) Success of the allies. By the Treaty of London (May 30, 1913) Turkey was to surrender all territories in Europe except Constantinople and a small strip of adjacent territory (Enos-Midia line).
3. War among the Balkan Allies (June 30 to Aug. 6, 1913).
- (a) Bulgaria (with Austria's support) attacked her allies as a result of disputes over division of conquered territory.
 - (b) Roumania joined Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro in defeating Bulgaria. Turkey recovered Adrianople.
 - (c) Treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 6, 1913). Most of the conquered territory was given to Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, though Serbia was denied (through Austrian, German, and Italian pressure) an outlet to the Adriatic. A smaller share was given Bulgaria. Roumania secured a slice of Bulgarian territory. Albania was made a principality under a German ruler.
4. Some wider features of these conflicts:
- (a) A general European war was prevented (though with difficulty) by statesmen of the different countries working through the agency of (1) diplomatic notes, and (2) diplomatic conferences held especially at London. Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chief agent in maintaining peace. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Grey, Viscount.")
 - (b) Austrian and German influence was seriously impaired, for they "had guessed badly and supported the losing side—first Turkey and then Bulgaria." Their Balkan domination and Middle Europe project alike were threatened by the events of 1912-13. Corresponding increase of Russian and Serbian power.
 - (c) A new assertion of power on the part of Germany and Austria, principally against Russia and France, to recover the ground lost through the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest was made practically certain.

III. INDICATIONS THAT GERMANY AND AUSTRIA PLANNED AN AGGRESSIVE STROKE BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914.

I. AUSTRIA PROPOSED AN ATTACK ON SERBIA IN 1913. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Austria and Serbia, 1913."

1. Austria's Proposal to Italy (Aug. 9, 1913—the day before the Peace of Bucharest.)

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *causum foederis* of the Triple Alliance. . . ." (Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in dispatch of Aug. 9, 1913. Revealed by ex-Prime Minister Giolitti in speech of Dec. 5, 1914. See *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 401.)

2. Italy declined the proposal, as (apparently) did Germany also. The declination of the latter was probably due to the fact that German military preparations were not yet completed. (See below, V 1.)

"If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a *causum foederis* cannot be established. It is a

step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade from this most perilous adventure." (Reply of Prime Minister Giolitti to above dispatch, *Ibid.*)

II. SECRET MILITARY REPORT ON STRENGTHENING THE GERMAN ARMY (MARCH 19, 1913).

This report came into the possession of the French Minister of War in some unexplained way soon after it was drawn up; it is published in *French Yellow Book*, No. 2; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 130-133.

The following extracts occur in the part headed "Aim and Obligations of Our National Policy, of Our Army, and of the Special Organizations for Army Purposes":

1. Minds of the people must be prepared. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 15-16; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913," etc.)

"We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. . . . We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak [of war] should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 131.)

2. "Stir up trouble in the North of Africa and in Russia."

"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. . . . The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated." (*Ibid.*, p. 32.)

3. Small states to be coerced. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Neutralized State," "Netherlands, German View," etc.)

"In the next European war it will also be necessary that the small States should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland; so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark and Scandinavia. . . . In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank." (*Ibid.*, p. 132.)

4. No guarantee to Belgium for security of her neutrality.

(See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 11; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Belgium, Neutralization of.")

"Our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. . . . If we could induce these States [on our northwestern frontier] to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. . . . If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantage to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

5. Short-term ultimatum to be issued. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")

"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

6. Prizes of the war. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 17.)

"We will . . . remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy [Franche Comté, acquired by Louis XIV] and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces [of Russia] are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

III. CHANGED ATTITUDE OF THE KAISER: INTERVIEW WITH KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM (NOVEMBER, 1913).

1. Circumstances of the interview; held in the presence of General von Moltke (chief of the German General Staff) and reported to Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, "from an absolutely reliable source." Published in *French Yellow Book*, No. 6; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 142-3. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Albert I," "William II," etc.)
2. War with France regarded by the Kaiser as inevitable. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "William II, Ambitions.")

"This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I [Cambon] am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

"The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. . . .

"General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, 'for,' he said to the King [Albert], 'this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresisti-

ble enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.'" (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 142.)

3. Cambon's comment on the interview.

"As William II advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German Army [German army law of 1913, cited below; France met this by increasing her military service from two years to three years], the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.

"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. . . ." (*Ibid.*, p. 143.)

IV. GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AS REPORTED BY FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS (JULY 30, 1913).

(In *French Yellow Book*, No. 5; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 136-142.)

1. The Moroccan settlement considered a diplomatic defeat. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16.)

" . . . Here is a synthesis of all these opinions: The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 136.)

2. Forces making for peace.

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain." Those favoring peace included "the bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct," etc. But the classes which prefer peace to war "are only a sort of make-weight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling." (*Ibid.*, p. 137-138.)

3. Forces making for war. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Arbitration, German Attitude," "Disarmament, German Attitude," "German Military Autocracy, Propaganda for War," "Militarism or Disarmament," "Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913," "War, German View," etc.)

"There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 139.) It included the following:

- (a) Those who regard war as inevitable, and hence "the sooner the better."
- (b) Those influenced by economic reasons—"overpopulation, over-production, the need for markets and outlets," etc.
- (c) Those influenced by "Bismarckism." "They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force."
- (d) Those influenced by "a mystic hatred of revolutionary France," and others who acted from "a feeling of rancor."

4. Social classes included in the war party. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Coal and Iron as Cause of War," "German Diplomacy," "Junker," "Peace Terms, German Industrialists on," "Peace Terms, German Opinion as to," "Peace Terms, German Professors on," "Treitschke," etc.)

- (a) The country squires (junkers), who wish to escape the imposition of inheritance taxes ("death duties") "which are bound to come if peace continues. . . . This aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. . . . This social class, which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 140.)
- (b) The capitalist class ("higher bourgeoisie"), including the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, and all who "regard war as good business." Among these are "doctrinaire manufacturers" who "declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown." (*Ibid.*, p. 140.)
- (c) University professors, etc. "The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. . . . *Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German.* They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession." (*Ibid.*, p. 140-1.)
- (d) Diplomats and others "whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment."

. . . German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact." (*Ibid.*, p. 141.)

5. Must war be considered inevitable?

"The opinion is fairly widely spread even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition."

"Must war then be considered as inevitable? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained." (*Ibid.*, pp. 141-143.)

V. EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY MEASURES OF GERMANY TAKEN BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Egypt," "German Army Act, 1913," "German Intrigue Against American Peace," "Kiel Canal," "Sinn Fein," "South Africa," etc.)

1. Laws of 1911, 1912, and especially 1913, increased the German army in time of peace from 515,000 to 866,000 men. Great increase of machine-gun corps, aviators, etc. Enormous stock of munitions prepared. Exceptional war tax levied of \$225,000,000. Special war fund (for expense of mobilization, etc.) increased from \$30,000,000 to \$90,000,000.
2. Reconstruction of Kiel canal (connecting Baltic and North Sea) hastened so as to be ready in early summer of 1914. Fortifications of Helgoland, etc., improved.
3. Strategic railways constructed leading to Belgian, French, and Russian frontiers.

"Germany had made ready, at heavy outlay, to take the offensive at a moment's notice, and to throw enormous forces across the territories of two unoffending and pacific neighbors [Belgium and Luxemburg] in her fixed resolve to break through the northern defenses of France, and thus to turn the formidable fortifications of the Vosges. She has prepared for the day by bringing fully-equipped and admirably constructed railways up to her neighbors' frontiers, and in some places across them. . . . An immense sum of money has been sunk in these railways, . . . and there is not the least prospect of an adequate return on them as commercial ventures. They are purely military and strategic preparations for war with France." (See *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1910, and February, 1914, and *New York Times Current History*, I, 1000-1004.)

4. Exportation of chemicals used in making explosives greatly reduced in 1913-14, and importation of horses, foodstuffs, and fats (used in nitroglycerin) greatly in-

creased to provide war stocks. Great purchases of beds and hospital supplies in May, 1914; embargo on stocks of foreign pneumatic tires in Germany; hasty collection of accounts by German merchants; transfer of bank balances, etc., from beginning of July, etc. (See *Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 9-10.)

5. Recall of reservists from South America, etc., in May and June, 1914.

6. Exceptional grand manœuvres of 1914. Ordered in May, these massed "500,000 men in Cologne, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine for the month of August." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 9.)

7. Preparations for stirring up revolt in the British Empire.

(a) In South Africa. Reply of the Kaiser (in 1913) to a communication from the future rebel leader, Colonel Maritz: "I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately." (Speech of General Botha at Cape Town, July 25, 1915. See Rose, *Development of the European Nations*, 5th ed., II, p. 379.)

(b) In British India. On July 8, 1915, indictments were brought in the Federal Court at San Francisco against 98 persons, including German consuls, at which time the Federal District Attorney said: "For more than a year prior to the outbreak of the European war certain Hindus in San Francisco and certain Germans were preparing openly for war with England. At the outbreak of the war Hindu leaders, members of the German consulate here, and attachés of the German Government, began to form plans to foment revolution in India for the purpose of freeing India and aiding Germans in their military operations." The leaders of these defendants plead guilty to the charges against them in December, 1917. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Intrigue Against American Peace.")

"Consideration of all testimony leads to the conviction that the India plot now before the Federal Court here [in Chicago] is but a very small part of the whole conspiracy. . . . The defendants appear to have traveled far and wide in promotion of their alleged work. And always, testimony indicates, German consuls were aware of what was going on and ready to give things a push. Pro-Germanism all over the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Hawaii, Manila, China, Indo-China, Siam, Java, and various parts of Africa has been brought into the case. No part, according to the testimony, seems to have been detached. All blended into the whole scheme, which is alleged to have had its inspiration and propulsion in Berlin." (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 19, 1917.)

8. Coaling arrangements made for German naval vessels (June 14, 1914).

"A German cruiser, the *Eber*, was in dock at Cape Town a few days before the outbreak of war, and got away just in time. An intercepted letter addressed to the commander contained certain instructions from Berlin, which were dated June 14, 1914. These instructions revealed a complete system for coaling the German navy on the outbreak of war through secret service agents in Cape Town, New York and Chicago.

"The commander of the *Eber* was given the names of shippers and bankers with whom he could deal confidentially, the essence of the plan being that a collier would leave Table Bay [Cape Colony] ostensibly bound for England, but really to meet a German warship at an agreed rendezvous. Naturally, so far as Cape Town is concerned, the arrangements have been upset owing to the discovery, and this, perhaps, explains why German cruisers have been more in evidence in North Atlantic waters than in the southern ocean." (Cape Town correspondent of *London Times*, issue of October 6, 1914.)

- VI. CONCLUSION. Before June 28, 1914, Germany willed, if not war, at least another trial of diplomatic strength in which the threat of war should enter as a decisive factor.

"There is a whole category of facts to which we do not, temporarily, attach a decisive importance, for the spirit of mathematics can invoke in its favor the benefit of coincidence. . . . It is a question of various measures taken by Germany (the state or individuals) long before the menace of war was appreciable. . . . Certain persons would see in those measures, of which the war has demonstrated the utility, the proof that Germany had, months before, taken the resolve to launch the European war in 1914. When one has seen the German Government at work, this hypothesis is not extravagant." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 9-10.)

"Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. . . . We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view, and with the conviction, that Germany, as a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. . . . Now strikes the hour for Germany's rising power." (Maximilian Harden, editor of *Die Zukunft*; see *New York Times Current History*, III, p. 130.)

"It now appears beyond the possibility of doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a long and settled purpose. For many years she had been preparing to do exactly what she has done, with a thoroughness, a perfection of plans, and a vastness of provision in men, munitions and supplies never before equaled or approached in human history. She brought the war on when she chose, because she chose, in the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation." (Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, September 14, 1917.)

IV. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONTROVERSY.

I. INTRODUCTION: PRIOR RELATIONS OF SERBIA, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA.

1. Previous history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under Stephen Dusan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; independent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent years of "Greater Serbia" movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.")
2. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.
 - (a) Political estrangement due to Austria's high-handed annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Serbia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. Declaration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31):
 "Serbia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (*British Blue Book*, No. 4; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 4.)
 - (b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was imposed in 1906.
 - (c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north," who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." (*Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 19; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 465.)
 - (d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway required that Serbia should be controlled by Austria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.)
3. Russia's interest in Serbia—founded upon kinship in blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Germany recognized that their policy toward Serbia might lead to war with Russia. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Pan-Slavism.")

"During the Balkan crisis he [the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia." (Report of British Ambassador to Russia. *British Blue Book*, No. 139; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 101.)

"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies." (*German White Book*; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 406.)

II. THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION (JUNE 28, 1914).

1. Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and his wife, while on an official visit to Serajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia. Failure of first attempt at assassination by explosion of a bomb; success of second attempt, some hours later, by revolver shots. The assassins were Austrian subjects of Serbian nationality. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Serajevo.")
2. Opportuneness of the crime for Austria. (See Ramsay Muir, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, p. 152.)

III. AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA (JULY 23, 1914.)

1. Preliminaries: Secret investigation of the crime by the Austrian court at Serajevo. (Reports of the alleged results in *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 490-4; *Austrian Red Book*, Appendix 8, and *German White Book*, Appendix; summary, p. 416-7.) Quieting reports as to its intentions issued by Austrian Government, but preparations made in secret for rigorous measures against Serbia.
 "A reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided." (Austrian Minister at Belgrade to Austrian Government, July 21, 1914. In *Austrian Red Book*, No. 6; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 452.)
2. Conference at Potsdam (July 5, 1914), at which the terms of the Note were practically settled. The holding of such a conference has been denied by German newspapers, but the denial is not convincing. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Potsdam Conference"; *New York Times*, *Current History*, September, 1917, pp. 469-471.)
3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatum to which unconditional acceptance must be given within forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of its demands. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")
 "I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." (Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in *British Blue Book*, No. 5; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 13.)
 "The demands of that [the Austrian] Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized State in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war." (German Socialist newspaper *Vorwärts*, July 25, 1914.)
4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those of the Note itself. (See *British Blue Book*, No. 4; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 3-12.)

"2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana [the chief society for Serbian propaganda], to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form."

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary."

"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto."

5. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.

"We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations." (*German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 406.)

This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (See Ramsay Muir, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Austrian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Balkans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program? The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which certainly was not consulted.

6. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult: Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate withdrawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a remote mountain resort, etc., etc.
7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and France make urgent endeavors:
- (a) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meeting the demands of Austria.
 - (b) To obtain an extension of the time limit, in order (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Serajevo; and (2) to permit them to exercise a moderating influence on Serbia. Sharp refusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later proposals see ch. v.)

IV. SERBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE (JULY 25, 1914).

(See *British Blue Book*, No. 39; *Collected Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 31-37.)

1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia—
 - (a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands.
 - (b) Returned a qualified refusal to the other two.

As to No. 5, the Serbian Government said that they "do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, . . . but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."

As to No. 6, they returned a temperate refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a deliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the demand): "It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or even-

tually may be, implicated in the plot, . . . and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal [Austro-Hungarian] Government, the Royal [Serbian] Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents."

(c) In conclusion, Serbia suggested reference to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in case its reply was not considered satisfactory.

2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dishonest and evasive. (See *Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 34; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 506-514.)

Two hours after receiving it the Austrian Minister left Belgrade with all his staff. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.

The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Government could "no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." (*British Blue Book*, No. 93; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 70.)

V. AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914).

1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain, Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Serbia, July 28, 1914.
2. Demand of Germany that the war be "localized"—i. e., that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastisement of Serbia.
3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their chief fear was lest something might, against their wills, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the haste and secrecy which attended their measures.

"The impression left on my mind is that the *Austro-Hungarian Note* was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country [Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In *British Blue Book*, No. 41; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 38.)

"He [the German Secretary of State] admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the Note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document." (British Charge at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, July

25, 1914. *British Blue Book*, No. 18; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 22.)

"In the Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen arrogance has no precedent in history, each phrase bears witness that Austria-Hungary desired the war. . . . Only a war, for which the best minds of the army were thirsting, . . . could cure the fundamental ills of the two halves of the Austrian Empire, and of the monarchy. Only the refusal and not the acceptance of the claims put forward in the note could have profited Vienna.

"The question has been asked: Where was the plan of campaign elaborated—in Vienna or Berlin? And some hasten to reply: In Vienna. Why do people tolerate the propagation of such dangerous fables? Why not say the thing that is (because it must be), namely, that a complete understanding in all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna." (Maximilian Harden, in *Die Zukunft* for August 1, 1914; quoted in G. Alexinsky, *Russia and the Great War*, 129-130.)

2. Austria's object was to reduce Serbia to a state of vassalage, as a step to Austrian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. Her promises not to destroy Serbia's sovereignty, or to annex her territory, therefore, failed to satisfy Serbia's friends.

"Austria demanded conditions which would have placed Serbia under her permanent control." (Prof. Hans Delbrück, a noted professor and statesman of Germany, in *Atlantic Monthly*, for February, 1915, p. 234.)

3. Germany's objects were:

- (a) To recover her prestige, lost in the Agadir affair (1911) and over the Balkan wars (1912-13).
- (b) To strengthen her ally Austria, and so increase her own power.
- (c) To humiliate Russia and the Triple Entente, and to disrupt or render harmless the latter.
- (d) To promote the Central European—"Berlin to Bagdad"—project, and open a trade route to Salonika, the most favorably situated seaport for the commerce of Central Europe with the East.

4. To advance these ends Germany and Austria deliberately incurred the grave risk of a general European war.

V. FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY TO AVERT WAR: GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AT WAR WITH RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

I. OUTLINE OF EVENTS, JULY 21 TO AUGUST 5, 1914.

- July 21. Secret orders preliminary to mobilization issued in Germany. These measures, including the movement of troops towards the French frontier, continued up to final mobilization. (See *Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 14-25; *Nineteenth Century and After*, issue for June, 1917.)
- July 23. Austrian Note sent to Serbia.
- July 25. Reply of Serbia. Austrian Minister quits Belgrade, severing diplomatic relations.
- July 27. Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference at London on the Serbian question. France, Russia, and Italy accepted; Germany refused.
- July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia.
- July 29. Russian mobilization on the Austro-Hungarian frontier.
- July 30. Bombardment of Belgrade. General Mobilization in Russia begun.
- July 31. "Threatening danger of war" proclaimed in

Germany. German sent ultimatums to Russia and to France.

- Aug. 1. Orders for general mobilization in France and in Germany. Declaration of war by Germany against Russia. Italy declared that she would remain neutral since "the war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German ambassador himself, an aggressive object." *British Blue Book*, No. 152; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 107.)
- Aug. 2. Occupation of Luxemburg by Germany. Demand that Belgium also permit German troops to violate its neutrality.
- Aug. 3. Belgium refused the German demand. Germany declared war on France.
- Aug. 4. Germany invaded Belgium. Great Britain declared war on Germany.
- Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.

II. PROPOSALS FOR PRESERVING PEACE.

1. A conference at London proposed by Sir Edward Grey (July 27). To be composed of the German and Italian ambassadors to Great Britain, as friends of Austria, and the French ambassador and Grey himself, as friends of Russia. Its purpose, to discover "an issue which would prevent complications."

"If it is borne in mind how incomparably more difficult problems had been successfully solved by the conference of ambassadors at London during the Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference." (*I Accuse*, p. 155.)

The proposal was accepted by Russia, France, and Italy. It was declined by Germany (without consulting Austria) on the ground that she "could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal." (*German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 409.) Grey explained that it "would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion;" nevertheless, Austria and Germany continued to decline.

2. Germany proposed (July 26) that France "exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg." The French Foreign Minister in reply "pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Serbia. The [German] ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 28; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 276.)
3. Germany proposed direct negotiations between Russia and Austria over the Serbian question (July 27). Austria declined these direct negotiations, even though proposed by her ally. (Was this due to collusion between the two Governments?)
4. The Kaiser (who unexpectedly returned to Berlin on July 26 from a yachting cruise) attempted to act as "mediator" between Russia and Austria; but apparently he confined himself to the effort to persuade Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen." (Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, in *German White Book*, exhibit 22; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 431-2.)

"Neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor over

that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace." (J. M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case*, p. 112.)

5. The Tsar proposed, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser (July 29), "to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 542.) This telegram is omitted from the *German White Book*: "The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace, and for this reason it was declined." (*I Accuse*, p. 187, note.)
6. Proposal by Grey (July 29) that Austria should express herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.

King George of England, in a personal telegram (July 30) to the Kaiser's brother, said: "I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 539.)

Grey's expressed opinion (July 29) was that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace." (*British Blue Book*, No. 84; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 64.)

7. Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 30): "If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 60; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 288.)

Reply of German Foreign Minister that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 63; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 289.)

8. Second Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 31): "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 67; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 291.)

This proposal remained unanswered.

9. Austria declared (August 1) that she was then "ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 73; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 293.)

Sir Edward Grey comments: "Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." (*British Blue Book*, No. 131; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 97.) From July 30 onwards "the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight." (British Ambassador at Vienna, in

British Blue Book, No. 161; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 117.)

But it was then too late, as Germany had already resolved upon war, and was preparing her ultimatums which precipitated the conflict.

III. GERMAN ULTIMATUMS AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

1. A council of war, held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, apparently decided definitely to make war on France and Russia.

"Our innermost conviction is that it was on this evening that the decision of war was reached. The 5th of July, before his departure for a cruise on the coasts of Norway, the Kaiser had given his consent to the launching of the Serbian venture. The 29th of July he decided for war." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 38.)

"People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation *en bloc* if war were not resolved on." (*I Accuse*, p. 189.)

2. General mobilization of Russian army (July 30-31). This was grounded not merely on the measures of Austria, but also on "the measures for mobilization [against Russia] taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days." (*French Yellow Book*, No. 118; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 223.)

The Tsar assured the Kaiser: "It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon." (*German White Book*; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 411.)

For evidence of German mobilization against France beginning as early as July 21, see *Nineteenth Century and After*, issue for June, 1917. Consult also *I Accuse*, pp. 194-201; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Mobilization Controversy."

3. German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, midnight) demanding that the Government "suspend their military measures by midday on August 1" (twelve hours).

Demand addressed to France (July 31, 7.00 p. m.) as to "What the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia?" (*French Yellow Book*, No. 117; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 223.) The French Prime Minister answered (August 1, 1.05 p. m.) that "France would do that which her interests dictated." (*German White Book*, exhibit 27; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 434.)

4. Declaration of war against Russia at 7.10 p. m. on August 1, following Russia's failure to demobilize. (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 76; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 294.)

Orders for a general mobilization of the French army were signed at 3.40 p. m. the same day.

5. Declaration of war against France on August 3 (*French Yellow Book*, No. 147; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 240.)

This declaration contained charges that France had already violated German territory (e. g., by dropping bombs from aeroplanes on railway tracks near Nuremberg). These charges are now shown to be falsehoods. (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 130-230; pamphlet entitled, *German Truth and a Matter of Fact*, London, 1917.) To avoid possible clashes

through hot-headedness of her troops and under-officers, France withdrew her troops 10 kilometers (about six miles) within her own frontiers. On the other hand, German bands repeatedly crossed the French frontier, and even killed a French soldier on French soil before the declaration of war. (*French Yellow Book*, No. 106.)

Similar falsehoods were inserted in the Austrian declaration of war on *Serbia*, and in the German declaration of war on *Russia*. Falsehood and forgery were used with Machiavellian unscrupulousness by Germany in the conduct of her foreign affairs. (Compare Bismarck's changes in the "Ems dispatch" at beginning of Franco-German war and his diabolical pleasure that war with France thus became certain. Bismarck, *Autobiography*, II, p. 101. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy," etc.)

IV. GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.

The testimony is overwhelming not only that Germany planned with Austria an aggressive stroke in 1914, but that in the end it was she who willed the war. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "War, Responsibility for.")

"The constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula [of July 31], declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power had ever been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war." (Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 31, in *French Yellow Book*, No. 114; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 221.)

"Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its commission been denied with greater effrontery and hypocrisy." (*I Accuse*, pp. 208-9.)

"The German Government contrived the war jointly in concert with the Austrian Government, and so burdened itself with the greatest responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war. *The German Government brought on the war under cover of deception practised upon the common people and even upon the Reichstag* (note the suppression of the ultimatum to Belgium, the promulgation of the German White Book, the elimination of the Czar's despatch of July 29, 1914, etc.)." (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, German Socialist, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

"The object of this war [on the part of the opponents of Germany] is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, *having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out* without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices

and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. *This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people.* It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling." (President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peace proposals, August 27, 1917.)

VI. VIOLATION OF BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY BRINGS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

I. WHY GREAT BRITAIN WAS EXPECTED TO STAY OUT.

1. Embittered state of party relations growing out of the Budget struggle of 1909-11, the limitation of the veto of the House of Lords in 1911, violence of the suffragettes ("the wild women"), and the passage by the House of Commons of the Irish Home Rule bill (May 25, 1914).
2. Serious threat of rebellion in northern Ireland (Ulster) against putting in force Irish Home Rule act. Organization of armed forces under Sir Edward Carson; "gun running" from Germany.
3. Widespread labor troubles, especially among the railway workers.
4. Unrest in India, following administrative division of the province of Bengal; boycott movement; revolutionary violence attending Nationalist (Hindu) agitations.
5. Unwarlike character of the British people; a "nation of shopkeepers" supposedly unready for the sacrifices of war. Progress of pacifist opinions ("Norman-Angellism").
6. Lack of an army adequate for use abroad. Composed of volunteers ("mercenaries") instead of being based on compulsory service, it was regarded (in the Kaiser's phrase) as "contemptible."

II. BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR.

1. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, labored unremittingly for peace. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Grey and British Policy, 1914.")

"Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the name of the 'peacemaker of Europe.' . . . His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and energy will remain inextinguishable in history." (*I Accuse*, pp. 247-8.)

"No man in the history of the world has ever labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend, Sir Edward Grey, for that which is the supreme interest of the modern world—a general and abiding peace. . . . We preserved by every expedient that diplomacy can suggest, straining to almost the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations, even to the last making effort upon effort and hoping against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay between honor and dis-

honor, between treachery and good faith, and that we had at last reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then, and only then, that we declared for war." (Prime Minister Asquith, at the Guildhall, London, September 4, 1914.)

"Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal," etc. (*German White Book*; in *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 410.) Similar admissions that Great Britain strove sincerely and energetically for peace are found in other passages in the *German White Book*. Later the German Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, declared: "The inner responsibility [for the war] lies on the Government of Great Britain. . . . England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel." (Speech in Reichstag, December 2, 1914.) This statement, however, is palpably false.

2. British fleet kept together after the summer manoeuvres (July 27). Importance of this step.

"I pointed out [to the Austrian ambassador] that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt [over the Serbian question]." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 48; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 43.)

3. Her liberty of action reserved; Great Britain was free for engagements (July 29).

"In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. . . . We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because . . . we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn [the German ambassador] not to count on our standing aside, but that it would not be fair that I should let [the French ambassador] be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in *British Blue Book*, No. 87; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 65-66.)

4. Germany's "Infamous Proposal" of July 29 (following the Potsdam council of that date, at which war apparently was resolved upon). In return for *British neutrality in case of war between Germany and France*, the German Chancellor promised: (a) Not to aim at "territorial acquisitions at the expense of France" in Europe; (b) a similar undertaking with respect to the French colonies was refused; (c) the neutrality of Holland would be observed as long as it was respected by Germany's adversaries; (d) in case Germany was obliged to violate Belgium's neutrality, "when the war

was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

"He [the German Chancellor] said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." (British Ambassador at Berlin, in *British Blue Book*, No. 85; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 64.)

5. This proposal was emphatically rejected by Great Britain. "What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 101; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 77. Compare Germany's attitude over Great Britain's proposal for a naval compact in 1912—see ch. i, IV 6 (c).)

The proposals of July 29 may be regarded as "the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved, while Holland would be left alone." (J. H. Rose, *Development of the European Nations*, 5th ed., II, p. 387.)

6. Grey holds out the prospect of a League of Peace (July 30). In his reply to the foregoing proposals, the British Foreign Secretary adds:

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between

the Powers than has been possible hitherto." (*British Blue Book*, No. 101; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 78.)

Germany made no reply to the above suggestion.

7. Would Great Britain keep out if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality? (August 1.)

"He [the German Ambassador] asked me [Sir Edward Grey] whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

"I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

"I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free." (*British Blue Book*, No. 123; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 93.)

8. Great Britain not to come in if Russia and France rejected reasonable peace proposals; otherwise she would aid France (July 31).

"I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 111; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 86.)

9. Great Britain gives Naval assurance to France (August 2), following the German declaration of war on Russia (August 1) and the invasion of Luxemburg.

"I am authorized [by the British Cabinet] to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in *British Blue Book*, No. 148; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 105.)

This assurance was given as the result of an arrangement of several years' standing whereby the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean and the British by agreement in the North Sea. "It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated." (Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at Paris, in *British Blue Book*, No. 148; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 105.)

III. NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG AND OF BELGIUM VIOLATED.

1. Luxemburg invaded by German troops (August 2). This was in violation of the Treaty of London (1867),

as well as of her rights as a neutral state in general. (See Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 2-5; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Luxemburg," "Neutral Duties," "Neutrality," "Neutralized State.")

2. Special status of Belgium as a Neutralized State. Based upon the Treaty of London (1839), by which Belgium became "an independent and perpetually neutral state, . . . bound to observe such neutrality towards all other states," and Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia became the "guarantors" of her neutrality. The German Empire was the successor to Prussia in this guarantee. Confirmation of Belgium's neutrality in 1870, by treaties between Great Britain and Prussia and Great Britain and France. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Neutralization.")

"Had Belgium been merely a small neutral nation, the crime [of her violation] would still have been one of the worst in the history of the modern world. The fact that Belgium was an internationalized State has made the invasion the master tragedy of the war. For Belgium represented what progress the world had made towards co-operation. If it could not survive, then no internationalism was possible. That is why, through these years of horror upon horror, the Belgian horror is the fiercest of all. The burning, the shooting, the starving, and the robbing of small and inoffensive nations is tragic enough. But the German crime in Belgium is greater than the sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the basis of faith on which the world must build or perish." (Walter Lippman, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1917).

3. German reassurances to Belgium in 1911 and 1914.

"Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty." (German Minister of War, in the Reichstag, April 29, 1911. See *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 12; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 306.)

"The troops will not cross Belgian territory." (German Minister to Belgium, early on August 2, 1914, to Brussels journalists. In H. Davignon, *Belgium and Germany*, p. 7.)

"Up to the present he [the German Minister to Belgium, on August 2] had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbors." (Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 19; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 309.)

4. France officially assured Great Britain and Belgium of her resolve to respect Belgium's neutrality (July 31 and August 1), in response to an inquiry addressed by Great Britain to both France and Germany. (*British Blue Book*, No. 115 and 125; *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 15; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 87, 94, 307.)

5. Germany declined to give such an official assurance (July 31)—apparently on the ground that "any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." (*British Blue Book*, No. 122; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 92.)

6. Germany demanded (August 2 at 7.00 p. m.) permission to pass through Belgium on the way to France, alleging (falsely) that France intended to march into Belgium, and offering to restore Belgium and to pay an indemnity at the end of the war. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, she would be considered "as an enemy,"

and Germany would "undertake no obligations" towards her. (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 20; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 309-311.)

7. Belgium refused such permission (August 3). "The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe." (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 22; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 312.)

8. German armed forces entered Belgium on the morning of August 4. Belgium thereupon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia, as guaranteeing Powers, to come to her assistance in repelling the invasion.

9. Germany's justification of her action.

(a) Plea of necessity. "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. . . . We know . . . that France stood ready for an invasion [this statement was false]. France could wait, we could not. . . . The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through." (Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Bethmann Hollweg," "Kriegs-Raison," "Notwendigkeit.")

(b) Charge that Belgium had violated her own neutrality by concluding military conventions with England in 1905 and 1912 directed against Germany. This claim is based on a willful misinterpretation of documents discovered by Germany in Brussels after the taking of that city. (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 350-367.)

"That a wrong was done to Belgium was originally openly confessed by the perpetrator. As an afterthought, in order to appear whiter, Cain blackened Abel. In my opinion it was a spiritual blunder to rummage for documents in the pockets of the quivering victim. . . . To calumniate her in addition is really too much." (Karl Spitteler, a Swiss, quoted in *I Accuse*, p. 234.)

(c) Military expediency was the real reason. This is shown, among other indications, by an interview (August 3, 1914) between the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Belgian Minister to Germany.

German Minister: "It is a question of life or death for the Empire. If the German armies do not want to be caught between the hammer and the anvil they must strike a decisive blow at France, in order then to turn back against Russia."

Belgian Minister: "But the frontiers of France are sufficiently extended to make it possible to avoid passing through Belgium."

Foreign Minister: "They are too strongly fortified." (H. Davignon, *Belgium and Germany*, p. 14.)

IV. GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR.

1. Appeal of King Albert of Belgium to King George (August 3). "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention

of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 25; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 313.)

2. Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany (August 4) asking assurance by midnight that "the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany." (*British Blue Book*, No. 153, 159; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 107-109.)

3. War declared by Great Britain (about midnight, August 4). The "scrap of paper" utterance.

The account of the last interview (about 7.00 p. m., August 4) of the British Ambassador with the German Chancellor is instructive: "I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; *just for a word—'Neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper* Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What he had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow [German Foreign Minister] *wishes me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?* The Chancellor said, *'But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?'* I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument." (*British Blue Book*, No. 160; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 111. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Scrap of Paper.")

4. Great Britain's reasons for entering the war.

(a) Her obligations to Belgium under the treaty of 1839.

(b) Her relations to France growing out of the Entente Cordiale (1904). These ties were strengthened in subsequent years by consultations of British and French naval experts, but no promise of anything more than diplomatic support was given until August 2, 1914.

"We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in any contingency that has not yet arisen and may

never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, November 22, 1912; see *New York Times Current History*, I, p. 283.)

"There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France [of August 2, 1914] that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that." (Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914; *New York Times Current History*, I, p. 289.)

(c) Self-interest—the realization that Germany's hostility to her was implacable, and that if Great Britain was not to surrender her position as a Great Power in the world, and possibly a goodly portion of her colonial possessions, she must ultimately fight Germany; if so, better in alliance with France and Russia than alone at a later time.

5. Great Britain's declared war aims.

"We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." (Prime Minister Asquith, November 9, 1914.)

"I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our allies and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained. . . . is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the continent discomfort by its continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the continent into war." (Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, January 26, 1916.)

"What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want a Europe free, not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war, free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, from perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords. In fact, we feel we are fighting for equal rights; for law, justice, peace; for civilization throughout the world as against brute force, which knows no restraint and no mercy.

"What Prussia proposes, as we understand her, is

Prussian supremacy. She proposes a Europe modelled and ruled by Prussia. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbors and of us all. We say that life on these terms is intolerable. And this also is what France and Italy and Russia say. We are fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost the desirability, of ever recurrent war. Germany's philosophy is that a settled peace spells degeneracy. Such a philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity. . . .

"The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of this war unredressed. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make no attempt to discriminate between the rights and the wrongs of this war are ineffective if not irrelevant.

"The Prussian authorities have apparently but one idea of peace, an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to war till it is defeated and renounced." (Sir Edward Grey to correspondent of *Chicago Daily News*, in June, 1916.)

VII. THE WAR SPREADS—CHARACTER OF THE WAR

I. OTHER STATES ENTER THE WAR.

1. Montenegro declares war (Aug. 7, 1914), as an ally of Serbia.
2. Japan declares war (Aug. 23), because of—
 - (a) Alliance with Great Britain (concluded in 1902; renewed in 1905 and 1911).
 - (b) Resentment at German ousting of Japan from Port Arthur in 1895, and German seizure of Kiao-Chau Bay (China) in 1897. Japanese ultimatum to Germany in 1914 modeled on that of Germany to Japan in 1895.
 - (c) Japan captures Tsingtsu, on Kiao-Chau Bay (Nov. 17, 1914). Thenceforth her part in the military operations of the war was light.
3. Unneutral acts of Turkey (sheltering of German war-ships) bombardments of Russian Black Sea ports, Oct. 29, etc.) lead to allied declarations of war against her (Nov. 3-5, 1914). It is now proved that Turkey was in alliance with Germany from August 4, 1914. (See *N. Y. Times Current History*, Nov., 1917, p. 334-335.)
4. Italy declares war on Austria, (May 23, 1915; on Germany August 27, 1916.) Due in part to—
 - (a) Italy's desire to complete her unification by acquiring from Austria the Italian-speaking Trentino and Trieste (*Italia Irredenta*).
 - (b) Conflicts of interests with Austria on the Eastern shore of the Adriatic.
 - (c) Austria-Hungary's violation of the Triple Alliance agreement by her aggressive policy in the Balkans.
5. Bulgaria, encouraged by Russian and British reverses, and assured by Germany of the much coveted shore on the Aegean, makes an alliance with Austria and Germany and attacks Serbia (Oct. 13, 1915). Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy thereupon declared war on Bulgaria (Oct. 16-19.) Refusal of King Constantine of Greece to fulfill his treaty with Serbia.

6. Portugal drawn into the war (March 9, 1916) through her long-standing alliance with Great Britain.
7. Roumania, encouraged by Allied successes early in 1916, attacks Austria-Hungary in order to gain Transylvania (Aug. 27, 1916.)
8. Further spread of the war: United States declares war on Germany, April 6, 1917 (see chapter IX)—Greece deposes King Constantine and joins the Entente Allies (June 12, 1917).—Siam, China and Brazil enter the war against the Teutonic Allies; Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, etc., sever diplomatic relations with Germany. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "War, Declaration of.")

II. WORLD-WIDE CHARACTER AND IMPORTANCE OF THE CONFLICT.

1. The most widespread and terrible war in history. A score of countries involved; compare the size of the belligerent areas and populations with those remaining neutral, of the States arrayed against Germany with those on her side.

"At least 38,000,000 men are bearing arms in the war—27,500,000 on the side of the world Allies and 10,600,000 on the side of the Central Powers—according to latest War Department compilations from published reports in various countries. These figures do not include naval personnel strength, which would raise the total several millions. Against Germany's 7,000,000, Austria's 3,000,000, Turkey's 300,000 and Bulgaria's 300,000, are arrayed the following armed forces: Russia, 9,000,000; France, 6,000,000; Great Britain, 5,000,000; Italy, 3,000,000; Japan, 1,400,000; United States, more than 1,000,000; China, 541,000; Roumania, 320,000; Serbia, 300,000; Belgium, 300,000; Greece, 300,000; Portugal, 200,000; Montenegro, 40,000; Siam, 36,000; Cuba, 11,000, and Liberia, 400."—(Associated Press dispatch, Oct. 22, 1917.)

2. Universal disorganization of commerce and industry. Widespread suffering even in neutral countries. Problems of food-supply, coal, and other necessities of life.
3. Importance of the issues involved: Government of the world by negotiation, arbitration, and international law, *vs.* reliance upon military force, and the principle that "might makes right."—Humanity *vs.* "frightfulness."—Democracy and freedom *vs.* autocracy and slavery.

III. INNOVATIONS IN WARFARE DUE TO THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND INVENTION.

1. New Developments in trenches and trench fighting. Vast and complicated systems of deep and narrow trenches, inter-communicating; underground refuge chambers of timber and concrete; elaborate barbed wire entanglements; shell craters fortified with "pill boxes" of steel and concrete as gun emplacements. Defended by men with magazine rifles and machine guns; use of hand grenades, trench mortars, sapping and mining; steel helmets and gas masks. "Camouflage," the art of concealment. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Barbed-wire Entanglements," "Camouflage," "French warfare," etc.)
2. Great guns (German 42-centimeter mortars, etc.) used

to smash old fashioned steel and concrete fortifications and bombard towns twenty-two miles distant. Enormous quantities of high explosives shell, fired by thousands of guns, for days at a time, used to destroy wire entanglements and trenches. "Barrage" (barrier) fire of shrapnel used to cover attack; definition and use of "creeping barrage"; excellence of French "75's" (quick-fire cannon with calibre of 75 millimeters—about three inches; British "tanks" (huge caterpillar motors, armored and armed with machine guns and rapid-fire cannon); poison gas and liquid fire; etc., etc. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Barrage" "Forbidden Methods of Warfare," "Gas Warfare," "Shells," "Tanks," etc.)

3. Great developments of a roplanes for scouting, directing artillery fire, etc. Use of captive balloons. Zeppelins used mainly for dropping bombs on undefended British and French towns; their failure to fulfill German expectations. Devices for combating aerial attacks. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Aviation," etc.)
4. Great development of the submarine and submarine warfare. Use of submarines against warships perfectly legitimate; employment against merchant shipping also entirely proper under certain limitations. Devices for combating submarines. (See *War Cyclopaedia* under "Submarine," etc.)
5. New problems of transport and communication. Great use of motor trucks and automobiles for moving troops and supplies; increased difficulties of supply owing to great numbers of soldiers engaged, and enormous quantities of shells fired. Use of wireless telegraph and telephone. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Motor Transport,")
6. Mobilization of civilian population in all countries and national control of industry, food production and consumption. Increased participation of women in war work. In this conflict not merely armies but nations are engaged against one another; and the side with the greatest man-power, the best organized production and consumption, the largest financial resources, the staunchest courage and the closest co-operation between its allies will win. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Civilian Tasks," "Food Control," "Fuel Control," etc.)

IV. EXAMPLES OF GERMAN RUTHLESSNESS AND VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

1. War from the standpoint of International Law.

"From the standpoint of the international jurist, war is not merely a national struggle between public enemies, but a condition of juridical status under which such a conflict is carried on. It consists of certain legal rules and generally recognized customs, most of which have been codified and embodied in international treaties—the so-called Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907—which nearly all the members of the international community, including Germany, have signed and ratified. Now, if we were to take up the Hague Regulations in detail, we should find that Germany has violated again and again practically all of them. A bare list or enumeration of the proved and well authenticated instances of violation of international law by Germany in this war would, in fact, fill many volumes. If these were accompanied by some description or commentary, I

verily believe that the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* would not contain all of them."—(Prof. A. S. Hershey, in *Indiana University Alumni Quarterly*, October, 1917)

"Germany does not really wage war. She assassinates, massacres, poisons, tortures, intrigues; she commits every crime in the calendar, such as arson, pillage, murder, and rape; she is guilty of almost every possible violation of international law and of humanity—and calls it war." (*Ibid.*)

2. The German war philosophy. Conception of "absolute war"; ruthlessness and "frightfulness" advocated as means of shortening war, and hence justified as really humane; doctrine that "military necessity" is paramount over every other consideration. International law regarded as a selfish invention of weak states seeking to hamper the strong. Principle of "Deutschland über Alles."

"Whoever uses force, without any consideration and without sparing blood, has sooner or later the advantage if the enemy does not proceed in the same way. One cannot introduce a principle of moderation into the philosophy of war without committing an absurdity. It is a vain and erroneous tendency to neglect the element of brutality in war merely because we dislike it."—(Karl von Clausewitz *Vom Kriege*, I, page 4.)

"War in the present day will have to be conducted more recklessly, less scrupulously, more violently, more ruthlessly, than ever in the past . . . Every restriction on acts of war, once military operations have begun, tends to weaken the co-ordinated action of the belligerent . . . The law of nations must beware of paralyzing military action by placing fetters upon it . . . Distress and damage to the enemy are the conditions necessary to bend and break his will . . . The combatant has need of passion . . . it requires that the combatant . . . shall be entirely freed from the shackles of a restraining legality which is in all respects oppressive"—(General von Hartmann, "Militärische Notwendigkeit und Humanität," in *Deutsche Rundschau*, XIV, pp. 76, 119-122.)

"Since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations, which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences . . . The danger that in this way he [the officer] will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of . . . By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them . . .

"Every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be obtained is permissible . . . It follows from these universally valid principles that wide limits are set to the subjective freedom and arbitrary

judgment of the commanding officer."—(Official publication edited by the General Staff, *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*; in translation by J. H. Morgan entitled *The German War Book*, pp. 54-55, 64.)

All the foregoing extracts are quoted in E. Lavissee and C. Andler, *German Theory and Practice of War*, pp. 25-29. See also, D. C. Munro, *German War Practices*, "Introduction;" *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Frightfulness," "Kriegs-Raison," "Notwendigkeit," "War, German Ruthlessness," "War, German View," etc.

3. German treatment of Belgium and other occupied territories (Northern France, Russian Poland, Serbia, etc). Evidence found in captured letters and diaries of German soldiers and in proclamations of German commanders, as well as in testimony of victims and witnesses. The violations of international law and the laws of humanity include:—

- (a) Deliberate and systematic massacres of portions of the civil population, as a means of preventing or punishing resistance. Individual citizens murdered (some while hostages); women abused, and children brutally slain. Several thousand persons were so killed, often with mutilation and torture. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hostages," "Non-combatants," etc.)

"Outrages of this kind [against the lives and property of the civil population] were committed during the whole advance and retreat of the Germans through Belgium and France, and only abated when open manoeuvring gave place to trench warfare along all the line from Switzerland to the sea. Similar outrages accompanied the simultaneous advance into the western salient of Russian Poland, and the autumn incursion of the Austro-Hungarians into Serbia, which was turned back at Valievo. There was a remarkable uniformity in the crimes committed in these widely separated theaters of war, and an equally remarkable limit to the dates within which they fell. They all occurred during the first three months of the war, while, since that period, though outrages have continued, they have not been of the same character or on the same scale. This has not been due to the immobility of the fronts, for although it is certainly true that the Germans have been unable to overrun fresh territories on the west, they have carried out greater invasions than ever in Russia and the Balkans, which have not been marked by outrages of the same specific kind. This seems to show that the systematic warfare against the civil population in the campaigns of 1914 was the result of policy, deliberately tried and afterwards deliberately given up." (Arnold J. Toynbee, *The German Terror in Belgium*, pp. 15-16.)

- (b) Looting, burning of houses and whole villages, and wanton destruction of property ordered and countenanced by German officers. Provision for systematic incendiarism a part of German military preparations. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Estates Destroyed," "Belgium's Woe," "Family Rights and Honor," "Pillages," etc.)

"It is forbidden to pillage a town or locality even when taken by assault . . . [In occupied territory], pillage is forbidden."—(Hague Convention of 1907. Articles 28 and 47.)

- (c) Excessive taxes (12,000,000) a month, and heavy fines on cities and provinces, laid upon Belgium. Belgium robbed of its industrial and agricultural machinery, together with its stocks of food stuffs and raw materials, which were sent into Germany or converted to the use of the German army. This was according to a "plan elaborated by Dr. W. Rathenau in 1914 at Berlin, for the systematic exploitation of all the economic resources of occupied countries in favor of the military organization of the Empire." (See Munro *German War Practices; War Cyclopedia*, under "Belgium, Economic Destruction," "Contributions," "Requisitions.")

"[1] Coal, minerals, metals chemical products; wood and various building materials; wool, flax, cotton and other materials for weaving; leathers, hides and rubber, all in every possible state of industrial transformation, from the raw material to the commercial product and the waste; [2] further, all machines, fixed and movable, and machine-tools (in particular, the American lathes which it is impossible to replace at present); transmission belts; wires for electric lighting and motor power; oils and grease products; [3] transport material, whether by road, railway or water, and an important part of the rolling-stock of local railway lines; all traction power, whether animal or mechanical; thoroughbreds and stud animals, and the products of breeding; [4] agricultural products, seed and harvests, etc.,—were successively immobilized, and then seized and removed from the country, as a result of legislative acts on the part of the civil authorities, following upon innumerable requisitions by the military authorities. The value of these seizures and requisitions amounts to billions of francs . . .

Moreover, many of the measures taken were inspired not only by the motives of military interest denounced above, but by the underlying thought of crushing the commercial rivalry of Belgium. This was explicitly admitted in Germany itself by several authorities publicists."—(*Memorandum of the Belgian Government on the Deportations*, etc. February 1, 1917, pp. 7-8.)

The total exactions from Belgium, in money and materials, are computed to be "in excess of one billion dollars, or nearly five times as much as all the world has contributed to keep the Belgian people from starving to death."—(S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*, page 116.)

- (d) Forceful deportation of tens of thousands of Belgian and other civilians to Germany, the men to serve practically as slaves in Germany's industries, and the women reduced frequently to worse than slavery. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopedia*; under "Belgium, Deportations.")

"They (the Germans) have dealt a mortal blow to any prospect they may ever have had of being tolerated by the population of Flanders (which they were seeking to alienate from French-speaking Belgium); in tearing away from nearly every humble home in the land a husband and a father or a son and brother, they have lighted a fire of hatred that will never go out; they have brought home to every heart in the land, in a way that will impress its horror indelibly on the memory

of three generations, a realization of what German methods mean—not, as with the early acrotities, in the heat of passion and the first lust of war, but by one of those deeds that make one despair of the future of the human race, a deed coldly planned, studiously matured, and deliberately and systematically executed, a deed so cruel that German soldiers are said to have wept in its execution, and so monstrous that even German soldiers are now said to be ashamed."—(U. S. Minister Brand Whitlock, in January, 1917.)

- (e) Fearful devastation of part of Northern France during Hindenburg's "strategic retreat" (March, 1917), including complete destruction of villages and homesteads, systematic destruction of vineyards and fruit trees, etc. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopedia*, under "Destruction," "Frightfulness," "Hindenburg Line.")

"In the course of these last months, great stretches of French territory have been turned by us into a dead country. It varies in width from 10 to 12 or 15 kilometers ($6\frac{1}{4}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}$ or 8 miles), and extends along the whole of our new position, presenting a terrible barrier of desolation to any enemy hardy enough to advance against our new lines. No village or farm was left standing on this glacis, no road was left passable, no railway track or embankment was left in being. Where once were woods there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have been blown up; wires, cables, and pipelines destroyed. In front of our new positions runs, like a gigantic ribbon, an empire of death."—(Berlin *Lokal-anzeiger*, March 18, 1917; quoted in *Frightfulness in Retreat*, page 5.)

"Whole towns and villages have been pillaged, burnt and destroyed; private houses have been stripped of all their furniture, which the enemy has carried off; fruit trees have been torn up or rendered useless for all future production; springs and wells have been poisoned. The comparatively few inhabitants who were not deported to the rear were left with the smallest possible ration of food, while the enemy took possession of the stocks provided by the Neutral Relief Committee and intended for the civil population . . . It is a question not of acts aimed at hampering the operations of the Allied armies, but of acts of devastation which have no connection with that object, and the aim of which is to ruin for many years to come one of the most fertile regions of France —(Protest of the French Government to Neutral Powers, in *Frightfulness in Retreat*, pp. 6-7.)

- (f) Wanton destruction of historic works of art—library of Louvain; cathedrals of Rheims, Soissons, Ypres, Arras, St. Quentin; east of Coucy; town halls, etc. of Ypres and other Belgian cities. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Louvain," "Rheims," "Works of Art," etc.)

4. Other violations of the laws of warfare on land.

- (a) Use of poison gas and liquid fire (both first used by the Germans); poisoning of wells; intentional dissemination of disease germs (anthrax and glanders, at Bucharest, etc.); bombardment of undefended towns by Zeppelins, aeroplanes, and cruisers; bombardment of hospitals, etc. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Bombardment," "Explosives from Aircraft" "Forbidden Weapons," "Gas Warfare,"

"Poisons," "Roumania, German Treachery in," "Zeppelins," etc.)

- (b) Civilians, including women and children, used as a screen by German forces; frequent abuse of Red Cross and white flag. (See Munro, *German War Practices*, under "Hostages and Screens.")

"We waited for the advance of the Germans," states a British officer; 'some civilians reported to us that they were coming down a road in front of us. On looking in that direction we saw, instead of German troops, a crowd of civilians—men, women, and children—waving white handkerchiefs and being pushed down the road in front of a large number of German troops.'—'They came on as it were in a mass,' states a British soldier, 'with the women and children massed in front of them. They seemed to be pushing them on, and I saw them shoot down women and children who refused to march. Up to this my orders had been not to fire, but when we saw women and children shot my sergeant said: "It is too heartrending," and gave orders to fire, which we did.'—'I saw the Germans advancing on hands and knees towards our positions,' states another; 'they were in close formation, and had a line of women and children in front of their front rank. Our orders at that time were not to fire on civilians in front of the enemy.'—(Arnold J. Toynbee, *The German Terror in France*, pp. 6-7.)

- (c) Wounded and prisoners killed in many instances. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hun," "Prisoners of War," "Quarters," etc.)

"28th August.—They [the French] lay in heaps of eight or ten wounded or dead on the top of one another. Those who could still walk we made prisoners and brought with us. Those who were seriously wounded, in the head or lungs, etc., and who could not stand upright, were given one more bullet, which put an end to their life. Indeed, that was the order which we had received."—(Diary of a German soldier, in Joseph Bedier, *How Germany seeks to Justify her Atrocities*, p. 45.)

"By leaps and bounds we got across the clearing. They were hear, there, and everywhere hidden in the thicket. Now it is down with the enemy! And we will give them no quarter . . . We knock down or bayonet the wounded, for we know that those scoundrels fire at our backs when we have gone by. There was a Frenchman there stretched out, full length, face down, pretending to be dead. A kick from a strong fusilier soon taught him that we were there. Turning round he asked for quarter, but we answered: 'Is that the way your tools work, you—,' and he was nailed to the ground. Close to me I heard odd cracking sounds. They were blows from a gun on the bald head of a Frenchman which a private of the 154th was dealing out rigorously; he was wisely using a French gun so as not to break his own. Tender-hearted souls are so kind to the French wounded that they finish them with a bullet, but others give them as many thrusts and blows as they can"—(Article entitled "A Day of Honor for our Regiment—24th September, 1914," in the *Jauresches Tageblatt*, 18th October, 1914; facsimile in Joseph Bedier, *German Atrocities from German Evidence*, pp. 32-33.)

"After today no more prisoners will be taken. All prisoners are to be killed. Wounded, with or without arms, are to be killed. Even prisoners already grouped in convoys are to be killed. Let not a single living enemy remain behind us."—(Order given 26th August, 1914, by General Stenger, of the 58th German Brigade; testified to by numerous German prisoners. See Bedier *German Atrocities*, pp. 28-29, 39-40.)

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel (Attila), gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German."—(Speech of the Kaiser to German troops embarking for the Boxer War in 1900; reported in *Bremen Weser Zeitung* and in other German newspapers; quoted in *London Times*, July 30, 1900.)

"It is forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms and having no means of self-defense, gives himself up as a prisoner; to declare that no quarter will be given,"—(Hague Convention of 1907, Article 23.)

- (d) Inhuman treatment of captives in German prison camps, at Wittenburg and elsewhere. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Prisoners of War," etc.) Compare Libby and Andersonville prisons during our Civil War.—The British treatment of German prisoners, on the other hand, was humane and correct.
5. Submarine warfare waged in disregard of international law. Sinking without warning of the *Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulflight*, *Lusitania*, *Arabic*, *Sussex*, etc; ruthless destruction of lives of innocent men, women, and children. Great extension of submarine warfare after February 1, 1917. Policy of "sinking without leaving a trace" (*spurlos versenkt*). Instructions to sink even hospital ships. Utter disregard of the rights of neutrals. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Lusitania Notes," "Submarine Warfare," "Spurlos Versenkt," "Visit and Search," etc., and under names of vessels.)
- "The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)
6. Practical extermination of the Armenian nation by the Turks, evidently with German sanction (1915-16). (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Armenian Massacres.")
- "In order, I was told, to cover the extermination of the Armenian nation with a political cloak, military reasons were being put forward, which were said to make it necessary to drive the Armenians out of their native seats, which had been theirs for 2,500 years, and to deport them to the Arabian deserts. I was also told that individual Armenians had lent themselves to acts of espionage.
- "After I had informed myself about the facts and had made inquiries on all sides, I came to the conclu-

sion that all these accusations against the Armenians were in fact, based on trifling provocations, which were taken as an excuse for slaughtering 10,000 innocents for one guilty person, for the most savage outrages against women and children, and for a campaign of starvation against the exiles which was intended to exterminate the whole nation . . .

"Out of convoys which, when they left their homes on the Armenian plateau, numbered from two to three thousand men, women, and children, only two or three hundred survivors arrive here in the south. The men are slaughtered on the way; the women and girls, with the exception of the old, the ugly, and those who are still children, have been abused by Turkish soldiers and officers and then carried away to Turkish and Kurdish villages, where they have to accept Islam. They try to destroy the remnant of the convoys by hunger and thirst. Even when they are fording rivers, they do not allow those dying of thirst to drink. All the nourishment they receive is a daily ration of a little meal sprinkled over their hands, which they lick off greedily, and its only effect is to protract their starvation,"—(Dr. Martin Niepage, *The Horrors of Aleppo, Seen by a German Eyewitness*, pp. 3-6.)

V. SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION OF GERMAN POLICY. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Der Tag," "German Military Autocracy," "Hegemony, German Ambition," "War, Responsibility for.")

"The German Government wages the war by methods which, judged even by standards till now conventional, are monstrous. Note, for example, the sudden attack upon Belgium and Luxemburg; poison gas, since adopted by all the belligerents; but most outrages of all, the Zeppelin bombings, inspired with the purpose of annihilating every living person, combatant or non-combatant, over large areas; the submarine war on commerce; the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*, etc.; the system of taking hostages and levying contributions, especially at the outset in Belgium; the systematic exactions from Ukrainian, Georgian, Courland, Polish, Irish, Mohamadan, and other prisoners of war in the German prison camps, of treasonable war-service, and of treasonable espionage of the Central Powers; in the contract between Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann and Sir Roger Casement in December, 1914, for the organization, equipment, and training of the 'Irish brigade' made up of imprisoned British soldiers in the German prison camps; the attempts under threats by forced internment to compel enemy alien civilians found in Germany to perform treasonable war service against their own country, etc. Necessity knows no law." (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, the German Socialist leader, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

"This war was begun and these crimes against humanity were done because Germany was pursuing the hereditary policy of the Hohenzollerns and following the instincts of the arrogant military cast which rules Prussia, to grasp the overlordship of the civilized world and establish an empire in which she should play the role of ancient Rome. They were done because the Prussian militarist still pursues the policy of power through conquest, of aggrandizement through force and

fear, which in little more than two centuries has brought the puny Mark of Brandenburg with its million and a half of people to the control of a vast empire—the greatest armed force of the modern world."—(Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

VIII. THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR.

I. STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN OUR NEUTRALITY (1914-16).

1. American opinion at the outbreak of the war confused as to merits and issues in the controversy; conflicting sympathies of hyphenated groups. (See *War Cyclopedia* under "Hyphenated Americans," "United States, Isolation," "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17.")
2. President Wilson's appeal for neutrality of sentiment. (August 18, 1914). "Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. . . . It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it." He expressed the fear that our Nation might become divided into camps of hostile opinion. "Such divisions among us . . . might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend." (Declaration of Neutrality of the United States, issued August 4, 1914. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17.")
3. Alienation of American sentiment from Germany and Austria. Invasion of Belgium generally condemned; admiration for her plucky resistance and horror at German atrocities; Cardinal Mercier's pastoral letter of Christmas, 1914; Commission for Belgian Relief under American direction (Mr. Herbert C. Hoover); Germany's monstrous crime in sinking the *Lusitania*; execution of Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Atrocities," "Belgium's Woe," "Cavell, Edith," "Fryatt, Captain," "Lusitania," "Mercier, Cardinal," etc.)
4. Was the neutrality of our Government a real neutrality? Lack of interest in the contest or of desire on the part of the people for the triumph of one or the other of the participants not necessary to neutrality of the Government. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Neutrality," "Neutral Rights," etc.)
5. Controversies with Great Britain over questions of blockade, contraband, and interference with our mails. Question of the applicability to the present emergency of the Declaration of London (drawn up in 1909 on the initiation of Great Britain, but not ratified before the war by any government.) Property rights alone involved in these controversies, which could be settled after the war by our existing arbitration treaty with Great Britain. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Blacklist," "Blockade," "Declaration of London," "Embargo, British," "Mails, British Interference with," "War Zone, British," etc.)
6. Controversies with Germany. Over our supplying munitions to the Allies, and her submarine sinkings (*Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulflight*, *Lusitania*, *Arabic*, etc.). Intrigues and conspiracies in the United States; the

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and the German attachés Boy-Ed and von Papen, dismissed by our Government (November 4, 1915) on clear proof of guilt, but no apologies to us or reprimand to them issued by their Governments. German intrigues against us in Cuba, Haiti, San Domingo, Mexico, etc.—For a defense of our policy in permitting sale of munitions, etc., see letter of Secretary of State W. J. Bryan to Senator Stone, January 20, 1915 (in *International Conciliation*, No. 96). (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Der Tag—When?," "Dumba," "German Intrigue," "Igel, von, Papers of," "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy of," "Manila Bay, Dewey and Dietrichs at," "Monroe Doctrine, German Attitude," "Intrigue," "Munitions," "Papen," "Sabotage," "Spies," "Strict Accountability," "Submarine Blockade," "Submarine Warfare," "Parole," "War Zone, German," and under names of vessels, etc.)

7. Apparent settlement of the submarine controversy in May, 1916.—Sinking of the channel passenger ship *Sussex* without warning on March 24, 1916, after months of expostulation, precipitates a crisis. Our demand that thenceforth Germany conduct her submarine warfare in accordance with international law, by (a) warning vessels before sinking them, and (b) placing passengers and crew in safety. Germany's conditional agreement to comply with this demand ends the crisis. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Submarine Warfare, American Lives Lost," "Submarine Warfare, German Defense," "Submarine Warfare, Illegalities," "Submarine Warfare, Stages of," "Sussex," "Sussex Ultimatum," "Sussex Ultimatum, German Pledge," etc.)

8. Unceasing German intrigues against the United States. A semi-official list of intrigue charges against the German Government, based on one set only of German documents seized by our Government (the von Igel papers), includes the following: "Violation of the laws of the United States; destruction of lives and property in merchant vessels on the high seas; Irish revolutionary plots against Great Britain; fomenting ill feeling against the United States in Mexico; subornation of American writers and lecturers; financing of propaganda; maintenance of a spy system under the guise of a commercial investigation bureau; subsidizing of a bureau for the purpose of stirring up labor troubles in munition plants; the bomb industry and other related activities." Since our entrance into the war a vast amount of evidence as to Germany's treacherous and hostile intrigues on our soil has come into the possession of our Government. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Intrigue," "Igel, von, Papers of," "Parole," "Passports, German Frauds," etc.)

"From the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is happily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under

the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial German Government accredited to the Government of the United States."—(President Wilson, Speech of April 2, 1917).

9. Reasons for our long enduring patience in dealing with Germany: (a) Hope that saner counsels might prevail in that country. (b) Our traditional sense of responsibility toward all the republics of the New World. (c) The desire, by keeping free from the conflict, more effectively to aid in restoring peace at its close. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Pan-Americanism," "Permanent Peace," "Watchful Waiting," etc.)

II. FROM NEUTRALITY TO WAR (1916-17).

1. Unsuccessful Peace overtures (Dec. 1916-Jan. 1917). Independent overtures by Germany (Dec. 12, 1916), and by President Wilson (Dec. 18). Answer of the Allies based on the reasonable idea of "Reparation, Restoration and Security." Refusal of Germany to disclose her terms. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Peace Overtures, German, 1916," "Peace Terms, German Industrialists on," "Peace Terms, German Professors on," etc.)

"Boasting of German conquests, 'the glorious deeds of our armies,' the [German] note implanted in neutral minds the belief that it was the purpose of the Imperial German Government to insist upon such conditions as would leave all Central Europe under German dominance and so build up an empire which would menace the whole liberal world. Moreover, the German proposal was accompanied by a thinly veiled threat to all neutral nations; and from a thousand sources, official and unofficial, the word came to Washington that unless the neutrals used their influence to bring the war to an end on terms dictated from Berlin, Germany and her allies would consider themselves henceforth free from any obligations to respect the rights of neutrals. The Kaiser ordered the neutrals to exert pressure on the Entente to bring the war to an abrupt end, or to beware of the consequences. Clear warnings were brought to our Government that if the German peace move should not be successful, the submarines would be unleashed for a more intense and ruthless war upon all commerce." (*How the War Came to America*, pp. 10-11. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Military Position To-day," "Mittel Europa," etc.)

2. President Wilson outlined such a peace as the United States could join in guaranteeing (Jan. 22, 1917). Favorable reception of these proposals in the Entente countries; lack of response in Germany. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Aim of the United States," "America, Creed," "Balance of Power," "League to Enforce Peace," "Permanent Peace, American Plan.")

"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not [1] recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property . . .

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people

but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"I am proposing [2] that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

"I am proposing . . . [3] that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and [4] that moderation of armaments which make of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence."

[5] "Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind." (President Wilson, Speech to U. S. Senate, Jan. 22, 1917.)

3. The "Zimmermann note" falls into the hands of the United States Government (dated Jan. 16, 1917; published through the Associated Press, February 28). In this the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs secretly informs the German minister to Mexico of the German intention to repudiate the Sussex pledge, and instructs him to offer the Mexican Government New Mexico and Arizona if Mexico will join with Japan in attacking the United States. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Zimmermann Note.")
4. The German Government officially notifies the United States (Jan. 31, 1917) that "from February 1, 1917, sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice." This meant the renewal of ruthless submarine operations, in violation of the pledge given after the sinking of the *Sussex*. (See *War Cyclopedia*, as above under I-7, also under "Submarine Warfare, Unrestricted.")

"The German Chancellor . . . stated before the Imperial Diet that the reason this ruthless policy had not been earlier employed was simply because the Imperial Government had not then been ready to act. In brief, under the guise of friendship and the cloak of false promises, it had been preparing this attack."—(*How the War Came to America*, p. 13.)

5. German Ambassador to the United States dismissed and diplomatic relations severed (Feb. 3, 1917). This act was not equivalent to a declaration of war. President Wilson in his speech to the Senate announcing it distinguished sharply between the German Government and the German people.—Failure of the German Government to recall its submarine order led the President to

recommend to Congress (Feb. 26) a policy of "armed neutrality." More than 500 out of 531 members of the two houses of Congress were ready and anxious to act; but a "filibuster" of a handful of "willful men" defeated the measure, by prolonging the debate until the expiration of the congressional session, on March 4.—March 12, orders were finally issued to arm American merchant ships against submarines. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Armed Neutrality Adopted," "Diplomatic Immunity," "Prussian Treaties, Attempted Modification of," "United States, Break with Germany," "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17," etc.)

6. President Wilson urges the recognition of a state of war with Germany (April 2). (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "United States, Break with Germany," etc.)

"The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a warfare against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it . . . There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

"With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war . . . It will involve the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany.

"We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feelings towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor States with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may

be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

"A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or to observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own . . .

"The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them . . .

"We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship [for the German people] in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few."—(Speech to the Senate, April 2, 1917)

7. Declaration of a state of war with Germany. Passed in the Senate (April 4) by a vote of 32 to 6; in the House (April 6), 373 to 50. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "War, Declaration Against Germany.")

"Whereas, The Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United

States."—(Joint Resolution of Congress, approved by the President, April 6, 1917)

8. *Declaration of War against Austria-Hungary* (Dec. 7, 1917). Passed unanimously in the Senate, and with one opposing vote (Meyer London, Socialist, from New York City) in the House. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Austria-Hungary, Break with," "Dumba, Recall of," "War, Declaration against Austria-Hungary," etc.)

III. SUMMARY OF OUR REASONS FOR ENTERING THE WAR.

1. Because of the renewal by Germany of her submarine warfare in a more violent form than ever before, contrary to the assurance given to our Government in the spring of 1916. This resulted in the loss of additional American life and property on the high seas and produced in the minds of the President and Congress the conviction that national interest and national honor required us to take up the gauntlet which Germany had thrown down. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Submarine Warfare," "American Lives Lost," etc.)
2. Because of the conviction, unwillingly reached, that the Imperial German Government had repudiated wholesale the commonly accepted principles of law and humanity, and was "running amuck" as an international desperado, who could be made to respect law and right only by forcible and violent means. The cumulative effect of Germany's outrages should be noted in this connection. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Diplomacy," "German Government," "Moral Bankruptcy of.")
3. Because of the conviction that Prussian militarism and autocracy, let loose in the world, disturbed the balance of power and threatened to destroy the international equilibrium. They were a menace to all nations save those allied with Germany; and the menace must be overthrown, as Napoleonism had been at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by a coalition of the states whose honor, rights, and national existence were endangered. The Middle Europe project should receive attention in this connection. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Autocracy," "Hegemony," "Kaiserism," "Mittel-Europa," "Prussianism," etc.)
4. Because of the gradual shaping of the conflict into a war between democratic nations on one hand and autocratic nations on the other, and because of the conviction that, as our nation in Lincoln's day could not hope to long endure "half slave and half free," so the world community of today could not continue to exist part autocratic and part democratic. Note the effect of the Russian Revolution on the issues of the war. (See *War Cyclopaedia*.)
5. Because of the conviction that our traditional policy of isolation and aloofness was outgrown and outworn, and could no longer be maintained in the face of the growing interdependence which is one of the leading characteristics of this modern age. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, "United States, Isolation.")
6. Because of the menace to the Monroe Doctrine and to our own independence. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "America Threatened," "Monroe Doctrine," "German Attitude.")

"The history, the character, the avowed principles of action, the manifest and undisguised purpose of the German autocracy made it clear and certain that if America stayed out of the Great War, and Germany won, America would forthwith be required to defend herself, and would be unable to defend herself against the same lust for conquest, the same will to dominate the world which has made Europe a bloody shambles. . .

"If we had stayed out of the war and Germany had won, we should have had to defend the Monroe Doctrine by force or abandon it; and if we had abandoned it, there would have been a German naval base in the Caribbean commanding the Panama Canal, depriving us of that strategic line which unites the eastern and western coasts, and depriving us of the protection the expanse of ocean once gave.

"And an America unable or unwilling to protect herself against the establishment of a German naval base in the Caribbean would lie at the mercy of Germany and subject to Germany's orders.

"America's independence would be gone unless she was ready to fight for it, and her security would thenceforth be not a security of freedom but only a security purchased by submission."—(Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

IV. DUTY OF ALL CITIZENS TO SUPPORT THE WAR WHOLE-HEARTEDLY.

"A nation which declares war and goes on discussing whether it ought to have declared war or not is impotent, paralyzed, imbecile, and earns the contempt of mankind and the certainty of humiliating defeat and subjection to foreign control.

"A democracy which cannot accept its own decisions made in accordance with its own laws, but must keep on endlessly discussing the questions already decided, has failed in the fundamental requirements of self-government; and, if the decision is to make war, the failure to exhibit capacity for self-government by action will inevitably result in the loss of the right of self-government.

"Before the decision of a proposal to make war, men may range themselves upon one side or the other of the question; but after the decision in favor of war the country has ranged itself, and the only issue left for the individual citizen is whether he is for or against his country.

"From that time on arguments against the war in which the country is engaged are enemy arguments.

"Their spirit is the spirit of rebellion against the Government and laws of the United States.

"Their effect is to hinder and lessen that popular support of the Government in carrying on the war which is necessary to success.

"Their manifest purpose is to prevent action by continuing discussion.

"They encourage the enemy. . . They tend to introduce delay and irresolution into our own councils.

"The men who are speaking and writing and printing arguments against the war now, and against everything which is being done to carry on the war, are rendering more effective service to Germany than they ever could render in the field with arms in their hands. The purpose and effect of what they are doing is so plain that it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the greater part

of them are at heart traitors to the United States and willfully seeking to bring about the triumph of Germany and the humiliation and defeat of their own country.

"The same principles apply to the decision of numerous questions which arise in carrying on the war [such as conscription, sending troops to France, etc.] . . .

"It is beyond doubt that many of the professed pacifists, the opponents of the war after the war has been entered upon, the men who are trying to stir up resistance to the draft, the men who are inciting strikes in the particular branches of production which are necessary for the supply of arms and munitions of war, are intentionally seeking to aid Germany and defeat the United States. As time goes on and the character of these acts becomes more and more clearly manifest, all who continue to associate with them must come under the same condemnation as traitors to their country."—(Elihu Root, speech at Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

IX. COURSE OF THE WAR, 1914-17

I. CAMPAIGN OF 1914.

1. Germany's general plan of action: First crush France, then Russia, then Great Britain. The German plan in its earlier stages was like a timetable, with each step scheduled by day and hour.

2. On the Western Front:

(a) Belgium overrun (August 4-20). Resistance of Liege, Namur, etc., overcome by giant artillery (42-centimeter mortars); but the delay (of ten days) gave the French time to mobilize and threw the German plans out of gear. Liege occupied, August 7; Brussels, August 20; Namur, August 22; Louvain burned August 26.

"Every minute in it [the German plan] was determined. From the German frontier, opposite Ais-la-Chapelle, to the gap of the Oise, on the French frontier . . . there are six days' march. But the passage of the Germans across Belgium in arms halted before Liege and before Namur, halted on the edge of the Gette, beaten on August 12 on the edge of the forest of Haelen, victorious on August 18 and 19 at Aerschot—had lasted *sixteen days* (August 4-20). The splendid effort of the Belgians had therefore made ten full days late the arrival of the German armies on the French frontier, from which only eight marches separated them from the advanced forts of Paris."—(Joseph Reinach, in *N. Y. Times Current History*, Sept., 1917, p. 495)

(b) Invasion of France. Advance of Germans in five armies through Belgium and Luxemburg: General von Moltke, chief of staff; Generals von Kluck, von Buelow, etc. Wary tactics of the French under General Joffre; arrival of the British expeditionary force (150,000 men) under General French (August 8-21); Battle of Mons-Charleroi (August 21-23); dogged withdrawal of the French and British from Belgium to the line of the River Marne, while a new French army (the Sixth) was being formed. —Advance of the Germans to within twenty-three miles of Paris; then sudden swerve to the east away from Paris.

- (c) Battle of the Marne (September 6-10). The opposing forces in contact from Paris to Verdun, a front of one hundred and eighty miles. French attempt to turn the German west flank. German armies forced to retreat from the Marne to the River Aisne, where they entrenched.

The battle of the Marne was "one more decisive battle of the world, . . . for Europe conceivably the greatest in permanent meaning since Waterloo. In that battle it has been decided that Europe should still be European and not Prussian. At the Marne, France had saved herself and Europe."—(F. H. Simons, in *American Review of Reviews*, for February, 1915, page 179.)

- (d) Failure of the Allies (Sept. 12-17) to break through the German line in the Battle of the Aisne. Extension of the trench system from Switzerland to the North Sea (fall of Antwerp, Oct. 8). Importance of German conquest of Belgian coast as supplying bases for her later submarine warfare.

The battle line established after the Battle of the Aisne remained practically stationary, with some slight swaying backward and forward, for the next three years. The parts of France held by the Germans included ninety per cent of her iron ore, eighty per cent of her iron and steel manufactures, and fifty per cent of her coal resources.

- (e) Battle of the River Yser (Oct. 21-31); Belgians cut their dykes. First battle of Ypres (Nov. 1-15); Prussian Guards defeated by the "contemptible little army" of Great Britain. German losses on Yser and at Ypres, 150,000.

2. On the Eastern Front:

- (a) First Russian invasion of East Prussia (Aug. 18) following their unexpectedly rapid mobilization. The resulting necessity of withdrawing German troops from the West front helped to produce the German check on the Marne. Russians disastrously defeated among the Masurian lakes in the Battle of Tanneburg (Aug. 26-Sept. 1). General Hindenburg thenceforth the idol of Germany.

- (b) Russian invasion of Galicia. Breakdown of the Austrian resistance. Capture of Tarnapol, Halicz and Lemberg (Aug. 27-Sept. 3); Jaroslav (Nov. 5); siege of Przemyśl (surrendered March 22, 1915); invasion of Hungary threatened.

- (c) German invasion of Russian Poland fails. Three offensives of German armies against Warsaw beaten off (Nov.—Dec.). Narrow escape of a German army from disaster in the Battle of Lodz (Nov. 19-Dec. 3).

- (d) Thanks to the relaxation of Austrian pressure, due to the foregoing events, Serbia expelled the Austrian invaders from her territory (Dec. 14).

3. Loss of Germany's colonies. New Guinea, Bismarck archipelago, etc., taken by the Australians (Sept.). Tsungtau (Nov. 7) and various Pacific islands captured by the Japanese. British conquest of Togoland (August 26); German Southwest Africa (July 15, 1915); Kamerun (Feb. 16, 1916); British invasion of German East Africa begun (conquest completed in December, 1917).—Failure of De Wet's German-aided rebellion in

South Africa owing to loyalty of the Boers (Oct.—Dec., 1914).—Pro-Turkish Khedive of Egypt deposed, British protectorate proclaimed, and a new ruler set up with title of Sultan (Dec. 17, 1914).

4. Turkey openly joins the Teutonic Allies (Oct. 29). Defeat of Turks by Russians in the Caucasian region (Jan. 1915). Failure of Turkish attempts to invade Egypt (Feb. 3, 1915). Revolt of the "holy places" in Arabia against Turkish rule and establishment of a petty kingdom there (June 27, 1916).

5. Naval War. Great importance in the war of British naval preponderance, aided by early concentration in the North Sea. British naval victory in Helgoland Bight (Aug. 28). German naval victory in the Pacific off coast of Chili (Nov. 1). Three British cruisers torpedoed by submarines in the North Sea (Sept. 21). German cruiser *Emden* caught and destroyed at Coco-Island after sensational career (Nov. 10). British naval victory off Falkland islands (Dec. 8) avenges defeat of Nov. 1. German fleets driven from the seas. Disappearance of German shipping. Freedom of action for British transport of East Indian, New Zealand, Australian, and Canadian troops, etc., to Europe, and of Allied commerce, except for the (as yet slight) submarine danger. Error of Great Britain in failing to declare at once a rigid blockade of Germany.

6. Situation at close of 1914: On western front, defeat of the plan of the German General Staff; on eastern front, Teutonic forces held in check; Germany and Austria as yet cut off from their new ally, Turkey. On the whole the advantage was on the side of the Entente Allies. But the Allied commanders (General Joffre, Lord Kitchener, and Grand Duke Nicholas) failed fully to grasp the needs of the situation. "Each of these leaders believed that the height of military efficiency had been reached in the past campaigns"; in the great development of barrier fire and the excellence of the French "75's." The Teutonic allies, on the other hand, "were making the colossal preparations of artillery and munitions which were destined to change the year 1915 into a tragedy for the Entente Allies."—(T. C. Frothingham, in *N. Y. Times Current History*, Sept., 1917, page 422.)

II. CAMPAIGN OF 1915.

1. On the West Front. Failure of the Allied offensive in Champagne (March—April); Battle of Neuve Chapelle. Second Battle of Ypres (April 22-28); Germans first use poisoned gas; heroism of the Canadians. Inadequacy of Allies' preparations for carrying the formidable German entrenchments. Desultory fighting through the summer. Failure of the second offensive in Champagne and Flanders (Sept.). General French superseded by General Haig as British commander in chief. Death of Lord Kitchener through the sinking of the warship *Hampshire* (June 7, 1916).

2. The Gallipoli Expedition. Failure of Allies to force the Dardanelles with their fleet alone (Feb.—March.). Troops landed after long delay, in April and August. Abandonment of expedition in Dec.—Jan., after enormous losses. Disastrous effects on the hesitating na-

tions, Bulgaria and Greece. Bitter controversy in Great Britain over the question of responsibility for this fiasco.

3. Second Russian invasion of East Prussia crushed by Hindenburg in Battle of Masurian Lakes (Feb. 12). Russians lost 150,000 killed and wounded and 100,000 prisoners.
4. Terrific drive of combined Germans and Austrians under Hindenburg and Mackensen in Poland and Galicia (April—Aug.). Fall of Przemyśl (June 2); Lemberg (June 22); Warsaw (Aug. 5). All Poland conquered; Courland overrun. Russian losses, 1,200,000 killed and wounded; 900,000 captured; 65,000 square miles of territory. Russian line established from Riga to Eastern Galicia. Grand Duke Nicholas removed from chief command and sent to command in the Caucasus (Sept. 8).
5. Bulgaria joins the Teutonic Allies (Oct. 13). Serbia crushed by simultaneous invasions of Austro-Germans and Bulgarians (completed Dec. 2). Montenegro conquered (Jan. 1916)—Landing of an Anglo-French army at Saloniki prevents King Constantine of Greece from openly joining the Teutonic alliance.
6. Italy declares war on Austria (May 23) to recover the regions about Trent (the "Trentino") and Trieste. Lack of military results on Italian front in 1915 (failure to capture Gorizia). War on Germany not declared until Aug. 27, 1916.
7. Naval War. In a battle in the North Sea (Jan. 24) a British patrolling squadron defeated a German raiding squadron. Increasing use of submarines by Germany. German proclamation of "a war zone" about the British Isles (in force Feb. 18) establishes a so-called "blockade" of Great Britain.—Sinking of the passenger steamship *Lusitania* (May 7) with loss of 1198 lives (114 Americans).
8. Increase in Allies' munitions supply arranged for; appointment (May, 1915) of Lloyd George to be British Minister of Munitions. Failure of Zeppelin raids over England to produce expected results. (Between Jan. 19, 1915, and Oct. 1, 1917, German aircraft, including Zeppelins, raided England thirty four times, killing outright 865 men, women, and children, and wounding over 2,500.)
9. Summary: The situation at the end of 1915 was much less favorable for the Entente than at the beginning of the year. Little change on Western front. Great changes on Eastern front:—Russians driven from Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia; Hungary saved from invasion; General Powers linked to Turkey by the adhesion of Bulgaria and the conquest of Serbia. "The Teutons were no longer hemmed in; they had raised the siege."

III. CAMPAIGN OF 1916.

1. Battle of Verdun ("no longer a fortress but a series of trenches"). Great German attack under the Crown Prince (Feb.—June); defeated by the heroic resistance of the French under General Petain ("They shall not pass.") Enormous German losses (about 500,000 men) through attacks in close formation against French fortifications defended by "barrage" fire and machine guns. Practically all ground lost was slowly regained by the French in the autumn. "Verdun was the grave of Germany's claim to military invincibility."—(Col. A. M. Murray, *"Fortnightly" History of the War*, I. 368).—Hindenburg made commander-in-chief of the German forces, August 29.
2. Battle of the Somme (July 1—Nov.). The strengthened artillery of the Allies enabled them to drive back the German front on a breadth of twenty miles, and nine miles deep. Estimated loss of Germans 700,000 men; German estimate of French and British loss, 800,000. The Allies failed to break through the German lines.
3. Galician and Armenian Fronts. Great Russian offensive (June—Sept.) under General Brusilov, on front from Pripet marshes to Bukovinian border. Capture of Czernovitz (June 18). Hundreds of thousands of Austrians taken prisoners.—Successful offensive of Grand Duke Nicholas in Armenia against the Turks: capture of Erzerum (Feb. 16) and Trebizond (April 18).
4. Roumania enters the war and is crushed. Encouraged by Allied successes and coerced by the disloyal Russian Court, Roumania declared war (Aug. 27) with a view to rescuing her kindred populations from Austrian rule. Unsupported invasion of Transylvania; terrific counter attacks by German-Austrian-Bulgarian armies under Generals Mackensen and Falkenhayn; Roumanians driven from Transylvania. Greater part of Roumania conquered (fall of Bucharest, Dec. 6). Rich wheat-fields and oil lands gained by Teutons, and the "corridor" to Constantinople widened. The "Mittel-Europa" project approaches realization.
5. British failure in Mesopotamia. Basra, on Persian Gulf, taken by British Nov. 31, 1914; advance of General Townshend's inadequate expedition from India up the Tigris River toward Bagdad; expedition besieged by Turks at Kut-el-Amara (Jan.—April, 1916); relieving expedition forced to turn back. Surrender of General Townshend (April 29) with 13,000 men. Serious blow to British prestige in the East. (The report of an investigating commission, June 26, 1917, divides the responsibility for failure between the Home Government and the Government in India.)
6. Italian Front. Successful Austrian offensive from the Trentino (May 16—June 3). Brusilov's drive in Galicia, however, relieved the pressure upon the Italians, who then (Aug. 6th to Sept.) free Italian soil of the Austrians, and began an offensive which brought them Gorizia on the River Isonzo (Aug. 9) and carried them to within thirteen miles of Trieste.
7. Naval War. Battle of Jutland (May 31); the German high seas fleet engaged the British battle-cruiser fleet until darkness enabled the German ships to escape the on-coming British dreadnoughts.—Increased use of submarines by Germans. Channel packet *Sussex* sunk (March 25) without warning, in violation of German pledge.
8. Political events in Great Britain affecting the war. Adoption of compulsory military service (May 25) lays the basis for a British army of 5,000,000 men.—Sinn Fein rebellion in Ireland crushed (April 25–28); Sir

Roger Casement executed (Aug. 2).—Lloyd George displaces Asquith as head of British cabinet, to infuse new energy into the war (Dec. 5-7).

9. Summary: The balance in 1916 inclined on the whole in favor of the Allies—at Verdun, on the Somme, in Galicia, in Italy, and on the sea. Against these victories must be set the disasters of Roumania and Mesopotamia. The Central Powers continued to possess the advantage of operating on interior lines, enabling them while adopting a defensive attitude on certain fronts to concentrate for a drive elsewhere; also of their superiority (though diminished) in strategy, tactics, and material equipment.

IV. CAMPAIGN OF 1917.

1. Unrestricted submarine warfare begun by Germany (Feb. 1). Hundreds of thousands of tons of belligerent and neutral shipping sunk each month; (merchant shipping destroyed by mines and submarines to Jan. 1, 1917, was 3,982,556 tons; from January to June, 1917 the total was 3,600,000 tons). Reliance upon this weapon by Germany to starve Great Britain out; failure of the policy to achieve the ends planned. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Shipping, Losses," "Spurlos Versenkt Applied," "Submarine Blockade," "Submarine Warfare," etc.)
2. Entrance of the United States into the War. War declared on Germany, April 6; on Austria-Hungary, December 7. (See chapter VIII.) Energetic measures to raise and train an army of several million men, and to provide food, munitions, and shipping for ourselves and our associates. Magnitude of this task prevented the full weight of the United States being felt in 1917. Nevertheless, about 250,000 American troops were in France under General Pershing by December. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Austria-Hungary, Break With," "United States, Break with Germany," "War, Declaration Against Austria-Hungary," "War, Declaration Against Germany"; also under "Acts of Congress," "Alien Enemies," "Army," "Bonds Act," "Cantonments," "Espionage Act," "Food and Fuel Control Act," "Profiteering," "Red Cross," "Selective Service," "Shipping Board," "War Industries Board," "Y. M. C. A.," etc.)
3. Further Spread of the War. Cuba and Panama follow the United States in declaring war on Germany (April 7). King Constantine of Greece deposed (June 11, 1917) and Greece joined the Allies (July 2). Siam declared war on Germany July 22; Liberia, August 4; China, Aug. 14. Brazil repealed its declaration of neutrality and severed diplomatic relations; war declared Oct. 26. The following broke diplomatic relations with Germany: Bolivia (April 14), Guatemala (April 27), Honduras (May 17), Nicaragua (May 18) Haiti (June 17), Costa Rica (Sept. 21), Peru (Oct. 6), Uruguay (Oct. 7), Ecuador (Dec. 8). German destruction of South American vessels and revelations of the abuse by her diplomats of Argentine neutrality under cover of Swedish diplomatic immunity (the Luxburg dispatches; *spurlos versenkt*), led to widespread agitations for war with Germany and united action of all the South American countries.
4. Western Front. Withdrawal of German forces on a front of fifty miles to new and more defensible positions (the "Hindenburg line") extending from Arras to Soissons (March); wanton wasting of the country evacuated. *Battle of Arras* (April 9—May) brought slight gains to the Allies; a mine of 1,000,000 lbs. of high explosives was fired at Messines (July 7).—Terrific British offensives in *Battle of Flanders* (July—Dec.) won Passchendaele ridge and other gains. *Battle of Cambrai* (Nov. 20—Dec.) begun by "tanks" without artillery preparation, penetrated Hindenburg line and forced German retirement on front of twenty miles, to depth of several miles. Terrific German counter attacks forced partial retirement of British (from Bournon wood, etc.)
5. Italian Front. Great Italian offensive begun in the Isonzo area (Carso Plateau) in May. When the Russian Revolution permitted the withdrawal of Austrian troops to the Italian front, a new Austro-German counter-drive was begun (Oct.—Dec.) which undid the work of two years. Northeastern Italy invaded; Italian stand on the Piave and Brenta Rivers (Asiago Plateau). French and British aid checked further enemy advance in 1917. Interallied War Council formed (Nov.)
6. Bagdad captured by a new British expedition (March 11). Restoration of British prestige in the East. Co-operation of Russian and British forces in Asia Minor and Persia. British advance from Egypt into Palestine in March; Ascalon and Jaffa taken (Nov.); Jerusalem surrendered to British, Dec. 9, 1917.
7. Revolution in Russia. Due to pro-German policy of certain members of the Russian court and the well founded suspicion that a separate peace with Germany was planned. Abdication of the Czar, March 19. Power seized from Constitutional Democrats by moderate socialists and radicals (Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates); formation of a government under Alexander Kerensky (July 22). Military power of Russia paralyzed by abolition of discipline; frequent refusals of soldiers to obey orders; "fraternizing" of the armies encouraged by German agents. Germans seized Riga (Sept. 3), and the islands at entrance to Gulf of Riga (Oct. 13-15), thus threatening Petrograd. General Kornilov failed in an attempt to seize power with a view to restoring order and prosecuting the war (Sept.).—Overthrow of Kerensky (Nov.) by extreme socialists (Bolsheviki), who repudiated Russia's obligations to the Allies, and negotiated a separate armistice with Germany with a view to an immediate peace, Dec. 15). Practical withdrawal of Russia from the war, permitting transfer of German troops to the French and Italian fronts. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Kerensky," "Lenine," "Russian Revolution," etc.)
8. Summary: Ruthless submarining imparts a more desperate character to the conflict, but brings Germany and her allies no nearer ultimate victory. Against her submarine successes, the Austro-German gains in Italy, and the Russian defection, must be set the British victories in Mesopotamia and Palestine, the Allied gains on the Western Front, and the entrance of the United States with its vast potential resources into the war.

X. PROPOSALS FOR PEACE: WILL THIS BE THE LAST WAR?

I. SUMMARY OF STATES AT WAR IN 1917.

1. The Teutonic Allies: Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey (1914); Bulgaria (1915).
 2. The Entente Allies: Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Japan (1914); Italy, San Marino (1915); Portugal, Roumania (1916); United States, Cuba, Panama, Liberia, Siam, China, Brazil (1917), Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador severed diplomatic relations with Germany (1917) without declaring war.
- II. AMERICAN AIMS IN THE WAR. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Aims of the United States," "Permanent Peace," "American Plans," "United States, Isolation of," "War Aims of the United States.")
1. Vindication of our national rights. "We enter the war only where we are clearly forced into it, because there is no other means of defending our rights." Hence war not declared at first against Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.
 2. Vindication of the rights of humanity. "Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right . . . Our object . . . is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power."
 3. Making the world safe for Liberty and Democracy. "We are glad . . . to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." (The [above quotations are from President Wilson's speech to Congress on April 2, 1917])
 4. Creation of an improved international system including a permanent League or Concert of Powers to preserve international peace. (See President Wilson's speech of January 22, 1917, as well as his speech of April 2.)
 5. Absence of selfish designs. "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the right of mankind. We shall be satisfied when these rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)
- III. VARIOUS PEACE PROPOSALS. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Lansdowne Note," "Peace Overtures, German, 1916," "Peace Overtures, Papal," "Peace Terms, American," "No Annexations, no Indemnities," etc.)
1. Offer of Germany and her allies (December 12, 1916) to meet their enemies in a peace conference (see "Official Documents Looking toward Peace" in *International Conciliation* for January, 1917). An empty and insincere proposal. They "propose to enter forthwith into

peace negotiations," but refuse to state any terms; on the other hand much is made of the "glorious deeds of our armies" and their "incomparable strength." The proposal evidently looked to a "German peace," with Germany and her allies triumphant.

Reply of the Entente Allies (December 30, 1916). The German proposal was styled "less an offer of peace than a war manoeuvre. It is founded on calculated misinterpretation of the character of the struggle in the past, the present and the future. . . . Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationality and the free existence of small states, so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world."—(*Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.)

2. President Wilson's effort (Dec. 20, 1916) to elicit peace terms from the belligerents. (See his note in *International Conciliation*, for February, 1917.)
 - (a) Germany merely repeats its proposal of December 12, still refusing to go into details in advance of a formal conference.—(*Ibid.*, p. 7.)
 - (b) The Allies reply (Jan. 10, 1917). Their statement of terms included adequate compensation for Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro; evacuation of invaded territories of France, Russia, and Rumania; reorganization of Europe on the basis of nationality; the ending of Turkish rule in Europe, etc.
3. Widespread and intense desire for peace among the German people. Evidenced, among other things, by the fall of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg (July 14, 1917) following this declaration of the Reichstag (July 13):

"As on August 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of the war the German people stand upon the assurance of the speech from the throne—"We are driven by no lust of conquest."

"Germany took up arms in defense of its liberty and independence and for the integrity of its territories. The Reichstag labors for peace and a mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation among the nations. Forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic and financial violations are incompatible with such a peace.

"The Reichstag rejects all plans aiming at an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Only an economic peace can prepare the ground for the friendly association of the peoples.

"The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international juridical organizations. So long, however, as the enemy Governments do not

accept such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and violation, the German people will stand together as one man, hold out unshaken and fight until the rights of itself and its allies to life and development are secured. The German nation united is unconquerable.

"The Reichstag knows that in this announcement it is at one with the men who are defending the Fatherland. In their heroic struggles they are sure of the undying thanks of the whole people."—(*N. Y. Times Current History*, VI, p. 195.)

It should be noted that the Reichstag has no power to conclude peace, or to initiate peace negotiations, or even to force the German Government to do so.

4. Pope Benedict XV attempts to promote Peace.

(a) His first appeal (Aug. 1915) lacked definite proposals and was without effect.

(b) His second appeal (Aug. 1, 1917) recommended: (1) "That the material force of arms shall give way to the moral force of right"; simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments; the establishing of compulsory arbitration "under sanctions to be determined against any State which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards." (2) True freedom and community of the seas. (3) Entire and reciprocal giving up of indemnities to cover the damages and cost of the war. (4) Occupied territory to be reciprocally given up; guarantees of Belgium's political, military, and economic independence; similar restitutions of the German colonies. (5) Territorial questions between Italy and Austria, and France and Germany, to be taken up after the war "in a conciliatory spirit, taking into account, as far as it is just and possible . . . the aspirations of the population." Questions of Armenia, the Balkan States, and the old Kingdom of Poland to be dealt with in the same way.—In the main this was a proposal for the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* [the conditions existing before the war]—a drawn battle.—(*N. Y. Times Current History*, September, 1917, pp. 392-293).

5. Reply of the United States to the Pope's appeal (Aug. 27, 1917). The Entente Allies practically accepted this reply as their own.

"To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by his holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy, would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference and the certain counter-revolution, which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?"

" . . . We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired,

but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on."

6. Reply of Germany (September 22, 1917). This was filled with the vaguest generalities. In part it consisted of hypocritical and lying protestations that ever since the Kaiser ascended the throne he had "regarded it as his principal and most sacred task, to preserve the blessings of peace for the German people and the world"; and that "in the crisis which led up to the present world conflagration his Majesty's efforts were up to the last moment directed towards settling the conflict by peaceful means." With reference to the substituting of "the moral power of right" for "the material power of arms", and for the reduction of armaments and the establishing of arbitration, indorsement was given the Pope's proposals in such vague and general terms as to bind the German Government to nothing.

"The Imperial Government greets with special sympathy the leading idea of the peace appeal wherein his Holiness clearly expresses the conviction that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right. . . . From this would follow, according to his Holiness' view, the simultaneous diminution of the armed forces of all states and the institution of obligatory arbitrations for international disputes.

"We share his Holiness' view that definite rules and a certain safeguard for a simultaneous and reciprocal limitation of armaments on land, on sea, and in the air, as well as for the true freedom of the community and high seas, are the things in treating which the new spirit that in the future should prevail in international relations should first find hopeful expression .

"The task would then of itself arise to decide international differences of opinion not by the use of armed forces but by peaceful methods, especially by arbitration, whose high peace-producing effect we together with his Holiness fully recognize.

"The Imperial Government will in this respect support every proposal compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people."

No notice whatever was taken of the Pope's plea for the giving up of occupied territory and the restoration of Belgium's independence. When reports were published in the German press that nevertheless the Government

was prepared to give up Belgium, the Chancellor denied this, saying (September 28):

"I declare that the Imperial Government's hands are free for eventual peace negotiations. This also refers to Belgium."

7. Formula of the Russian revolutionary Government; "No annexations and no punitive indemnities." Attempt of Socialists to promote an international conference of Socialists at Stockholm (Sweden) in September, 1917, on this basis. Failure of the conference because of (a) suspicion that pro-German influence was back of the proposal; (b) publication of proofs of pro-German and unneutral conduct on the part of Swedish diplomatic officials.

IV. WILL THIS BE THE LAST GREAT WAR? (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Arbitration," "Hague Tribunal," "International Law, Sanction of," "League to Enforce Peace," "Peace Treaties," "Permanent Peace," etc.)

1. Conflict vs. mutual aid as factors in evolution. Are States of necessity rival and conflicting organizations?
2. William James' answer to the militarists' plea for war as a school to develop character and heroism; the existence of a "moral equivalent for war." (See *International Conciliation* for February, 1910).
3. Amicable means of settling international differences. These include negotiation, good offices, mediation, international commissions of inquiry, and international arbitration. (See A. S. Hershey, *Essentials of International Law*, ch. xxi.). About 600 cases of international arbitration have been listed since 1800. Importance of developing the habit of relying on these amicable means of settling differences.
4. Proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. These include the following articles, to be signed by the nations joining the League.

"(1) All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a Judicial Tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

"(2) All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

"(3) The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

"The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized by the Executive Committee: "The signatory Powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international Judicial Tribunal or Council of Conciliation before threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory without first

submitting, or offering to submit, its grievance to the court or Council aforesaid and awaiting its conclusion.

"(4) Conferences between the signatory Powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article I."—(World Peace Foundation, *Pamphlet Series*, August, 1916.)

5. Possibility of World Federation.

- (a) Some historical antecedents—the Holy Alliance (1815); the Quadruple, later the Quintuple, Alliance (1815); the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907); the Conference at Algierias (1906).
- (b) Success of partial federations—the United States of America; Dominion of Canada, Commonwealth of Canada, and Union of South Africa; the British Empire; the German Empire; etc.
- (c) Lack of explicitness in current proposals. "Internationalists hold that nationalism is no longer expressive of the age, but that federation is not as yet feasible; that the present sovereignty of states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to change the theory suddenly. Hence, they propose internationalism, that is, a sort of confederation, a co-operative union of sovereign states, a true Concert of Powers. The individual schemes vary greatly and are usually not very explicit, chief emphasis being placed on faults of the present system."—(Edward Kriebiel, *Nationalism, War, and Society*, page 210.)

6. Indispensable elements in an effective World Federation.

- (a) The triumph of democratic government. "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith with it or observe its covenants . . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)
- (b) An international legislature. We have already the beginnings of a world legislature in the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.
- (c) An international executive authority and an international army and navy.
- (d) An international court of justice. The so-called permanent court of arbitration at the Hague (Hague Tribunal) not a real court.
7. The triumph of the United States and the Entente Allies over militarist and despotic Germany, gives the best assurance of the establishment of a League of Peace and the practical ending of war.

CHAPTER REFERENCES.

Detailed reading references to the best literature on the war have been prepared to accompany each of the preceding chapters of this Syllabus. These references will be included in the Syllabus Reprints, and also will be printed in "The History Teacher's Magazine" for February, 1918.

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